Port Moresby, 12 August 1969
Unnumbered. Confidential
1. I refer to your memorandum of 22nd July 1969, addressed to me and in which you directed that I should move to Bougainville to assume control of police in the region as there were indications that disturbance of some size could possibly develop.1
2. I arrived in Bougainville at 8:15 a.m. on 26th July, and on that morning I had a discussion with the District Commissioner2 and Inspector Gascoigne.3 I later visited Loloho with the inspector, Loloho being about one mile from the point where it was intended to conduct a survey of Rorovana land.
[ matter omitted ]
4. On Monday morning, 27th July, with the District Commissioner, I flew in a helicopter over the entire area involved in the operation. We landed on the beach at the site where the survey was to commence and I saw that the area consisted of a young coconut plantation with a good deal of undergrowth and a narrow beach.
[ matter omitted ]
7. In discussion with the District Commissioner and Mr Brown,4 we decided that the survey should commence on the beach where we had landed in the morning, mainly because this was the furthermost point and if the people ofRorovana intended to oppose the survey and take action to prevent it, this was the most likely spot they would choose.
8. We decided that we would take the full police complement with us on the day the survey commenced as by doing this a show of police strength could well deter the people from opposing the survey.
9. Also on 27th July I received a report from a reliable source that Mr Mckillop of Arawa Plantation had been spreading a rumour around Kieta that 6,000 people would oppose the survey when it commenced on the following Friday. A further rumour was that Middlemiss, also of Arawa plantation, intended to supply two shotguns to Rorovana people on the Friday to ‘assist in defending their land’. It was also said that the Guava people were moving down into the area to assist the Rorovanas.
10. Because of these rumours I decided to take the trained riot unit from Barapina to Loloho when the survey commenced to reinforce the other units.
[ matter omitted ]5
13. On 13th July a report was received that Mckillop was spreading a further rumour that 4,000 peoples now would be involved when the survey commenced. He had said that they would offer passive resistance and would attempt to disorganise the surveyors by sitting in the line of survey etc. in the hope that police would kill one of them and that they would then call in all of the surrounding villagers numbering in the vicinity of 10,000.
14. The first police unit arrived on the afternoon of Tuesday 29th July and was quartered in the police barracks for the night. It moved to Loloho the following day. The final police unit arrived at 5.35 p.m. on 30th July and went straight to Loloho. This then made a total of 70 other ranks police in all and three officers besides myself at Loloho.6
15. Because of the rumours which were spreading in Kieta I considered it wise to contact the Deputy Crown Solicitor in Rabaul, Mr Norris Pratt, and I requested him to fly to Kieta on 31st July. I did this because I felt that certain points of law require[d] clarification.
16. When Mr Pratt arrived in Kieta, he, the District Commissioner, Mr Brown, Inspector Gascoigne and I discussed the problems of both passive and active resistance by the people of Rorovana and we finally decided that if the people did prevent the surveyors or attempt to prevent the surveyors from entering on to the land in dispute they committed an offence under section 18(5) of the Survey Ordinance. We considered that the surveyors and their assistants had legal right of entry and that the police had a right to escort them on to the land. It was also agreed that a discretion for arrest lay with the police who, in this particular case, were interested only in seeing that the surveyors and their assistants were able to carry out their work and not in making arrests. I considered that it was in the best interests of the people not to arrest them and that it was incumbent upon me to prevent a breach of the peace between surveyors, their assistants and the people.
17. On the evening of 31st July I was told by a reliable source that Mr Travers,7 a solicitor from Melbourne, who was visiting Kieta at time, had a meeting with the leaders of the Bougainville people and had advised them that they should attempt to create some small incident on the Friday when the survey commenced in an endeavour to assist them in their case regarding land both then and in the future. It was not clear what form the small incident was to take.
18. At 4.45 p.m. on Thursday, 31st July 1969, I addressed all of the officers who were to participate on Friday and briefly outlined for them the legal aspects of the exercise. I told them of the authority for the surveyors to enter the land and for the police to accompany them. I stressed the fact that our duty as police officers was to maintain law and order. I outlined the rumours I had heard and I told them that although I did not anticipate any real violence, I did believe that the people would argue and probably attempt to remove survey pegs etc. I thought at this time that Travers had possibly advised the people along the lines that Australians would be advised as he had come from Melbourne and I had been told(?)8 that he had not visited the Territory before.
