Port Moresby, 5 September 1969
7271. Secret Priority
Rabaul
Following is my current appreciation.1
1. Policy after Council elections was stated in House on 18th June.2 Our aim is broadly to get the Tolais working together, with Administration support, to solve their very complex problems. The Council as duly constituted body has been promised Administration support, and in particular the Administration has undertaken to protect Councillors against threats and violence. Owing to Bougainville and South Pacific Games commitments police numbers have been short of what has been needed to bolster the Council. The Administration has also had to be mindful of Council’s slender electoral base, the substantial support of the Mataungan Assoc (including support from younger, educated elements) and the need during the South Pacific Games to avoid precipitating incidents. As a result the morale of the Council has been low and its performance poor. The Administration has tended to look to compromise solutions which might bring the Council and the Association together.
2. An assessment was called for as a basis for an appreciation for the Minister on 3rd September 1969 last weekend.3 Assessment indicated that the Mataungan Association was probably gaining ground and was in no mood for compromise solution. Before appreciation could be completed, the Mataungan Assoc on Monday resorted to overtly unlawful methods. The Administration was obliged to bring in very substantial police reinforcements to uphold the law in the face of a serious threat.4 The threat has so far been contained. This has heartened the Council. But threats still exist with serious danger points tomorrow, Sunday and next Wednesday (when Mataungan Assoc leaders charged this week will be in court).5
3. Assuming threat is contained, we shall have the capacity, because of our greatly increased strength, to put pressure on the Mataungan Assoc and the waverers and restore the balance in favour of the Council. This can be done by ensuring no discussions under duress, and then going on to issue tax defaulter warrants, at the same time vigorously campaigning over the radio for the payment of taxes and support of the Tolai cocoa fermentary and against spending too much time at political meetings. A continued attack should be made on land problems through selective purchasing of developed plantations in the short term. We should also maintain our public position of encouraging the parties to get together in a situation where a genuine negotiation can take place free of threats. The Council resolution provides an excellent base for this.6 Early action by the House is feasible and will probably result in recommendation for a commissioner to be appointed by Administration under relevant ordinance to recommend solution to Council problem.
4. A prerequisite for this approach is our ability to maintain roughly our present strength in Rabaul. I am assured that this is possible for a matter of weeks with some small margin for Kieta should the situation there deteriorate again.
5. Alternatives which can be considered if para 3 not successful are:
(a) a compromise more or less in Mataungan terms which would mean the abolition of the multi-racial Council, put the Mataungan Association in control in the Gazelle and probably lead to radical solutions of land problems in the Gazelle
(b) a direct electoral test, e.g. by referendum, a fall back solution which is not favoured by district staff but which I do not rule out
(c) suspension of the Council and installation of a manager accompanied by appointment of select committee or commissioner to find a solution acceptable to all parties (including the Administration). This alternative had attractions when the Council was losing strength, but clearly a compromise from strength is preferable to one from weakness.7
[NAA: A452, 1969/2889]
Gazelle Peninsula: aftermath of the September incident
On 5 September, the House of Assembly adopted a motion which requested the Administration to establish a commission of inquiry. The core of the inquiry’s work would be an investigation of ‘the most appropriate form of local government for the Gazelle Peninsula exclusive of the town of Rabaul’, accompanied by a study of the future relationship between the Peninsula council and an urban one proposed for Rabaul.1 Thirdly, the inquiry would look at ‘other relevant matters, including the long term problems of the Tolai community’. Three days later, Barnes authorised Hay to announce ‘in general terms’ that the Government would indeed conduct an inquiry.2
Discussion of the inquiry’s precise terms of reference revealed differences between Territories and the Administration. After meeting with the AEC, Hay suggested that the first and second parameters match those put forward by the House—with the exception that recommendations arising from the first would also be circumscribed by the Local Government ordinance.3 On the third, Hay suggested that the commission might ‘identify so far as possible long term problems which have contributed to differences of opinion within the Gazelle Peninsula about the existing Local Government Council’. He wrote that these terms
would serve my original purpose of enabling the enquiry to be set into a wider context. This would not lead to expectations that the present commission would get involved in recommending solutions of land matters which require a more general study.
