Canberra, 9 May 1969
Secret
Papua and New Guinea
National unity and public order
The purpose of this submission is to seek Cabinet’s approval of a proposed attitude towards present or future secession movements in parts of Papua and New Guinea and generally towards national unity in the Territory; and towards questions of public order that could arise in this connection.1
Background
2. Since 1949 Papua and New Guinea has been administered as one unit. Before the War New Guinea was administered from Rabaul and Papua from Port Moresby. Under the German administration New Guinea was also administered from Rabaul.
3. Our current policies for political, economic and social development and in particular the economic development programme are all based upon the concept of one Administration. Historical considerations and ethnic, language and geographical factors, however, all militate against unity.
4. Some months ago there was talk in the Rabaul area about separation of New Britain and the New Guinea islands area from the mainland and a political party was formed to work for this.2 Little has been heard of this party recently. In parts of Bougainville, however, there is a traditional feeling of separateness from the rest of the Territory. With the land requirements of C.R.A. for the copper project increasing in recent months the initial hostility towards the intrusion by that company into particular areas of Bougainville is still apparent in some areas and there has been a considerable amount of discussion about secession from the Territory.3
5. Ownership of land is an emotional issue among the native people. Financial compensation or offers of resettlement elsewhere are not always acceptable to the people directly concerned. Until C.R.A. has entered into occupation of the land that it requires, difficulties with the native people including in some areas opposition to the acquisition of land or pressure for secession may be expected.
6. The latest report of the Territory Intelligence Committee in Annex A4 indicates that a call for independence for Bougainville may shortly be made. The Administrator with the Minister’s authority has made a strong statement calling for unity in the light of the benefits which flow to the whole of the Territory from the project. He considers the situation is under control.
7. The adjustments which the people of Bougainville are being called upon to make are adjustments of the same kind as those which the Government’s policies for economic development will require in other places. If the C.R.A. project is allowed to falter the Government’s policy for the economic, social and political development which has been operating on the basis of co-operation on the part of the House of Assembly and the people of the Territory will be placed in jeopardy. The approach underlying the economic development programme approved last year would have to be re-appraised. This is apart from the fact that the Administration could in terms of the Agreement ratified by Ordinance of the House of Assembly also be liable to pay substantial damages to C.R.A.
8. The Bougainville copper project is the only enterprise at present under way which will make a major if not dominant contribution to accelerated economic growth and so provide a sounder economic foundation for progress towards self government. Natural resources exploited in other parts of the Territory similarly help to establish the economic basis for self government for the Territory as a whole.
9. In November last the House of Assembly passed a resolution calling for national unity.5 Bishops of the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches have similarly stressed the need for national unity. The Trusteeship Agreement is drawn in relation to the present area of the Territory and it is highly unlikely that any variation of the Agreement could be got through the United Nations.
10. The political problems arising from C.R.A.’s operations in Bougainville are likely to be debated in June in the House of Assembly. They could also be raised at the Trusteeship Council later this month. So far official statements have stressed the advantage of national unity. However I consider that if the issue remains a live one or if it becomes acute it should be made clear that the Government’s attitude is that secession of any part of the Territory cannot be accepted at this stage of the Territory’s development.
11. As already indicated the Administrator considers that the situation is under control Nevertheless the possibility of passive or even active resistance to the occupation of land in connection with the C.R.A. project cannot be discounted nor can the possibility be ruled out that a secessionist campaign will develop. I think it unlikely that any situation will arise which is beyond the resources of the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary assisted as necessary by the Reserve Constabulary. Nevertheless the possibility, however remote, of a situation developing which could require the deployment of elements of the P.I.R. needs to be borne in mind. Police strength is being called upon to an unusual degree at the present time to strengthen border posts in connection with the approaching act of ascertainment in West Irian.
12. While the latent possibilities of the Bougainville situation provide an immediate cause for reconsidering the arrangements, the recommendations set out below are couched in quite general terms so that they would have effect for any move for secession in New Britain or elsewhere in the Territory if this were necessary.
