255

Cablegram, Loveday To Dea

Djakarta, 5 February 1969

284. Secret

West Irian: TPNG1

Our 257.2 Malik fixed for me to see him at mid-day Tuesday.3 I called on Soepardjo earlier that morning and ran through the story with him to prepare the ground for Malik. Soepardjo took it all very sensibly but at one stage expressed concern at the way our newspapers were playing up border matters and asked whether we could do something to stop it. I explained why we could not (see below).

2. I then saw Malik to whom Soepardjo had reported. I explained, and Malik fully accepted, that my call was wholly in the context of maintaining frank discussion with a view to minimizing any possibilities of awkward situations developing, in this case as a consequence of apparent increased military patrolling near the West Irian side of the border. I then picked up Soepardjo’s point about publicity saying that if people crossed the border the news could not be prevented from getting out, to the press, to TPNG politicians and to the UNHCR. This was a fact of life which Indonesia would no doubt wish to consider in deciding the extent to which she tried to clean up her side of the border through military activity. Active patrolling could well result in increased crossings into TPNG and consequent new publicity. Moreover whereas we could turn back people who crossed for economic reasons, it would be a very different situation if the crossers could claim they were fugitives from armed pursuit. A further point was that active patrolling would increase the risk of patrols inadvertently crossing the border of which there were reports of two cases in January, and there was the ultimate danger of contact and incidents with Australian patrols.

3. Malik took this very well. He said that earlier in the morning he had checked with Sudjarwo (his special representative for West Irian) who had assured him that no military operations were going on near the border. Malik said however that you could not always believe what the military told you and said that many of them were prone to think that the best way to solve things was with a gun.

[ matter omitted ]4

4. Malik said that accordingly he would get Sudjarwo to send off a signal straightway to West Irian saying that if it were feasible no more operations were to take place near the border. Malik said it would be better if such a halt could be maintained until ascertainment was over, but in any event he would say that no operations should take place until after he himself had visited the area, which he hoped to do soon in company with the new Minister for the Interior (Amir Machmud) who was ‘very military’ in his activities and needed to be ‘educated’. General Basuki Rachmat, the former minister, had been much more civilian than military and his death was a great loss.5 Malik repeated that he was glad that the military commander on the spot was Sarwo Edhie, and said he would like us to continue to keep him closely informed of any developments as a check on what was actually going on near the West Irian border.

5. At an earlier stage of the discussion Malik said that if some active patrolling were militarily necessary, it would be important for the patrol to have careful orders to avoid crossing the border and preferably for our people to have advance notice of what was happening. In this he was echoing an idea put up by Soepardjo earlier as a personal comment that the time might be coming for the patrols on both sides of the border to know of each other’s movements and what each side’s ‘standing operation procedures’ were. r did not express a view on the desirability of this since I was concerned to press for damping down or eliminating armed operations altogether in the border area. There is always the danger too that the Indonesians would seek to engage us in ‘joint operations’ against the dissidents which is what I would assume they would like. However the nature of the discussion opens up a logical way in which to pass on to Soepardjo the substance of the recently decided principles governing PIR patrols (your letter of 22nd January)6 and I now think it would be desirable to move in this direction. I would have had some concern about springing this on the Indonesians cold, but the way the situation is developing I consider it could [all]7 happen in a natural way and without exciting undue suspicion.8

[NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 4]

1 In a cablegram of 2 February, DEA communicated to Loveday reports of ‘increasing Indonesian activity in the border area’ against lrianese dissidents. Operations had allegedly occurred on both the Irian and PNG sides of the border. The cable concluded: ‘You will appreciate that armed operations in the area immediately adjacent to the border could well result in increased crossing of dissident elements into TPNG and also inadvertent infringements of the border by Indonesian troops … We are seeking to check and verify the reports as far as practicable but separating out rumour and fact is obviously difficult. We do not wish to exaggerate the situation but it seems advisable for you to have a discreet talk with Malik about the policing activities of the Indonesian patrols in these areas in order to minimise any possibilities of awkward situations developing’ (cablegram 284, NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 part 12).

2 Not printed.

3 That is, 4 February.

4 Matter omitted refers to Malik’s recollection of an incident in which he had persuaded Sarwo Edhie ‘to use persuasion [rather] than force’. Malik said Sar.vo Edhie—who had ‘matured a lot’ prior to his Irian appointment—had accepted his advice and would be open to further guidance.

5 Rachmat died in early January 1969.

6 On 17 January, the Department of the Army despatched to the PNG Command instructions for” ‘a situation when contact with a foreign patrol on the Eastern side of the border is unavoidable’ (the instructions amplified those of June 1967—see footnote 9, Document 213). PIR commanders were instructed to act in accordance with the principles of ’a. Speed [of reporting and reaction on the ground]. b. Adoption of appropriate formation and posture. c. Warning (i.e., non-violent persuasion). d. Use of minimum force. e. Domination of the area [by observing retreating forces]’. Commanders were asked to use ‘only that action which is necessary … If he must reply to fire … no more ammunition than is required to stabilize the position will be used’. They were also instructed to place their patrol between fleeing refugees and Indonesian forces if the parties were obviously distinguishable and on the Australian side of the border (attachment to memorandum, Army (White) to DEA, 17 January 1969, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 6).

7 Editorial interpretation. Word corrupted in the original.

8 For further discussions in DEA on this idea, see minute, M.G.M. Bourchier (Head, Malaysia and Indonesia Section, DEA) to Osborn, 13 February 1969, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 4.