19. I instructed the officers that they were to hold their platoons very steady and that I would be solely responsible for issuing orders. That they would take note of my orders and under no circumstances were they to act on their own initiative or permit their police to do so. I pointed out to them that if women and children were involved, and there most probably would be, that under no circumstances were they to allow the women and children to be injured. They were to see that they were removed quietly. I told them it was not our job to cause a situation and we were there mainly for the purpose of maintaining law and order.
20. On the morning of Friday, 1st August, 1969, I addressed all of the police in Loloho on parade and I told them the nature of the exercise to be carried out that day …
21. The police party left Loloho at 7.15 a.m. and escorted the survey party to the southern edge of the disputed ground … As the police and the survey party were making their way through a coconut grove, at 7.50 a.m. near the beach, a large group of male natives were met, Middlemiss from Arawa was with them. I spoke with these people and they stated that nobody was to enter on to their land particularly the surveyors. I told them that the law said that the surveyors who were with us could enter and 1 tried to persuade them to leave. The District Commissoner arrived then and also spoke with the people.9 They did not appear to be armed. They told the District Commissioner that they would not listen and the situation was very tense. The people also said that they would resist any action by the surveyors.
22. I therefore deployed each riot unit, called an escort for the surveyors and instructed them that if the people became very hostile they were to escort the surveyors back to Loloho. I then took up a position at the head of the party and moved through the people. No action was taken to prevent us moving forward.
23. At 8.25 a.m. we reached the point at which the survey was to commence and the first cement peg was positioned. The police units were deployed in the coconut grove and the beach area. I estimate that about 250 Rorovana people were present at this time.
24. The District Commissioner addressed them through a loud hailer at 8.25 a.m. and immediately after this a group of them rushed forward and tried to pull the survey peg from the ground. These comprised mainly women. I immediately had the escort of police form a tight circle around the peg. I moved into the centre of the circle of police and instructed them to keep the people off only by pushing with their batons. They did this[.W]hilst they were engaged I continually asked the people to resist.10
25. All of the people gathered were excited and there was a good deal of shouting. A number of them moved from the beach area into the coconuts and bush. There were, in all, three or four concerted rushes by the people to get at the peg and in between these rushes individuals attempted to crawl through the legs of police and remove the peg.
26. About 8.55 a.m. after a struggle, the people did manage to pull the peg from the sand and rolled it about ten feet down a slight incline. Following this, loud cheering broke out and the people picked up another spare cement peg which was lying nearby and carried it off along the beach, apparently to be used as a symbol of victory.
27. By 9 a.m. most of the people had moved along the beach to Rorovana and by 10 a.m. the area was clear. Following the arrival of the theodolite about 9.50 a.m. the survey commenced and the surveyors were escorted by baton carrying police.
28. On Saturday, 2nd August 1969, the survey continued with police escort and they found that the peg inserted in the ground the previous day had been removed and thrown aside. There was also a rumour that the local people had said if bulldozers were used or trees cut down they would unite and fight for their rights. During the weekend things remained quiet.
29. On Monday 4th August I talked with the bulldozer drivers and told them what to do in case of an emergency and also that they were to be particularly careful to watch for people sitting in the paths of their dozers. At 1.45 p.m. the surveyors, two bulldozers and four platoons of riot police moved again into the disputed area. The bulldozers followed certain contours and magnetic readings were taken by the surveyors. Clearing took place and there was no sign of opposition from the local people.
30. By 4.30 p.m. all had arrived back at Loloho. One of the bulldozers, however, was bogged down in bush in the survey area and so at 7.45 p.m. on Tuesday 5th August, together with Inspector Power11 and a platoon and a half of police, I went to the northern boundary of the disputed land in an effort to locate the bulldozer.
31. When we arrived at the northern boundary we contacted about 20 male persons including Raphael Bele.12 I spoke with these people and they said they were waiting to talk about the land. I told them that the District Commissioner would be along shortly and they could discuss this matter with him. Power and I then continued on in an endeavour to locate the bulldozer.
32. Whilst walking along the track which had been cut the previous day, we met about 25 men and women. One of the women had a small child aged about five or six years with her. Because it was obvious that many people were moving towards the boundary we decided to abandon the search for the bulldozer and return to the boundary area where the District Commissioner was and where the rest of the police had arrived. The District Commissioner told me that the people had said that they would oppose the bulldozers and surveyors entering on to their land and would in fact throw themselves under the dozers.
