Canberra, 15 January 1969
0.3295 Restricted
United Nations debates on Papua and New Guinea
In All Posts Savingram 82 of 25th August, 1968,1 we sought the assistance of our Missions in making representations about recent United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Papua and New Guinea. As an outcome of a number of contributing factors, including representations made in a number of overseas capitals and lobbying by our Mission and Delegation in New York, the debate and voting on Papua and New Guinea at the most recent session of the Assembly saw a favourable shift in attitudes towards, and understanding of, the Australian position; and it may now be appropriate to express our appreciation to some governments for their direct or tacit support. An account and analysis of the debate on2 the voting is given below for posts to use as guidance in determining whether and how to express appreciation.
2. At its preceding regular sessions in 1966 and 1967 the Assembly adopted resolutions on Papua and New Guinea which were based on doctrinaire and emotional views about colonialism, and which made false assumptions about conditions in the Territory.3 The resolutions were completely unacceptable to us because, inter alia, of their implications of bad motives, their unrealistic demands, and their failure to pay any heed to the known interests and wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. This year a number of developments—the three-yearly United Nations Visiting Mission to New Guinea, the second general elections and introduction of a limited ministerial system, and announcement of the $1,000 million five-year development programme4—together with what may be growing appreciation of the differences between Pacific dependencies and former colonies in other regions, created conditions for a new examination by the world body of Australia’s administration of the Territory. These factors were assisted by the failure, for primarily administrative reasons, of the Committee of Twenty–four to engage in a lengthy debate or to adopt a mischievous report about the Territory this year; and by the decision of the Chairman of the Fourth Committee to lump ten items, including the question of Papua and New Guinea, into a general debate rather than take each one in order at the most recent Assembly meeting.
3. The outcome was that in the general debate few references were made to Papua and New Guinea. In addition to our own representative, those of Liberia and France (both of whom provided members of the 1968 Visiting Mission) and the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United States, Turkey, Greece, Canada and Malaysia spoke favourably about our administration, while criticism was mostly confined to portions of more general statements on decolonisation issues. At the same time a number of representatives, notably those of Greece, were active in the lobbies advocating a more reasonable attitude towards our policies and administration. In the Afro-Asian caucus and its drafting group, a number of African and Asian countries (especially Liberia, but also Ghana, India, Madagascar and Ethiopia) appear to have worked for a shift from previous resolutions to a more realistic and accommodating draft on Papua and New Guinea, the result of which was an open break in Afro-Asian unity when two separate drafts were tabled and adopted, by simple majorities, in the Fourth Committee. (The full text of both are set out as annexes)5 Unfortunately the end result was the adoption in plenary of the resolution which we opposed; and failure of the second resolution, which we supported, to muster a two-thirds majority. The result, nevertheless, represented a marked improvement in our position and has given cause for optimism that continued concerted approaches could lead to a further shift in attitudes and voting at the next Assembly meeting later this year.
4. The resolution adopted was originally sponsored by five Arab states—Sudan, U.A.R., Morocco, Tunisia, and Somalia—after arguments and differences within the Afro-Asian group. It was later co–sponsored by 21 other African and Arab States—Zambia, Mali, Syria, Burundi, Yemen, Sierra Leone, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Uganda, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Dahomey, Tanzania, Southern Yemen, Upper Volta, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Mauritania, Algeria—but one of these, Sierra Leone, subsequently withdrew its sponsorship. The resolution, referred to in some communications as the ‘Afro–Arab’ draft:—
i. re-affirmed the right of the people of Papua and New Guinea to self-determination and independence;
ii. regretted that Australia had not fully implemented Resolution 1514 (XV)6 and other resolutions relating to the Territory;
iii. called upon Australia to implement fully Resolution 1514 (XV), and to this end, to,
a. fix an early date for self-determination and independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people of the Territory, and
b. hold free elections under United Nations supervision on the basis of universal adult suffrage in order to transfer effective power to the representatives of the people of the Territory; and
iv. requested Australia to report in this regard to the Trusteeship Council and the Committee of Twenty–four, who are to report thereon to the next session of the General Assembly.
5. While we opposed the resolution as a whole, and took particular exception to disregard of the known inhabitants’ wishes in regard to the timing of self-determination and independence, and to the call for new elections ‘under United Nations supervision’, it does not
i. re–affirm Resolutions 2227 (XXI)7 and 2348 (XXII),8 thus breaking from the pre-existing framework of reproof;
ii. make implications of discriminatory practices, condoned or otherwise; and
iii. make any reference to military activities.
Apart from the injection of the call for free elections ‘under United Nations supervision’ (the phrase in quotes being the result of a last minute tactical compromise between moderates and Arabs in the Afro-Asian caucus) the new resolution is consequently more moderate and less objectionable than the two preceding resolutions about the Territory—a fact which was noted and strongly criticised by the Soviet Union spokesmen in the Fourth Committee. It was however more radical than the second draft, and attracted wide support from the African, Asian and Latin American members—some of whom also voted in favour of the second resolution—as well as communist states. There was nevertheless a noticeable decrease in support for the resolution compared with 1967 (i.e., thirteen fewer affirmative votes than for Resolution 2348 despite three new African members) especially amongst Asian states, and an increase of three in negative votes despite the more moderate tone.
