Canberra, 23 May 1969
Constitutional development
We will prepare a Working Paper on Constitutional Development to discuss with the Official Members before the meeting of the House when Arek’s motion is going to be debated.
[ matter omitted ]
3. You should prepare as soon as possible a working paper which leads to the conclusions in the draft Cabinet submission1 but which spells out our reasons in greater detail for the purposes of discussion with Official Members. The really critical thing is to get over to the Official Members the difference between representative government which they now have and responsible government.
4. You should quote from some of the statements made by the Minister about balanced political, economic and social development; and about the need to have a reasonable financial base for self government. Point out that in 1972 the financial base for self government simply will not exist. The Maori Kiki approach2 is not in accordance with official Government statements and the assumption must be that the Australian grant would be replaced by assistance different in character and in quantity if the Territory moves to self government. You would then come to the conclusion set out in the draft Cabinet submission that if there are proposals for self government which the Select Committee wishes to entertain they should do so in discussion with Ministers.
5. With regard to variations to existing constitutional arrangements short of self government I think the paper should include the annex to the Cabinet submission which contains the criteria which was previously laid down by Cabinet and which seems to be perfectly satisfactory.
6. This is the time for Official Members to say openly that the Ministerial Member system does not apply to reserved subjects3 (but this need not apply to Assistant Ministerial Members). In presenting this, reference could be made to the provisions for reserved subjects in the B.S.I.P. constitutional proposals.4 This is a quite standard provision and should be presented openly and publicly as such.
7. Subject to this the Official Members should understand that—
(a) Ministerial Members can be appointed under Section 245 to cover the whole non reserved area; and
(b) Their functions can be expanded under Section 25 to give them a fuller extent of authority within the criteria laid down by Cabinet.
8. This sort of argument leads to the fact that the Minister is authorised under the Papua and New Guinea Act to determine the role and functions of Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members and any proposal in the Select Committee for review of the existing arrangements should be discussed with him.
Changes in the legislature
9. The Administration have already got some preliminary thoughts about a possible Second Chamber:—The only reaction that we have received {was} Johnson’s sarcastic comment about creating a bunyip aristocracy. We want to make some specific points in connection with the legislature which will show to the Administration that we are not stressing this as a means of diverting attention away from changes in executive government. These points are—
1. The present arrangement under which legislation is taken though all stages in one meeting is inherently bad—if the Administration {do} it we cannot expect the private members not to. This is6 really caused the so called confrontation of the Lussick Bill;7 it is the real cause of discontent also over Lussick’s Crocodile Bill.8 The 21 day rule will not suffice. Second house of review would give time for cooling off.
2. A second House based upon regions could positively assist in national unity by watching the interests of the remoter regions in the same way as the Senate watches the interests of the smaller States.
- The present Local Government Association with the embellishments set out in the draft Cabinet submission provides a ready basis for such a Chamber.
3. There is a political judgment which needs to be made about the desirability to maintain regional electorates and if it is desirable to get rid of them a second Chamber would provide an obvious way of doing so. In the last House there is no doubt at all that the European members from special electorates were more trouble than they were worth. In the present House I think it is probably true to say that a number of European members adopt a much more responsible attitude than Barrett or Downs. On the other hand the rationale for special electorates (i.e. the doubt whether Australians would be elected at the open electorates) no longer exists and in addition the standing of the indigenous members for the open electorates improves. with each House.
This is an area on which the Minister would want an assessment from the Official Members themselves.
The objective of the paper in this area must be to stress the fact that there {are} real issues which have to be discussed logically and are not merely brushed aside.
11. 9There are a number of other proposals mentioned in the Cabinet submission for variations in the A.E.C. and the House which should be canvassed. There is clearly room for the Budget Committee to advance towards what the previous Select Committee expected it to do. 10 Any Select Committee will clearly need to examine the existing role and functions of Ministerial Members. This means that the existing arrangements under Sections 24 and 25 would have to be made available to the Committee and we should discuss the extent to which Ministerial Members are performing the functions in Departments in accordance with recommendations of the previous Select Committee and in accordance with the approved arrangements. You should try to imply in this that in some cases at least the Administration should wake up to the fact that Ministerial Members patently are not performing these functions particularly in the continued role of Assistant Administrators as overlords and in regard to the fact that there have been no financial delegations to them. This could lead to criticism by the Select Committee in that the present system does not give effect to the intentions of the last Committee which the House of Assembly had understood had been accepted by the Government.
[NAA: A452, 1969/1135]
1 Document 270.
2 In a visit to Australia during April and May, Maori Kiki was quoted as saying ‘lf[Pangu] get[s] a majority at the next election, we want self-government tomorrow’. He also said that an independent PNG would attract funds from a number of sources, including Australia, the US and, if necessary, communist countries. ‘We would’, he said, ‘hope to draw financial support from everywhere’—‘Just because you accept help from communists it doesn’t mean you are a communist yourself’ ( Australian , 30 April 1969, NLA: mfm NX 48. See also MIS no. 5/69,6 June 1969, NAA: Al838, 936/3/15 part 5).
3 See footnote 3, Document 5.
4 In proposals on constitutional development in the Solomon Islands, the UK High Commissioner would not have to consult the elected Council on issues relating to ‘defence, external affairs, internal security and the police and certain matters relating to the civil service … In addition, the independent position of the Judiciary, (and) certain departments of Government … would be maintained’. Other powers (though perhaps not those Ballard had in mind) included the ability to act against advice ‘for the purposes of maintaining or securing financial or economic stability’, to pass motions rejected by the Council and to refuse assent to bills. The High Commissioner could also make laws when the Council was not sitting. With regard to ‘powers of an executive nature or of making subordinate legislation’, he would consult the Council and would be obliged to act in accordance with its advice ‘unless he considered it expedient in the interests of public faith or good government to act otherwise’ (‘Interim proposals on constitutional development’, Legislative Council paper 119 of 1968, 4 December 1968, NAA: A1838, 317/1 part 2).
5 Sections 24 and 25 are quoted in the editorial note, ‘Changes to the Papua and New Guinea Act’.
6 This word appears to be superfluous.
7 See editorial note ‘Tensions in the House: the Chatterton and Lussick bills’.
8 Presumably, a reference to P.G. Johnson’s crocodile bill; see Document 263.
9 There is no paragraph 10 in the original.
10 For the report of the Guise Select Committee, see Document 118.