Canberra, 26 June 1969
Secret
West Irianese: Zongganao and Runaweri1
Policy on this question as approved by Mr. Fairhall is set out in telegram 1913 to Djakarta attached.2 The Minister for External Territories has been in agreement with it. In brief it is that—
(a) The two men should be treated as refugees, in accordance with the principles of the Convention on Refugees and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum. The grant of permissive residence itself indicates an intention to treat them as refugees.
(b) As refugees, they cannot be deported to the country from which they fled.
(c) They can remain in TPNG as permissive residents, but cannot carry on anti-Indonesian activities there.
(d) As to their going on to New York or elsewhere, Australia ‘will neither prevent nor assist’.
(i) We have no legal power to prevent aliens leaving TPNG;
(ii) Active frustration of their attempts to leave would invite public and international criticism, including more active interest of the High Commissioner for Refugees.
2. Jockel has asked for further instructions, arguing that there have been new developments since our telegram 1913 was sent. (See his telegram 1691 attached.)3 The main points he makes are these:
(i) Malik told Jockel on 14th June (and also has told the press off the record) that Zongganao and Runaweri were involved in a plot to murder General Sarwo Edhie and Ortiz Sanz. Malik has also referred (to journalists) to the alleged agreement that Australia will return border crossers, in particular criminals. A similar claim was made in the liaison talks at Djajapura to Webb, who replied that this would be a matter for discussion between Djakarta and Canberra.
[ matter expunged ]4
(iii) Jockel also refers to the border agreement as implying that ‘Indonesia will not contest who we take provided we bottle them up.’
(iv) He refers to reports that a third West Irianese is seeking to cross into TPNG to join the mission to go to New York as strengthening his previous argument that, unless we hold firmly to a policy of preventing the onward passage of such people, TPNG will become an escape route for5 series of them.
3 .In general he argues that we must find ways of preventing the West Irianese from leaving TPNG.
4. Our comments are these:
(i) We cannot confirm that these two persons were engaged in a murder plot, although their organization (the KPPB)6 did have a plan in 1967 to murder the then Indonesian military commander. But these allegations do raise the possibility (a) of an Indonesian request to us to return the two as criminals; and (b) a line of lndonesian public attack on the men if they should in fact get abroad.
5. As to (a), Jockel thinks that a direct Indonesian request is unlikely because Malik would realise the probability of a refusal or an invocation by us of the UNHCR. We agree with this assessment.
6. Whatever the truth of the Indonesian charges, and they relate to acts which have clear political motivation, the men are political refugees and we would not in fact wish to return them.7
7. Jockel implies, however, that we might use these charges as a means of ‘bottling up these two men in Manus’, presumably by preventing their travel abroad by some means and by threatening deportation. If this were done it would rapidly become public and the legality of our action could be questioned—especially now that their case has aroused public interest and an offer of funds. The fact is that we do not have legal power to detain indefinitely.
8. As to the alleged agreement to return border crossers, we told Djakarta (our telegram 1676)8 that ‘there is no agreement between the Australian and Indonesian Governments requiring the return of all West Irianese who cross the border … 9 our practice is closely to question West lrianese crossing the border and claiming to be refugees. Those who can establish that they are in fact refugees are permitted to remain as permissive residents under certain conditions.’
Travel documents
9. The two men have now approached the U.N. Information Office at Port Moresby and the Netherlands Foreign Minister for travel documents. Jockel seems to suggest that we ourselves should seek to dissuade the Dutch from meeting this request (his telegram 1691, paragraph 5). 10 You might care to consider this: to do so would depart from the ‘neither help nor hinder’ principle so far adopted.
10. It is possible that we might be asked to provide travel documents; the Convention on the Status of Refugees would imply some obligation to do so, except for the fact that we (alone of countries adhering to the Convention) have entered a reservation on this point. We would not propose to provide such a document—though this could entail some criticism if our refusal became known.
11. There is also the possibility that we might be asked to provide simply documents of identity, which might be acceptable to the United States or another country as the basis for a visa. In this case we might find it hard to refuse particularly as the Refugee Convention specifically places this obligation on parties.