The Department replied that Hay’s first and second points were ‘too restrictive’ and that the third would not be possible in the time available.4 A counter-proposal was for the commission to concern itself with
(a) the most appropriate form or forms of local government for the Gazelle Peninsula, and
(b) the relationship which should be foreshadowed between the rural and urban areas of the Gazelle Peninsula … we would suggest that the [public] statement on the commission of enquiry might state that while the Administration is taking other action in connection with causes of discontent which do not relate to the local government issues the commission would be asked to make any comments it sees fit on issues which arise during the course of its enquiry which it considers have contributed to discontent in the Gazelle Peninsula.
Hay agreed, provided this last idea was implemented—
Otherwise we shall risk merely scratching the surface of a complex problem which may well arise elsewhere. The commission’s report should be a document which points the way to a real solution and which influences the conduct of other young people who have similar frustrations and racial and tribal altitudes to those of Mataungan leaders. But if the commission cannot address itself to the wider issues, which are essential elements in the situation, then a crucial opportunity will be lost, both to get the Tolais to declare themselves publicly {on them and to} get the commission’s comments on their declarations. Explan[ations] of the issues I have in mind are (a) the means of arriving at decisions (b) the rights and obligations of a minority … (c) tribal versus wider loyalties.5
Barnes approved the Department’s terms on 18 September.6
Deliberations on the scope of the inquiry were paralleled by considerable debate on its composition. Hay’s ‘preliminary thinking’ was that ‘there ought to be three men and that there should be a black face—either someone from Africa … or a suitable Tolai’.7 He also raised as a possibility Scarlett Epstein, an academic from the Australian National University. For his part, Barnes put forward the President of the Australian Law Council, P.D. Connolly, who he said was ‘a broad minded incisive kind of person who knows the political scene since he was once a member of Parliament with a keen interest in … Papua and New Guinea’.8 The Minister was not in favour of an academic as a member and felt that, if Hay insisted on a foreigner, a Fijian ‘would cause less difficulties’ than a Ghanaian.9 The Department was worried that an overseas participant ‘could become a difficult precedent if the House of Assembly were in a commission of enquiry in quite a difficult situation to press for a foreigner from a specific country’, and added that ‘in any case foreigners must be in a minority and … if there is to be a Fijian on the commission there should also be a native member’.10 External Affairs soon put an end to this option by saying it was ‘firmly opposed to any outsider … as this will be presented internationally as indicating that Australia cannot manage the affairs of its own territories’.11 The final decision on membership was that Connolly would be joined by Bishop Simon Gaius of the Gazelle’s Ngatur United Church and a local teacher, Aisea Taviai. Epstein was recruited as an advisor, as in mid-September Barnes ‘still consider[ed] that an Australian academic would not be suitable as a full member and in any case it would seem desireable to us [in DOET] not to have a majority of expatriate members’.12 The commission started hearings on 29 September.
The situation on the ground had eased as the commission was being organised. On 9 September, Hay cabled that the
security situation has been contained. There is no … sign of a change of heart or of objective on [the] part of Mataungan leaders but they are for the present advising their supporters against violence and against congregating in Rabaul while police are there in strength … In present circumstances, [the] likelihood of our seeking aid from armed services to [the] civil power is now much reduced.13
The Administrator noted that later in the week he would begin reducing police numbers because of the ‘ease with which in an emergency numbers can again be built up’.
In policy terms, Hay was determined to maintain a firm hand. Commenting on 6 September that the Administration was pursuing the policy option outlined in paragraph 3 of Document 314, Hay told Besley ‘he had noted a thread running through one or two of our messages which he described as irresoluteness’.14 Besley assured him that
this was not intended. We all agreed that law and order must be maintained but within this framework we were assuming that all concerned would be taking whatever steps could be taken (without giving into lawless groups) to take the heat off issues which might otherwise become flash points.
Hay concurred, but differing emphases in Canberra and Port Moresby continued to be visible.