13. In Decision No. 329 of 19666 Cabinet gave its approval for planning to be put in hand for the provision of military assistance as a last resort. This approval was given in the context of the possible need to seek aid from Defence Forces in Australia. In the circumstances now envisaged any aid to the civil power would be expected to come from the Pacific Islands Regiment.
Recommendation
14. It is therefore recommended that—
(a) the Minister for External Territories be authorized to express the Government’s attitude towards unity of Papua and New Guinea on the following lines—
(i) the Government has since last war administered the two territories as one single administrative unit and the economic development programme is based on the Territory as a single unit;
(ii) that the House of Assembly, the authorized bodies of Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches and other responsible opinion in the Territory have endorsed the need for national unity;
(iii) that so far as New Guinea is concerned the Trust Agreement with the United Nations is founded upon the concept of the present Trust Territory of New Guinea;
(iv) that the Government does not accept that any move towards secession would be in the Territory’s interest at this stage of its development; if in the future a question of this kind arises it would be a matter for determination by all the people of the Territory.
(b) Cabinet endorse arrangements under which, at the request of the Minister for External Territories and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence may recommend to the Governor-General that authority be given to deploy elements of the Pacific Islands Regiment to guard important points or as a last resort to back up the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary if this should become necessary to maintain public order.7
[NAA: A5868, 577]
1 Hay ‘strongly support[ed]’ Barnes’ decision to consult Cabinet on Bougainville separatism, though he wrote that the current law and order problem related to ‘resistance to loss of land’, which had been ‘a manageable problem’ that did not seem to have ‘strengthened the hand of separatists’. On the other hand, he thought that ‘If the threat of separatism becomes more serious, involving demonstrations and perhaps violence on a widespread scale in Bougainville … then we shall need authority to use force if necessary … we should … need to have available an accession of police strength and/or authority to use the armed forces. I consider it urgent that the Government should consider whether that authority should remain subject to the present impediments. The army is for the foreseeable future our available reserve against sudden and substantial outbreaks of violence, particularly where they happen simultaneously in widely separated areas’ (telex 3347, Hay to Warwick Smith, 9 May 1969, NAA: M1868, 3).
2 See Documents 234, 236 and 240.
3 Following the development of a multi-faceted public relations plan for Bougainville (see footnotes 2 and 16, Document 243), Hay had written in April to Newby: ‘While it is recognized that a good deal is already being done, political education efforts need to be stepped up. The underlying theme of most political education material used should be “unity”, i.e. the advantages to be gained, as opposed to the disadvantages and dangers of secession’. Hay advocated ‘optimum use … of Radio Bougainville in its propaganda role of furthering the Administration’s current unity campaign on Bougainville’. ‘Essentially’, he concluded, ‘there is a need for an accelerated and co-ordinated propaganda campaign which will demand a good deal of back-up support and guidance from the headquarters level’ (minute, Hay to Newby, 22 April 1969, M1866, 4). For a summary of the evolution of ‘political education teams’ to April 1969, see undated paper by unidentified DOET officer, NAA: A452, 1968/5563.
4 Not printed.
5 See Document 246.
6 See footnote 2, Document 50.
7 An interdepartmental meeting discussed the submission on 14 May. The Departments of Prime Minister, Defence, Army and External Affairs said the submission did not contain enough information for a decision to be made on the recommendation in 14(b). In particular, these departments were unclear as to whether Barnes sought approval for use of the PIR as ‘a supplementary police force to maintain law and order in Bougainville’ or as ‘a military force to put down a secessionist movement’. DEA was not keen on the use of the PIR to maintain civil order as it ‘would be certain to attract international attention and criticism’. DEA believed both order and the maintenance of the Territory’s integrity were best managed by the Administration—and all departmental representatives, bar that of DOET, thought it desirable to undertake an interdepartmental study on ‘the whole range of circumstances in which the P.I.R. might be used and the considerations which might be seen to apply in different situations’. Territories said that it would do everything to maintain control by civil means, but that at short notice ‘circumstances might arise in which the support of the P.I.R. would be essential… it was a matter of having reserve authority, the existence of which would be kept entirely secret’ (submission, Booker to Freeth, 14 May 1969, NAA: Al838, 936/3/21 part 1).