Canberra, 28 March 1969
Confidential
T.P.N.G: The Arek Motion for a Select Committee on Constitutional Development2
1. Historical
1.1 Arek became publicly committed to moving a motion to establish a Constitutional Committee in January, 1969 at a press interview.
1.2 Following an exchange of telex messages and discussions between the Secretary and the Administrator, the attitude approved by the Minister to the motion was—
• prefer the motion should not be introduced or, if introduced, defeated.
• if not practicable to avoid establishment of Select Committee, official members should take action to concentrate work of Committee on aspects of constitutional development not related to political advancement in the executive area.
• if unlikely that acceptable terms of reference can be secured preferable to leave terms of reference in wide and vague terms.
• official members need not vote against motion and at Administrator’s discretion may support motion if terms of reference are not related to political advancement in executive area.
• Select Committee to include Johnson and second official member in respect of whom specific advice is required.
1.3 The above policy was notified to the Administrator by telex 2485 of 27th February, 1969.3
1.4 Arek moved his motion on 12th March, 1969.4 On the previous day a departmental telex (2863) was dispatched seeking advice on latest developments on the motion and asking for confirmation ‘that official members will be able to pursue lines indicated in our previous telex messages’.5 The Administration replied on 12th March saying ‘we will be able to pursue lines indicated by you’.
1.5 On 11 th March when I mentioned the motion to Mr Henderson in Port Moresby, he thought it was innocuous and that there was nothing in it to which official members could take exception.
2. Attitude towards the motion
2.1 The motion having been introduced, present policy is to defeat the motion or, if this is not practicable, to ensure the terms of reference are related to constitutional developments and not political advancement in the executive area.
2.2 The motion as it stands is not contrary to policy in the event that it succeeds. The question remaining to be answered therefore is whether the motion can be defeated.
2.3 For defeat to be secured, the support of the ‘independent group’6 would be necessary. Whether this support would be forthcoming could be established only by canvassing the leaders (Watts, Neville, Lussick). This will take time.
2.4 In another paper I have discussed the membership of the Committee if it is set up.7 To arrange membership favourable to the Government would also take time.
2.5 Clearly, it is necessary to decide whether the motion can be defeated before indulging in any necessary lobbying as to membership. A little more than two months remain before the next meeting of the House when the debate on the motion is to resume. The time factor is thus of paramount importance.
2.6 In the event that the Administration believes the motion can be defeated and it is decided to oppose the motion, lobbying for membership of the Committee would seem undesirable and unnecessary. There is always the danger however that a last minute change of heart could occur in the House and the motion could be agreed to. If this occurred, there would be little time for lobbying and a Committee with a minority of Government ‘sympathizers’ could be formed as a result of pressure group tactics on Arek (assuming Arek would move the motion for membership).
2.7 If the motion is defeated on this occasion, it is unlikely that the present House will not again be faced with a similar motion (possibly after two years of its life) and the terms of that motion might be far less acceptable than the present motion. Even if the terms of a future motion were the same as the present motion, all that would be achieved by defeating the present motion would be to have antagonized some members of the House who could otherwise be ‘Government supporters’.
2.8 There seems more to be gained therefore by not opposing, perhaps even supporting, if divisions are called, the motion than opposing it—particularly if membership of the Committee is arranged so that it is receptive to Government suggestions.
2.9 It seems therefore that policy needs to be reviewed without delay so that tactics may be decided. This is in line with para. 2 of telex 768 … 8
2.10 On the question of policy concerning membership of official members, policy originated it seems from the Administrator’s telex 1102 of 14th February9 in which he said in para. 6 ‘I would favour at the most one official member (probably Johnson)’. Possibly the Administrator did not envisage a Committee comprising 14 members (as proposed) when he favoured only one official member. My paper on membership covers this aspect.10
[NAA: A452, 1969/1135]
1 R.E. Vizard, Investigation Officer, Government and Constitutional Section, DOET.
2 See footnotes I and 2, Document 258. In March, Arek spoke with Hay about constitutional development. He told Hay that the ‘United Nations would be much better occupied checking from time to time on the effectiveness of the development programme and the extent to which it was being carried out by the Administration, than they were now in pressing for early independence … he had spoken on these lines to African leaders’. As to a date for independence, Arek suggested to Hay that ‘a target date of 20 years “with some flexibility” would, if set by the Government, give a firm guideline and enable planning for the necessary training and experience to take place in a realistic framework. He said that if 20 years proved to be unrealistic then it would be easy enough to change the target and set it back another I 0 years. Mr. Arek said that it was better for him to get in first with a proposal for 20 years, than for some other more radical Member to propose a much shorter period. He agreed that it would also be possible to set it forward if that were the prevailing wish. He said he had no ambition himself for the period after independence, because on his own proposal he would be over 60 by the time it came’. Hay wrote that his impression of Arek was ‘a favourable one’ and he recommended that Arek be included ‘in any short list for further appointments to Ministerial office’ (letter, Hay to Barnes, 24 March 1969, NAA: M78, M–A10).
3 Not printed.
4 A summary of proceedings in the House of Assembly noted that on ‘11 th March Arek … gave notice of a motion proposing that “A select committee be appointed to consider ways and means of presenting and preparing, and to draft for the consideration of this House, a set of constitutional proposals to serve as a guide for future constitutional development in the Territory”. The committee would consist of 14 members, have power to sit during any adjournment of the House, make progress reports from time to time and present a final report to the House at or before its second last meeting’(savingram AP141, DEA to all posts, 23 April 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/4/11 part 2).
5 Not printed.
6 See Document 200.
7 Vizard had suggested, inter alia, that the committee consist of 14 members, as had the previous Select Committee on Constitutional Development. Specifically, he proposed that there be three official members, two ‘level headed rational’ expatriate members, one member of Pangu, and seven indigenous elected members. Of this last group it was recommended that it exclude the Speaker and Ministerial and Assistant Ministerial Members. Of the remaining members, it was thought that ‘provided three selections are made from Highlands electorates and are not Pangu, the Committee would be weighted advantageously to the Government’ (minute, Vizard to Kirkpatrick, dated ‘3/69’, NAA: A452, 1969/1135).
8 29 January, Warwick Smith to Hay. Paragraph two explained that Barnes would be happy to see Arek’s proposal dropped but that it ‘would be quite another question whether, if the proposal were pursued to the point of being introduced in the House of Assembly, it ought then to be opposed’ (ibid.).
9 Not printed.
10 Referring to his suggestion of three official members, Vizard had suggested that there should be three official members, as had been the case with the previous select committee. He had argued that a ‘smaller number may lead to difficulties in case of illness or inability to attend meetings, etc’ while a ‘greater number could invite criticism having regard to the precedent established in the 1965 committee’. Vizard also believed that failure to include official members carried risks ‘that the Government’s view will not be expressed constantly and clearly to the committee’; ‘that the Committee might be unduly influenced by pressure groups’; ‘of insufficient consideration of some important aspects’; ‘of dominance by strong personalities among Committee members over weaker members’; ‘that important information concerning the Committee’s activities and views will not be available to the Government’; and ‘that the influence of the Committee will be without a steadying influence’ (minute, Vizard to Kirkpatrick, dated ‘3/69’, NAA: A452, 1969/1135).