Canberra, 18 March 1966
Top Secret
I am passing on to you herewith some notes given to me by my Department2 regarding Cabinet submission no. 71 (Papua and New Guinea—ultimate status).3 In addition I have run out some notes of my own and intended to use them if I were present when the submission was debated.
You will see that my view is that it is almost impossible to predict with certainty what is going to happen in Papua and New Guinea and that, for this reason as well as for political reasons, we should try to avoid making declarations about the ultimate status of Papua and New Guinea and try to stick as close as we can to the line that this is something for the people to choose and to work out in consultation with us in successive stages.
You will of course develop your own views on the submission but I gathered from the Prime Minister that he would like to know my own personal views on this particular submission and I am letting him know that I have given you these notes.
Attachment
NOTES ON CABINET SUBMISSION NO. 71 PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
1. We should avoid tying our hands by expressing preference for one status or another and we should try to keep as much flexibility as possible. In public, we should also avoid making any statements that might imply, (a) that we have made up our minds, (b) that we intend to decide what should happen to Papua and New Guinea, or (c) that we are restricting their choice either by stipulating conditions or by expressing preferences of our own.
2. We have to watch the effect of any advice we give on—
(a) international opinion
(b) opinion in Papua and New Guinea
(c) Australian opinion.
We have to be careful not to give international opinion grounds for thinking that we are making the decision, for our strongest argument against any attempt by other nations to dictate the eventual status of P.N.G. is to be able to say that the people of P.N.G. have chosen for themselves. We have to be careful not to give the people of P.N.G. any impression that we want to reject them, or get rid of them, or that we want to swallow them. We want to be careful about scaring Australian opinion with some notion that two million or more Papuans can come to the mainland, or with some idea that we will give the Territory away, or that we expect the Australian taxpayer to provide more and more millions every year in perpetuity. All these are arguments for saying as little as possible.
3. I also think it is difficult to predict what will happen. I will not develop this line of argument but would hesitate myself to join in any decision that even implied an endorsement of all parts of the submission. I question the soundness of some of the observations made in the submission but assume that we are not being asked to accept in toto the Territories argument.
4. This brings us to the question whether, assuming it is unavoidable to give some kind of lead to the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, we should endorse the draft statement contained in paragraph 61 of the submission. Departmentally the officers of External Affairs have suggested some rearrangement of that draft. (See paragraph 10 of the departmental notes). I myself wonder whether it will be sufficient to point out some of the considerations which the members of the committee might take into account, and to do so in private discussions with the chairman and without issuing any prepared statement of the Government’s view. Some of the considerations to be taken into account are given below.
5. As far as Australia is concerned, the Territories of Papua and New Guinea can be considered as one and a common future planned for them. The administrative union can become the future nation.
6. The advantages to P.N.G. of having a separate customs system, separate immigration laws, separate taxation and a separate parliamentary system and the inapplicability to P.N.G. of some Australian laws (Navigation Acts, divorce, social services) may be considered reasons why P.N.G. should not become part of the Australian Commonwealth.
7. The Australian Constitution in its provisions regarding the creation of new States may present some difficulty in deciding the manner in which P.N.G. could enter the Federation.
8. On the other hand the need for P.N.G. to receive financial support for some time to come and the needs in respect of a preferred position in the Australian market and in respect of defence, point to the need for retaining a very close association with Australia.
9. It is also to be asked whether P.N.G. aspires to have a separate national identity—e.g. individual membership of the United Nations.
10. In general, there is a need to distinguish between self-government and independence and to recognise that there are various degrees of independence. The phrase ‘close association with Australia’ is used in the submission rather vaguely and this vagueness may be unavoidable simply because the form and nature of that association still have to be worked out. We might try to establish the idea that there is no basic conflict between ‘independence’ and ‘close association’ if the closeness of the association is expressed as the will of an independent nation.
[NAA: A1838, 936/5]
1 Gorton was Acting Minister for External Affairs during Hasluck’s absence overseas between 19 March and 24 April 1966.
2 Document 29.
3 Document 25. Hasluck’s comments appear to be based on the same draft Cabinet submission used by Plimsoll and Booker (see footnote 2, Document 29).