6. In the Fourth Committee the Afro-Arab draft was approved by 65 in favour, 14 against and 17 abstentions. Two days later it was adopted in plenary by 72–19–24 with 10 absent …
[matter omitted]
7. The second draft was sponsored by Liberia despite pressure from other African and Arab states for its withdrawal. The Liberian representative was Mr Fahnwulu Caine, Director of International Organisation Affairs, State Department, Liberia, who had been a member of the 1968 Visiting Mission to New Guinea, who stood by the reports and recommendations of the Mission and the following Trusteeship Council meeting, and sought to present a resolution which would help the people of Papua and New Guinea and reflect fairly on Australian efforts. This draft, if it had been adopted, would have:
i. re-affirmed the inalienable right of the people of Papua and New Guinea to self-determination and independence;
ii. noted the report of the Trusteeship Council for 1967/68, and the recommendations of the 1968 Visiting Mission to New Guinea;
iii. called on Australia to take steps to transfer effective executive and legislative powers to the elected representatives of the people;
iv. requested that Australia accelerate indigenization of the Public Service and give local people greater administrative responsibility in the government structure; and
v. proposed that the United Nations give all help to the people of Papua and New Guinea freely to decide their own future.
8. The draft was supported by Australia (although we would have abstained in a separate vote on (iii) above) but was opposed by the Arab bloc (except Tunisia), the Communists (except Yugoslavia) and some other states possibly acting out of adherence to radical decolonisation attitudes rather than with regard to reality. The voting was 61 in favour, 37 against, 17 abstentions and 10 absent, after a vote of 41–37–17 in the Fourth Committee. A shift of five states from opposition to support would have given the draft the two-thirds majority required for adoption of resolutions concerning operation of the trusteeship system.
[matter omitted]
[NAA: A 1838, 936/3/19 part 1]
Reaction in PNG to the United Nations resolution of 1968
On 14 March 1969, the House of Assembly passed a motion sponsored by Ebia Olewale, MHAfor South Fly open, which ‘noted’ the resolution passed by the General Assembly on 18 December 1968 and also the ‘more realistic resolution sponsored by Liberia’.1 Olewale’S motion declared to the UN and ‘interested parties’ that the members of the House were ‘already elected in free elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage and that the resolution passed by the UN was thus already out-of-date’. The motion also reaffirmed a House resolution of 1964 which conveyed to Australia and the UN the ‘expressed wish of the people that they, the people, and they alone, be allowed to decide when the time is ripe for self-government in Papua and New Guinea, and the form that such government will take and the people’S further firm conviction that the road to self-government can be best traveled with one guide—and that one guide the Administering Authority, and that undue pressure from without can only lead to that disruption, chaos and bloodshed which the people have observed with great alarm in certain newly independent countries’.
Considerable debate ensued among Australian officials as to the best means, tactically speaking, of communicating the House’S views to the UN. While wanting the wishes of the House to be given maximum impact, there was concern that the exercise might appear contrived.2 Eventually, it was decided that the ‘correct constitutional position should be maintained’—the resolution would pass to the Australian Government and from there to the presidents of the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly.3 The rationale was subsequently explained to the Australian mission in New York:
We are not endeavouring to suppress or restrict the right of petition given a trust territory. In fact our interest in this case has been related primarily to the manner by which we could ensure that the resolution reached the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly as specifically mentioned in it … What we want to do is to establish insofar as we can a desirable procedure in a case of this particular kind as a precedent for similar cases in future (for example resolutions relating to West Irian). It is not our intention however to establish any inflexible posture with regard to them.4
1 Not printed.
2 This word should apparently read ‘and’.
3 See editorial note ‘The United Nations resolution on PNG, 1966’ and Document 153.
4 See, for example, Document 210 and editorial note ‘Changes to the Papua New Guinea Act’.
5 Not printed.
6 See footnote 7, Document 14.
7 See editorial note ‘The United Nations resolution on PNG, 1966’.
8 See footnote 2, Document 153.
1 Cablegram UN390, DEA to UNNY, 7 May 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/4/11 part 2. (For context, see Document 252.) Olewale’s motion came on the heels of a motion by Lussick, which declared ‘that this House [I] rejects, as an unwarranted insult to its Members, the Administration and the people of this Territory, the resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly calling for elections under United Nations supervision: [2] considers that the resolution is utterly unjustified by the facts and could tend to undermine our confidence in the professed good intentions of the United Nations Organization towards this Territory and [3] commends the stand taken by the Liberian Government whose delegate stood firmly by what he knew, from personal observation, to be the facts’. Lussick’s motion was adopted unanimously (savingram 17, DEA to UNNY, 11 March 1969, ibid.). Barnes, for his part, had condemned the UN resolution as ‘an affront to the [PNG] people themselves as well as to the [Australian] Government’ (press statement by Barnes, 19 December 1968, NAA: A1838, 936/3/5).
2 See, for example, minute, G.J.L. Coles (Political Affairs Section, UN Branch, DEA) to Petherbridge and Booker, 29 April 1969; cablegram UN637, UNNY to Canberra, 17 May 1969; cablegram UN680, UNNY to Canberra, 29 May 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/4/11 part 2.
3 Cablegram 462, DEA to UNNY, 25 May 1969, NAA: A6366, UN 1969/05T.
4 Cablegram 483, DEA io UNNY, 30 May 1969, ibid.