Port Moresby, 4 January 1969
National unity and secessionist movements
Reference your memorandum ‘National Unity’ ofNovember 19th 1968, with attachments,1 and your telex 8440 of 21st November 1968.2
2. The official attitude being developed here is in line with the Minister’s view that overt Administration condemnation of secessionist movements is to be avoided, but indigenous attention needs to be consistently and objectively directed to some of the salient practical problems that would result from political fragmentation.
3. In general terms, and having regard to the existing facts of tribal parochialism and prevailing indigenous ignorance of the economics of public Administration, the current little rash of secessionist movements—thus far confined to the island districts—can be assessed as one of the inevitable side-effects of the rather untidy process of rapid political evolution. There may be positive advantages in the fact that these symptoms of growing pains are occurring rather early in the life of the second House of Assembly. With careful handling it is hoped that these movements will have played themselves out before the next elections are due.
4. Informal talks by senior officials with leading Tolai members of the ‘Melanesian Independence Front’ have disclosed that indigenous thinking on the implications of secession is ill-informed and woolly, with few signs of emotional commitment. (It should be noted, however, that Mr. Melchior Tomot, who is relatively well educated and the most articulate of the Tolai M.I.F. leaders, has a very definite emotional involvement. He also has a background history of mental instability and must be regarded as an incipient psychotic.) Similarly casual discussions with other Tolai leaders not known to be actively involved with the M.I.F. indicate that the movement has not as yet any broad base of Tolai support and is being regarded rather warily by the Tolai community generally. Mr. Oscar Tammur, M.H.A., has expressed the view that Mr. S. Simpson, the Executive Officer of the Movement, is mainly interested in making the Rabaul area a pressure point to further his personal business interests, and that he has misled some of the old Tolai conservatives who were defeated in the last elections.
5. In talking to Tolai leaders Administration officials have not expressed any Government opposition to the principle of secession, but have endeavoured to promote consideration of its economic and financial implications. It appears that the elementary point that sharp increases in the overhead costs of Government must result if the 2.25 million people of the Territory establish a series of small separate States has not been put before the secessionists by any of their leaders. From these informal talks officials have also gained a general impression that:—
(a) The major task is still one of fundamental political education. Implicit in this is the need for ‘getting across’ the idea that collectively all the tribal groups of the Territory would constitute only a small country with limited resources, and that while they may not necessarily like each other, they are inextricably dependent upon each other. The analogy of the abortive secessionist move made by Western Australia in 1931 has been found useful.
(b) Most impact is made by gently posing the economic and financial problems involved in secession, including the cost of providing a spread of basic Government services that will meet indigenous needs.
(c) Emotional appeals for national unity by the Administration are not desirable. In this connection the observation in paragraph 2 of your memorandum under reference, that the adoption of too strong a position in support of national unity could be counter productive, is considered to be valid.
6. It is considered that the current movements on New Britain and New Ireland are not at present matters for major concern, but that care will need to be taken to avoid them developing an emotional content. The situation on Bougainville, which has its seeds in local factors going back many years, already exhibits some emotionalism and will be more difficult to handle. As you are aware, it is intended to pay some special attention to the Bougainville district within the next few weeks.3
[NAA: A452, 1971/2197]
1 Document 242.
2 See footnote 8, Document 246. The telex also implied doubt as to the Administration’s handling of the Lapun bill in the House and it quoted portions of Document 242 (NAA: A452, 1968/50 13).
3 See footnote 16, Document 243.