33. I estimate there were 65 people in all in the area and I considered that the child could have been brought as a sacrifice to be thrown under one of the bulldozers. Because of this I arranged for a constable to be detailed to specifically watch this woman and the child during any operation which may follow. It was noted also that some of the men as they arrived carried bush knives with them but they walked into the bush nearby and came out without them. Because of this a platoon of police was deployed in the area near where they had put their knives.
34. At 8.15 a.m. the bulldozer started up and all of the people gathered in the area moved and stood in front of them and a number of the men removed their shirts. They were addressed by the District Commissioner and told that the work must go on and that the police were there to see that nobody was hurt. I also spoke to them and told them that the police were not there to cause any trouble and that the surveyors and dozers had a lawful right to do their work and that the people should move off quietly and go about their business. They were addressed twice by the District Commissioner and twice by me.
35. They indicated they would not move and that they preferred to die rather than do so. I told them that if they did not move that police would be used to disperse them if necessary. They refused to listen to this advice so I then ordered that police flank the dozers and that a baton wave with shields move forward and try to push them from their positions. I instructed that nobody was to be hit with batons and that police were to use their shields in line, in an effort to dislodge the Rorovana villagers.
36. The people resisted strongly and outflanked the police in some cases. Many moved towards the dozers. There was a good deal of scuffling with people and police falling over on to the ground.
37. The area in which this took place was very confined and the ground, newly cleared, was heavy and slippery. The people were very excited at this stage and it was evident that police could not possibly move them without injury, or without injuring them. It was also clear that fighting was about to break out.
38. To prevent a breach of the peace or injury to the people I ordered that tear smoke should be laid down. A smoke grenade was tossed in front of the people but was not sufficient to move them, so several more were fired. The women in the crowd dispersed but it appeared that many of the men were not unduly affected. Several of them wrapped their shirts and singlets around the lower portions of their faces.
39. The police baton wave moved forward again in an attempt to clear the area. No batons were used. Finally after about 20 minutes the smoke had the desired effect and the crowd moved off through the bush. Light rain was falling at the time and the smoke quickly cleared. The surveyors and the bulldozers then began moving. Police preceded them.
40. After progressing about 200 yards on the track formed the previous day we again met the crowd of Rorovana people who had reformed in the middle of the track. They were very excited and there was a good deal of shouting and gesticulating. They were again addressed by the District Commissioner and I also spoke to them in the terms that I had done before. The men were in front of the women at this time and moved towards us in an aggressive manner as we approached. Two smoke grenades were fired as the men rushed at the police.
41. Again using considerable restraint the police lined across the track shoulder to shoulder with shields extended as buffers. After a minute or so it was clear that batons would have to be used and I ordered that the police strike at legs only which they did from under their shields.
42. After a very short while, Raphael Bele sang out and the people moved back. I was told later that one of the Rorovanas had received a very small laceration to his leg when he slipped over and as the people considered that blood had been drawn, and this was what they wanted, they retired. As they did so, all of them shouted and waved with clenched fists at the police. It was hard to determine exactly what was said but some of the police later stated they were shouting abuse and that they would ‘pay the police back’.
43. No more was seen of the people that day and clearing and surveying continued. The count made later showed that 45 grenades and cartridges had been fired—many into surrounding bush as a precaution against attack from any unsighted persons who were hidden there.
44. Mr Ellis, Secretary to the Department of Administrator, arrived in Kieta the morning of Thursday 7th August and he has given particulars of one or two instances.13 The following morning, after Mr Ellis had received reports from all field staff, it was decided to withdraw the Port Moresby unit from Loloho area and post it to Rabaul. The Mt Hagen unit, supported by the Barapina unit, remains in the area.
