Djakarta, 6 June 1969
Confidential
West Irian
Thanks for your telegram no. 1746 setting out the ideas about border matters in more detail. 1 The following views are put forward as a contribution to consideration of these problems in Canberra. They reflect our judgments of the situation as seen from here but of course we are not in a position to have a full appreciation of the political stresses and tolerances in Australia and in TPNG and the administrative problems.
2. The greater detail in your message, if anything, strengthens the view in my message No. 14872 that the Indonesian system just does not produce middle-level officers able to conduct this sort of exercise, and certainly not in the time scale envisaged. In our view, only pretty high-level Indonesian officials would be allowed to enter into such talks: if they were to be adequately prepared a good deal of time would be involved: and even then it is doubtful whether they could take matters very far in discussion in the first meeting. Moreover, I think that the Indonesians will be concentrating their high level efforts on trying to bring about a satisfactory state of affairs inside West Irian in the coming weeks. The slowness with which they have responded to our proposal for talks on border liaison is a good indication of where their priorities lie (whether or not Sarwo Edhie has been temporising, which I rather doubt).
3. It is true that General Soepardjo in the Foreign Office talks occasionally about the need for joint or co-ordinated patrols in the border regions, but I am not sure that this is how Malik would see matters developing. For this reason, if your thinking should develop along the lines of your message, I should like to have the opportunity to talk quietly and intimately to Malik about some of the issues our two governments might face if we formalized our co-operation beyond a certain point. Malik at present3 refers to the fact that there is an agreement in existence between Australia and Indonesia for handling the problem of border crossings, and by implication makes it clear that he regards this agreement as satisfactory. Also, despite the static that occasionally finds its way into the atmosphere, he wants matters to be handled in a low key and the temperature kept down. The temperature is in fact kept down in Djakarta, although we must expect a certain amount of reaction and quasi self-justification when border incidents are publicised from Australian sources.
4. As you know, I have been working to strengthen three basic principles:
(a) Indonesian patrols respect the border and do not cross it:
(b) in respect of inadvertent crossings or patrol contacts the instructions for Indonesian patrols should be tightened up to prevent out-bursts of firing:
(c) the basic feature of the agreement between Australia and Indonesia namely that Indonesia does not question our right to take custody of refugees and to give asylum in appropriate cases.
I would hope that by insisting on these points in Djakarta and by strengthening them as best we can through liaison contacts, the situation can continue to be contained. As you know, I hope that we will be able to add a fourth point, namely Australia’s willingness to retain in TPNG any border crossers who would engage in anti-Indonesian activities if we allowed them to return.
5. In talking to Indonesians I have kept before them the prospect that if things got difficult then the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees4 would inevitably come into the picture. This is something they do not want. They prefer the continuation of bilateral methods and a kind of working understanding with us. They don’t want another U.N. Agency coming into the picture with the possibility of unfavorable reports back to the General Assembly, etc. No doubt you have in mind that any proposal for regulating the procedure for repatriation of border crossers by an extradition agreement would immediately bring the U.N. High Commissioner into the picture.
6. While the sort of broad understanding that we now have with Indonesia leaves the possibility of incidents, strains, and pressures on our Administration, I feel that close and concerted action could have even greater disadvantages. For example, I have no reason to doubt the story produced by Brian May in the Australian on Wednesday 4th June in which he describes how a man believed to be a courier trying to cross into TPNG was shot dead without mercy. This sort of thing could continue and, once we were involved in joint policing of the border, pressures on the Australian Government to intervene and protest over such actions would become very heavy. Moreover, given the possibility of punitive action by the Indonesians, we should need to be very careful about arrangements whereby we returned West Irianese from TPNG into the actual custody of Indonesians at border posts. We could never be sure that any of the individuals whom the Indonesians regarded as dangerous would not be taken away and shot. Once we got into detailed joint arrangements we could be faced with quite difficult requests for the repatriation of categories of border crossers e.g. Papuan deserters from the Indonesian army, Papuan deserters from the Indonesian police such as those at Enarotali,5 persons who the Indonesians claim had engaged in terrorist activities etc. Your recent instructions to me were that I was not to give the Indonesians details of individuals on our side of the border. Once discussions are joined I doubt whether we could expect the Indonesians to go on refraining from asking for such people to be compulsorily sent back to them (that is the sort of point I should like to check with Malik before things went very far.) Such points could be difficult for both parties in any drafting of an agreed minute.
7. Then again, we need to take into account that the future is indefinite. We can’t see clearly ahead at this stage how the internal security situation in West Irian will develop. There would be a risk in entering into detailed arrangements in the near future which would tie us down into particular courses of action if matters were to deteriorate badly in West Irian (not that we are in fact pessimistic about that but nobody knows). It is for such reasons that we prefer the pragmatic, developing approach which the Webb visit6 represents rather than attempting an overall regime of detailed understandings between the two governments.
8. With reference to Mr Warwick Smith’s need to bring the P.I.R. into the picture, we do not think this need be a difficulty so far as the Indonesians are concerned. I see no difficulty in explaining that the problem is too big for the police and that the P.I.R. is needed for patrol work provided that the P.I.R. is introduced in a routine and low-key way.7
[NAA: Al838, 3036/14/1 part 5]
1 3 June. It conveyed the text of Document 278 and commented that the letter represented ‘tentative exploration of ideas in the two departments’ (NAA: Al838, 3036/1411 part 5).
2 4 June. It answered Plimsoll’s first message on the idea of a formal agreement (see footnote 1, Document 278) (NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1 part 5).
3 The word ‘repeated’ was here struck out by hand.
4 Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan.
5 A reference to a revolt by Irianese in April, during which indigenous police deserted and fought against the Indonesian administration (see, for example, savingram 22, Djakarta to DEA, 16 May 1969, A452, 1969/1766).
6 See Document 266
7 In a marginal note of 9 June, Shann wrote to Rowland: ‘(a) I am intuitively against over-formalizing the matter & Jockel is right about the lack of middle-level skill (b) I think that easily the best thing would be for you to spend a few days in Djakarta on your way to K[uala] L[umpur]—see Malik and the others, and ask the lndons to get Sarwo Edhie over to Djakarta at the time’. Rowland spoke with Galvin on 11 June, telling him that ‘the key to the problem lies in Djajapura and that he would have no great confidence in anything which might be worked out in Canberra {or} in Djakarta and even if Sarwo Edhie is represented’. He said his ‘initial reaction is that there is a great deal in Jockel’s point about not getting too closely enmeshed with the Indonesians … He looks for a situation in which Sarwo Edhie polices his side; we police ours; we neither cross into the others’ territory; and to achieve this we liaise but do not co-operate’. Galvin responded that ‘unless there are some agreed orders known at all levels we shall fall along from crisis to crisis as in the past few months. Whilst the Webb/Watson exercise may produce something—on the ground—some clear understandings at all levels are required and only something like the Canberra meeting to follow up the Webb visit can set this up’. Galvin later confided to Warwick Smith: ‘Jockel’s point about not limiting our freedom of action is a good one but one we could keep in mind at the talks rather than one which is sufficient to stop them being held’ (minute, Galvin to Warwick Smith, 11 June 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2608).