Canberra, 20 May 1969
Secret
Submission No. 577—Papua and New Guinea: national unity and public order1
Addressing itself first to the issue of possible secession movements in Papua – New Guinea, the Cabinet reached the view that the Commonwealth ought, increasingly, to rely upon the views of the House of Assembly of Papua–New Guinea in matters of general policy affecting the Territory, including in the matter of national unity. It noted that the House of Assembly had already declared in favour of national unity—see Annex ‘B’ to the Submission.2
2. It noted further that the political problems arising from C.R.A.’s operations in Bougainville are likely to be debated in the House of Assembly in June—see paragraph 10 of the Submission.
3. In the circumstances, the Cabinet agreed that at this point the Minister for External Territories could be authorized to go as far as to express the Government’s belief that the interests of the people of Papua–New Guinea are best served by national unity and to say that the Government endorses the House of Assembly declaration in this regard. In any such statement, the Cabinet would not wish the secession issue to be taken up in terms—for example as is suggested in paragraph 14(a)(iv) of the Submission. Beyond that, it noted, without necessarily adopting them or tying the statement to them, the lines sketched in paragraphs 14(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Submission.
4. As regards the proposal to deploy the P.I.R. in certain circumstances to assist in the maintenance of public order, the Cabinet saw this as carrying wider implications of great significance involving other portfolios, for example, Defence, External Affairs and Army. lt felt that before it came to any decision, it needed to have these implications fully identified. It therefore decided to remit the proposal for further study and report by an Inter-departmental Committee comprising the Departments of External Territories, Defence, External Affairs, Prime Minister’s and Army.3
[NAA: A1209, 1969/9031 part 7]
1 Document 268.
2 See Document 246.
3 Warwick Smith organised a meeting with his counterparts in these departments ‘with the aim of laying down something of a pattern that the inter-Departmental Committee might follow’. He suggested there was ‘an unsettled situation in several areas of Papua and New Guinea and we are anxious to report back to Cabinet at the earliest possible date so that we will all—including the Administrator of the Territory—know where we stand’ (letter, Warwick Smith to Plimsoll, 30 May 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/3/21 part 1). At the preliminary meeting, during which ‘nothing concrete’ emerged, Plimsoll emphasised that actions to quell civil disturbances in PNG would be seen in racial terms. Instancing international reactions to the Sharpeville shootings in South Africa, he also said it would be ‘extremely important to try to avoid killing anyone’; such reactions ‘could be incalculable’ (note for file by Plimsoll, 5 June 1969, ibid.). Plimsoll’s comments were indicative of the cautious views outside Territories, and interdepartmental consultations continued throughout the year. Initially, papers by all departments were considered (for DOET’s paper, see memorandum, DOET (Besley) to DEA, undated, ibid.) and though there were ‘no real differences on essential policy’ there were ‘real’ variations in ‘emphasis’ (minute, Coles to Doig, 19 June 1969, ibid.). Territories’ subsequent collation of the papers into a single piece was criticised by DEA as ‘too generalized’; ‘No mention is made of any particular situations … which might require the intervention of the army’—and it was thought the paper did not address the original question of ‘whether the existing procedures for calling out the army are adequate’ (minute, Coles to Doig, 2 July 1969, ibid.). Disagreement over the paper continued through August. In DEA, Coles wrote of ‘the basic concern that the significance of employing the army to enforce law and order in the Territory (e.g. Bougainville) should not be minimised. The pressure from … External Territories is to play down the significance’ (minute, Coles to Doig, 20 August 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/3/21 part 2).