12. But, whatever might eventuate about documents, we should make it clear to the two men that they could not expect re-admission to TPNG. This might well be sufficient to cause the United States (or any other country such as Holland) to refuse them a visa. While there are thus substantial obstacles in their way they might yet get to New York. The Netherlands Government is under domestic pressure to see that the West Irianese get as fair a deal as possible in the Act of Free Choice and may feel obliged to help these petitioners at least by the provision of travel documents.
Conclusion
13. In all the circumstances we feel that we have no alternative but to adhere to the general line of policy already adopted, though we do understand the embarrassment these people could cause the Indonesians. We think that Jockel should be guided accordingly in his discussions with Malik. We must leave the detailed handling to him; but (in brief) he should not lead Malik to think that it is in our power to ‘bottle up’ these men indefinitely—though as we have said we will do nothing to help them. In the end, we might, under pressure, issue them with a document of identity but we will certainly not volunteer to do so. And if, eventually, we did do so there is still no guarantee that they would be able to secure the necessary visas, given that we would make clear that they could not expect re-entry to TPNG.
14. If you agree we shall make this the basis of a telegram to Jockel, making it clear to him that you have endorsed the line proposed. 11
[NAA: A1838, 3036/14/116 part 14]
1 Well-known lrianese nationalists William Zongganao and Clemens Runaweri had crossed the border on 30 May. The said they had done so in order to determine the attitude of the Australian Government on Irian’s future and to obtain passage to the UN, where they wanted to argue the case for lrianese independence. They also requested a cash advance from the Australians for this trip, and claimed that the advance would be guaranteed by their supporters (MIS no. 5/69, 6 June 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/3/15 part 5). As Rowland explained in a letter to Jockel, the story was ‘widely reported’ in the Australian press on 11 June ‘with particular emphasis on their “mission” to New York’. He continued: ‘While we had been at some pains to keep them under wraps, the story was broken by the A.B.C. correspondent in Wewak who possibly picked it up by listening to Administration messages on the radio, a practice which appears to be quite common in press circles in the Territory. In view of the strong press interest which developed and with the House of Assembly … resuming on 16th June, External Territories felt it was necessary to recommend to Mr. Barnes the immediate granting of permissive residence to the two men’ (23 June, NAA: Al838, 3036/14/1/6 part 14).
2 Not printed.
3 Not printed.
4 Sub-paragraph (one sentence) expunged.
5 The word ‘a’ appears to be missing here.
6 This should probably read ‘KKPB’—Komite Kemerdekaan Papua Barat (West Papuan Freedom Committee).
7 Freeth here wrote in the margin: ‘Unless there were some strong evidence of a kind sufficient to justify an extradition if [an] extradition treaty had existed’.
8 Not printed.
9 Ellipsis in the original.
10 Not printed.
11 In marginalia, Freeth wrote: ‘I agree with the conclusions above. However at times the distinction between “political” refugees, and “criminal” refugees could be difficult. Implication in a murder plot would in my view place these men in the category of criminals. Malik’s statements are extremely vague. Jockel might indicate perhaps that if we were satisfied that there were strong admissible evidence other than hearsay of a kind which if an extradition treaty operated might lead to successful extradition procedures, we could consider returning them. If the nature of the evidence against these men is strong the fact could be mentioned to them as being likely to discredit them shld they go abroad. Malik’s mere allegation without some supporting facts is likely to be viewed simply as an attempt to discredit them—and perhaps we should be testing his genuineness by asking him about it. Addn— Examination of the evidence of these allegations could serve as a pretext for refusing to issue travel docts’. Territories later informed DEA that Zongganao and Runaweri were interviewed on Manus. They denied knowledge of a plot to kill Edhie and Sanz, considering that ‘this was an Indonesian attempt to discredit them’. They claimed to have earlier forewarned Sanz of an assassination attempt and said that they were aware of the kidnapping of a pro-Indonesian lrianese, Jabung Sabra, but had not been involved. Territories concluded that the pair probably knew of the plan to kidnap, but took no part. It was thought that involvement against Sanz was unlikely and that there was ‘no proof of their knowing of a plot to kill Edhie, but the interviewing officer thought that from their attitude and reaction it is likely that they did’ (memorandum, DOET (Galvin) to DEA, 30 July 1969, NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1/6 part 15).