Canberra, 11 March 1966
Top Secret
Papua/New Guinea—ultimate status: some thoughts on submission no. 71
At some point of time in the future the constitutional pattern of Papua/New Guinea will be determined—whatever the subsequent long term influences might be.
Therefore at some stage Cabinet will have to make up its mind and it will have to do so in a state of imperfect knowledge: the same applies to the Legislative Assembly in Papua/New Guinea.
The Committee however wants to report now. Its report will not set the final pattern because we are at least 5 years, possibly 10–20 years from that point. But it will report on long term constitutional development making its best guesses.
The Committee knows as well as Cabinet does what the likely answers are to its questions. The questions and consequently the answers will be a range of possibilities. The Committee can expect to have the comfort of discussions with Cabinet Ministers preferably a group of Cabinet—Ministers but at least with the Prime Minister2 and Mr. Barnes. But it cannot expect commitments at any time before the point is reached where there have to be commitments. The report will contain the Committee’s recommendations not the Government’s and will not be based on any firm undertakings.
But in these discussions with the Committee the Government has yet another opportunity to bend the twig the way it wants the branch to grow. For this purpose it should be as forthcoming as it can. And to be forthcoming it needs to know what its views are. Therefore Cabinet should be encouraged to give this submission deep and considered thought—spreading over weeks and perhaps months—not wholly related to some approaching interview.
Territories have not brought other Departments into their considerations. The possibilities that have been examined and discarded might present to other Departments and to Ministers lines of approach which need to be looked at closely. There might be advantage in Territories being asked to expose their thinking in full to other Departments in a round table examination.
Specifically—
1. The report talks about testing public opinion in Papua/New Guinea and about Australia waiting until the wishes of the people of Papua and New Guinea are known. This is hardly realistic. The Government is likely to have to make firm commitments long before it is possible for Papua/New Guinea to express any worthwhile view on problems such as constitutional development.
2. Can we not clearly state a view that we are in favour of working towards the unity of Papua and New Guinea?
3. Can we not say that we are happy to work towards a continued special association with Papua/New Guinea? We do not see this as leading to integration as far as we can see ahead but clearly in the long term anything is possible.
4. On defence can we imagine any stage being reached when we will not have a special interest in Papua/New Guinea? We would want to hold special rights in defence for as long as we can but we could never give a guarantee that we would not3 always want to carry a close association with Papua/New Guinea on defence matters. This would carry with it a commitment to regard the defence of Papua/New Guinea as the defence of Australia. (While we might say these things, realistically, we would have to contemplate for instance Papua/New Guinea concluding a defence agreement with Indonesia which might or might not lead to a conflict of interests as between Australia and Indonesia. Equally Papua/New Guinea might conclude defence agreements with New Zealand).
5. On economic aid a commitment to go on helping Papua/New Guinea would not appear to be very dangerous. We would not need to say that this economic aid would only continue as long as the country was politically friendly towards us. Or until it had its own viable economy. We would hope for close trade ties.
6. Our present immigration policy is to preserve a socially homogeneous population in Australia. This policy does not permit the unlimited entry of non Europeans. We could not contemplate the entry of Papuans and New Guineans for residence purposes and hold to our basic policy. We would probably be unwise to put Papua/New Guinea in some special position as against other Asian countries. There might be advantages in dampening now any idea that immigration to Australia is going to be easier for Papuans and New Guineans in the terms of our current policy. The Committee equally could know that we cannot see how far ahead we can maintain our current policy.
In all of this it is worth keeping in mind what the importance of this Committee’s report will be. Its report might be a milestone in Papua/New Guinea’s history or it might be pigeonholed. I think we have to assume the former. How damaging would it look if it presses specific questions on the Government and gets what it regards as unsatisfactory answers. In the U.N. any suggestion that Australia does not know where it is going with Papua/New Guinea may be damaging. Will this report have a significance in the U.N.? Australia’s answers perhaps should not give the impression of unlimited time being available for answers to evolve.
[NAA: A4940, C1724 part 2]
1 Document 25.
2 Harold Holt became Prime Minister upon Menzies retirement on 26 January.
3 This word was perhaps inserted in error.