45. I departed Kieta on Friday 8th August 1969, with Mr Ellis and returned to Port Moresby. Telephone reports from Inspector Gascoigne received since, indicate that all remains quiet in the Rorovana area.14
[NAA: A452, 1969/3921]
Bougainville: reaction to Rorovana
Events at Rorovana provoked a strong response from the Australian press. In a headline story accompanied by a photograph of a bare-breasted woman struggling with a policeman, the Age gave prominence to a comment by Leo Hannett that the action was a ‘typical Gestapo approach’.1 An editorial of a day later spoke of the ‘island tragedy’ and the ‘wave of revulsion throughout this country and the world’.2 Similar front page treatment was given in the Australian and the paper devoted a separate article to Hannett in which he said that ‘if they try to push us around we will fight … a real guerilla war’.3 On the 7th, an editorial in the same newspaper was headed ‘Tear gas in the name of progress’ and it spoke of ‘rigid paternalism’ while opining that the suspension of the project was a ‘fact [that] must be faced’.4
Barnes and the Administration attempted to anticipate and counter this wave of protest. On 6 August, Barnes had said that police action had been ‘regrettable’ but ‘necessary’.5 He remarked that the House of Assembly had approved land acquisition in Bougainville and that landowners would be given ‘fair compensation’. Finally, he rehearsed the Government’s firm belief that ‘the success of this project would have momentous effect on the prospects and progress of the Territory’. Newman developed this line further in an Administration statement. He said that the mine ‘promised to be the biggest single factor in reducing the Territory’s present economic dependence on outside aid’ and it ‘could bring forward by many years the date by which economic self-reliance was achieved’.6 The Administration would, he said, ‘be failing in its duty’ if the Territory ‘lost an opportunity of this magnitude’.
A week later, and under pressure from the Labor Party Opposition, Barnes spoke on the matter in parliament. He had been advised by Hay ‘not [to] attempt to play down the strength of the feelings of the Rorovana and other coastal people on the land question, or discount the possibility of resistance by the Arawa people in due course’.7 But at the same time Hay thought Barnes might ‘point to the similarity’ between the situation on the coast and that pertaining to the mine site in 1966–7, where there had been conflict and whose people were ‘now reconciled’ to the project and were receiving ‘generous compensation’. Barnes stressed this second point and referred to the possibility that conflict could occur elsewhere in the Territory as the Government confronted ‘problems of transition into a modern world’.8 In the main, though, his speech laid emphasis on the ‘gigantic benefits’ that would accrue to the Territory—and on the efforts the Administration had made in planning the project and communicating it to the people. He said the Government ‘made no apology for the Agreement’, considering it a ‘spectacular contribution’.
Ironically, a compromise came from those previously seen as obstructionist.9 In mid-August, Paul Lapun and Raphael Bele arrived in Australia in what was described as a mission ‘to keep Rorovana and Arawa in the hands of the villagers’.10 It was said that they would seek a High Court injunction to prevent the resumption of land in two areas.11 Behind closed doors, the pair were more conciliatory.12 In a meeting with Barnes on 19 August, they said they did not want to make ‘an immediate approach’ to the High Court as they preferred to negotiate a solution with the Government and CRA.13 A day later, they met with CRA Chairman Sir Maurice Mawby—who offered to re-plant Rorovana cocoa and coconut crops over an area equivalent to that lost—and after returning to Canberra, they met with Prime Minister Gorton and again with Barnes.14 Gorton ‘reacted favourably’ to a suggestion that there be direct negotiations between the company and the people—a modus operandi that Barnes affirmed, and with which he said CRA agreed, ‘provided it was in association with the Administration’.15 Barnes said negotiations could be ‘comprehensive in scope’, including compensation on the basis of the same principles as applied to Arawa plantation and extending to ‘social and other factors as put forward by Lapun’. The Minister apparently had some success in bringing Lapun and Bele his way: ‘the whole discussion was on the basis that there could be no alternative to [CRA’s use of] the Rorovana land and that there seemed little, if any, possibility of an alternative to Arawa land’. What remained imbued the ‘general atmosphere’ of the talk—‘an agreement to the concept of broadening out the area of consideration and action to help the Rorovana and later the Arawa people to make the general adjustments’.
Talks in Bougainville on the elements of an agreement occurred over a number of days in September.16 On the 10th, Barnes announced that they had ‘reached an advanced stage including agreement by the people to the use of the land concerned’.17 The landowners were to agree to a 42 year lease and were to be compensated in the form of cash, shares and infrastructural relocation and replacement. By December, the agreement had been signed, and negotiations with Arawa villagers were reported to be ‘continuing in a friendly atmosphere’.18 Concurrently, the Administration and CRA had decided that the town of Arawa would be ‘a normal Territory town catering for Government, Company and other interests’.19 The company was to be the construction authority with the Administration paying 60 per cent of design and engineering costs.
1 Not printed.
2 D.N. Ashton.
3 K.R. Gascoigne, position unidentified.
4 W.T. Brown, Deputy District Commissioner, Bougainville.
5 Matter omitted refers to Middlemiss’ admission of loaning a shotgun to an indigene and to the decision to charge him. During this exchange, Middlemiss said ‘he did not want violence … but … he was worried over the fact that some “hotheads” due to arrive in Rorovana could be expected to urge and incite the people into violence’. Hay also wrote that unregistered guns were seized from McKillop and police were considering the laying of charges. McKillop showed ‘no animosity … nor [did he make] any reference to land or political matters’.
