Canberra, 30 April 1969
Secret
West Irian Border: record of meetings with External Affairs and Defence
[ matter omitted ]2
West Irian border crossers
2. It was agreed that:
• despite larger influxes, no change warranted in policy of confining grant of permissive residence to persons in danger because of political activities;
• possible need, however, for change in handling arrangements because of
- processing difficulties resulting from larger numbers
- problem of returning cases to West Irian if border continually manned by Indonesian police
• would, therefore, be desirable to streamline procedures so as to establish immediately
- those to be returned to West Irian
- those to be considered for permissive residency
- and, in relation to the latter, enable quick decision on application for permissive residence to be made
• it was also desirable to establish separate holding camps for the various categories and move those granted permissive residence into the resettlement stage as rapidly as possible;
• maintain present attitude of keeping Representative U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva informed.
Political activities of West Irianese permissive residents
3. It was agreed
• scope for imposing further restraints severely limited by Territory law,3 refugees’ convention and attitude of some leading M.H.A.s.4 (Malik has been informed of this and understands position.);
• talk of preparations for insurrection unlikely to lead to trouble because of lack of physical resources and finance;
• External Affairs to inform Indonesian Government that M.H.A.s, particularly those sympathetic to the West lrianese cause, tend to be outspoken and there is nothing we can do to curb this.5
[ matter omitted ]6
Placement of PIR detachments at border posts
7. This Department’s representatives expressed concern that, although situation appeared to have calmed down since weekend7 incursions similar to that at Wutung could occur again, perhaps in even larger strength, and Administration resources on the spot might be inadequate. Moreover, Brimob8 more heavily armed than Administration police.
8. External Affairs and Defence made the following points:
- in the incident at Wutung Brimob party had withdrawn even though Administration officer and police who confronted them were unarmed
- border posts have now been considerably strengthened with armed police
- a further 250 police were available at 24 hours’ notice and could be drawn on if Administration still had doubts
- handling of such incursions essentially a police function and government policy generally was that Army should assist only as a last resort
- any substantial movement of PIR into border areas might be regarded as provocative by Brimob
- present Army instructions9 did not permit PIR assistance to Administration forces except in case of an unavoidable contact; i.e., they could not assist, without specific authority, if an Administration patrol deliberately confronted intruders
- Indonesian Government has given assurances that such incidents unlikely to recur and time should be allowed for these assurances to take effect
- in any event military forces were already available close to the border and could be moved in quickly in an emergency
9. This Department took the view that an obvious presence of troops in the border could have a stabilising effect rather than cause provocation.10. It also saw a difference between using military forces in aid of the civil power in a situation of domestic violence and using them to deal with foreign armed intruders crossing the border into our Territory. While it accepted that, in the former situation, forces could only be used as a last resort, it is considered that the last resort principle need not apply in the latter case.
10. The Defence representative replied that, without special government approval, action by the PIR would have to be confined to the circumstances outlined in the present Army instruction relating to contacts with armed foreign patrols in the border area.
11. In view of the considerations outlined above, the External Affairs and Defence representatives considered posting of PIR detachments at border posts was not warranted at this stage. Defence undertook, however, to examine in consultation with Army, the possibility and desirability of stepping up PIR patrols in border districts and concentrating them in special areas over the next three or four months.
Army instructions to PIR patrols
12.
• Defence representative made it clear that current instructions which envisaged PIR assistance to Administration patrols in dealing with foreign army or police patrols on our side of the border related solely to a situation when contact with such a patrol was unavoidable. They did not cover a situation where a PIR detachment had been deliberately placed at a border patrol post as a back-up to Administration police or situations where an Administration patrol deliberately intercepted or confronted a patrol from West Irian—an action which, of course, the Administration patrol would normally be bound to take.
• In other words the PIR could not at present, without specific government agreement, assist an Administration patrol to carry out its police functions but could merely help it to withdraw from a difficult situation. The instructions had been issued as an interim measure pending receipt oftheAdministration’s plans on which depended the drawing up of complete contingency plans for services’ assistance to the Administration in border situations beyond Administration’s capacity to handle.
• This Department pointed out that when these plans were being drawn up the scope of the action the PIR would be permitted to take would have to be expanded.
• It was agreed that this matter would have to be fully canvassed and instructions considered further in the course of preparing the joint service plans.
[NAA: A1838, 3034110/1/4 part 5]
1 The record appears under cover of a memorandum, DOET (Besley) to DEA, 2 May 1969. Besley indicated that the record had been cleared orally with DEA and Defence (NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 5).
2 Matter omitted indicates that DOET discussed paragraphs 2 and 3 below with DEA and the remainder with both departments.
3 In February, Besley had noted that ‘the Crown Law people in the Territory now say that the conditions we have imposed on permissive residents have no legal force whatever’ (minute, Besley to Legge and Galvin,13 February 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/18).
4 In early January, DEA had complained to Territories about a letter addressed to Hasluck by lrianese activists in PNG. The letter was considered ‘the most flagrant breach to date of the undertaking on political activities given by West lrianese permissive residents’, and DOETwas warned that ‘Unless effective counter-measures are taken, there is the possibility that our relations with the Indonesian Government could suffer considerable damage’ (memorandum, DEA (Jockel) to DOET, 6 January 1969, ibid.). Besley replied that lrianese activists were being watched, but that actions beyond warning them to avoid political activity would have undesirable political repercussions in the Territory (memorandum, DOET (Besley) to DEA, 19 February 1969, NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 part 14). Aside from Somare’s interest in the Irian issue (see footnote 19, Document 246), Guise had written to Barnes ‘as a Papuan in very deep distress’ about the ‘news that our brothers across the border are to be hunted and killed by the best troops that the Indonesian republic has got’. He pled with Barnes: ‘use your influence to get the United Nations to act’ (12 December 1968, NAA: A452, 1969/18).
5 DEA forwarded to the Embassy in Djakarta reports that ‘illustrate[d] typical attitudes’ of MHAs toward the Indonesian administration of Irian and the refugee question. An accompanying comment read: ‘The assumption made by members about the state of affairs in West Irian are certainly adverse even if not expounded, and it may be supposed that if the members knew more about it they would be more directly censorious. A conversation I had with Michael Somare on 31st March confirmed the impression one gets from these speeches and conversations around the Territory that to him and most of his countrymen West Irian is remote and of rather small interest. The fact that their kinsmen are being roughly used is regretted on humanitarian grounds, but the denial of independence makes little impression. This may change when the concept of independence comes to mean more than it does at present to the citizens of TPNG, but it is not now a political fact’ (memorandum, DEA (Bourchier) to Djakarta, 2 May 1969, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 5).
6 Matter omitted is a discussion of border contingency plans, which DOET said were soon to be completed by the Administration. Defence said it was engaged in joint service planning on the basis of a draft plan by the Administration.
7 See Document 264.
8 Indonesian police mobile brigade.
9 See footnote 6, Document 255.
10 Hay spoke with Besley on I May, telling him that ‘he had just returned [from the border] and was satisfied that [the] temperature seemed to be falling’. He argued that there were ‘too many people in the border area getting in each others’ way and would like to reduce staff there’—a plan that Besley tried to discourage: ‘If we now appeared to be backing off too fast other departments might rest on their oars and let the finalisation of planning drag on too long. In any case the departmental view was that there should be some reinforcement of the border for the next several months—the Minister was also of this mind’ (minute, Besley to Warwick Smith, 1 May 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2608).