6 Hay was convinced that the use of substantial numbers of police was the best means of preventing violence (see footnote 4, Document 310, for discussion of this concept in relation to the Gazelle; Hay has made clear that it also underlay his approach to problems on Bougainville (see Hay interview, 1973-4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 6:2/28)).
7 Kevin Travers.
8 Query perhaps inserted in the original by a communications clerk; indeed, a word or phrase seems to be missing in this sentence.
9 In a private interview, Hay later opined that Ashton ‘over-reacted to the very difficult situations he found himself in in 1968 and 1969 and finally, at the confrontation near Kieta in August of 1969, he appeared with a tin hat on his head … He looked like a police officer … because he was with a police riot squad with all their equipment—and that was the last thing that a field officer should do and get himself photographed in the paper’ (Hay interview, 1973-4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 3:2/5).
10 Presumably, this should read ‘desist’.
11 Initials and position unidentified.
12 Rorovana leader and local politician.
13 Ellis later reported to Hay: ‘My investigations reveal that the actions by the Police in both clashes with the Rorovanas recently were carried out by all ranks with great circumspection and restraint and, in my opinion, reflected great credit on the officers and men concerned who were undoubtedly confronted by a difficult situation’ (minute, Ellis to Hay, 9 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4123).
14 The PNG Public Solicitor, Peter Lalor, informed Hay that the police action of 5 August was ‘illegal’, an opinion that Hay was later told ‘is not strictly accurate’. The Administrator noted that Whitrod was informed the action was legal because it was directed only at the conduct of a survey. Hay also recorded that Lalor’s submission was made in the context of a request that a similar course not be taken on the land of the Pakia people (whom Lalor represented) without a court order. The Administration suggested to CRA that it take out court orders on all its land holdings (telex 6199, Hay to Besley, 8 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3767).
1 Age , 6 August 1969, NLA: mfm NX 41. Hannett was in Australia to campaign against the resumption of Bougainvillean land.
2 Age , 7 August 1969, ibid.
3 Australian , 6 August 1969, NLA: mfm NX 48.
4 Australian , 7 August 1969, ibid. During August, there were 17 editorials on Bougainville in Australian newspapers. For a summary, see ‘Monthly digest of Australian newspaper editorials’, no. 8, August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3921.
5 Press statement by Barnes, 6 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3092.
6 Telex 6136, Hay to DOET, 6 August 1969, ibid.
7 Letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 8 August 1969, ibid.
8 Commonwealth parliamenlary debates (Reps), vol. 64, 12 August 1969, pp. 15-18. For debate on the issue, see ibid., pp. 22-30 and pp. 114–23.
9 See Donald Denoon, Getting under the skin: the Bougainville Copper Agreement and the creation oft he Panguna Mine , Melbourne, 2000, pp. 125–41. Denoon describes the association of Lapun and Bele with Napidakoe Navitu, a south Bougainville political group whose leadership Canberra and Port Moresby considered irresponsible.
10 Australian , 18 August 1969, in NAA: A452, 1969/4123.
11 loc. cit.
12 Hay has suggested that MRA may have influenced the pair in this direction after their arrival in Australia (Hay interview, 1973–4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 6:2/7).
13 Telex 8096, DOET to Administration, 19 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4123.
14 Record of conversation between Barnes, Lapun and Bele, 21 August 1969, ibid. Gorton had been drawn to take an interest in Bougainvilleas a result of the events of early August. He rang Barnes on 8 August and asked that daily situation reports be submitted to him (minute, Mentz to Gutman, 8 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3921).
15 Record of conversation between Barnes, Lapun and Bele, 21 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4123.
16 See Bougainville situation reports in NAA: A452, 1969/3618.
17 Statement by Barnes to House of Representatives, 10 September 1969, in NAA: A5010, 189/3/1, part 1.
18 Minutes of Bougainville Joint Committee, 2 December 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3848.
19 See Bougainville progress report for September–November 1969 (tabled in the House of Assembly on 19 November) attached to memorandum, Administration (Hay) to DOET, 21 November 1969, ibid. For details of infrastructural planning, see NAA: A452, 1969/2161.