A third aspect of the Mataungan problem to attract the attention of Government was the trial of Tomot, Kereku and Rumet. Officials were nervous about the racial–political nature of the case—and their anxieties grew when the Mataungans asked a Biafran lawyer from the University of PNG, Ikenna Nwokolo, to defend the trio. Immediately, a study was requested on how such situations might be prevented:
It is understood that the University arranges admittance to practice {of} their lecturers. The question of how appointments particularly of non-Australians can be controlled is being taken up …15
Warwick Smith later commented that he had ‘no real objection’ to the University’s practice, but he was concerned about the ‘political involvement of other activities’.16 Such were matters that could only be dealt with in the longer term; the immediate quandary represented by a highly charged trial remained. This—and fears that the case might throw Administration actions and therefore local government law into doubt—prompted the Department to put forward the idea of a pardon for the defendants:
The establishment of the commission does of course create a new situation. It seems to us that it would be perfectly practicable for the prosecution against the three Tolais to be withdrawn and for this to be presented as a gesture of goodwill in accordance with the spirit which led to the establishment of the commission. They are not in any case likely to receive a very severe sentence from the magistrate and if they did this would be likely to lead to more serious disorder.17
Hay did not reply until the eve of the trial—and he forcefully rejected the notion:
Withdrawal of prosecutions at this stage would be interpreted as [a] political win for [the] Mataungans and would probably cast as much doubt on the legality of [the] Council as an adverse decision by the magistrate. We are strongly against this course of action. The Mataungans will get enough concessions due to the commission …18
Hay preferred as a contingency an appeal to the Supreme Court—or even a change to local government legislation that would retrospectively put the Administration’s actions on the MRC ‘beyond doubt’. Warwick Smith endorsed the message with the annotation yes’.
The opening of the trial was duly theatrical. Nwokolo, who, dressed in ‘Biafran national robes’ had been ‘greeted joyously’ by 50 Mataungans upon arrival at Rabaul airport,19 examined the first witness in a ‘flamboyant and dramatic style’.20 The crown ‘offered many objections’, after which Nwokolo became ‘more moderate’, but his ‘dramatics’ were said to have been ‘noted by the Mataungan observers in the court’. On 19 September, the case was adjourned until early October.
1 On 2 September, Besley had complained to Hay that ‘There is an apparent lack of consistency in the [various types of] messages [on Rabaul] no doubt due to the fact that they are prepared at different times by different groups and do not always arrive in sequence so that the picture here tends to be one of conflicting information rather than a developing situation … It is difficult to draw together a comprehensive picture of the situation … It seems to us … that a single comprehensive situation report should be prepared’ (telex 8582, NAA: A452, 1968/3943). Later in the month, ASIO’s Barbour ‘made the point [to Besley] that there is a good deal of information available in the Tenitory which seems … not to be getting through to Canberra. We discussed the recent Rabaul situation and I pointed out to him that on that occasion we did in fact get a very comprehensive report. There are however apparently other reports which are not getting through … Boyle, Barbour’s man on the spot seems to be doing a pretty fair job up there and is doing his best to ginger the Special Branch along’ (note for file by Besley, 30 September 1969, ibid.).
2 See footnote 2, Document 309.
3 Presumably, Document 309.
4 After the Hay–Barnes meeting of 3 September (see Documents 312 and 313), police reinforcements were despatched (see, for example, telex 7168, Hay to Besley, 4 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4001). The force was raised to 1,000 in anticipation of trouble on the 6th (MIS no. 9/69, 3 October 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/3/15 part 6).
5 Late on 4 September, Hay had told Besley that the Council ‘had passed a resolution to the effect that it had been previously pleased to agree to a meeting with the Mataungan Association on Sunday 7th. The Association had broken its word by proposing a meeting a day earlier accompanied by a public demonstration. Nevertheless the Council remained willing to meet on the 7th but also considered the possibility of a Select Committee of the House of Assembly being established to confer with the Councillors and the leaders of the Association at a meeting to be arranged’ (note for file by Besley, 5 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4071 ). A TIC account of 5 September gave a different version of the meeting, asserting that Council had made a ‘unanimous decision not to meet with M.A. on Saturday or at any other time’ (telex 7274, Hay to DOET, 5 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4001). Thus, in a special assessment for the JIC, the TIC judged: ‘Because the Council is now adopting a harder line towards the Mataungan Assoc, the latter, during the next few days, is expected to strengthen its resolve to break the multi-racial Council … violent demonstrations could occur’ (telex 7276, Hay to Parkinson, 5 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2889).
6 At this point, Hay was apparently continuing to interpret the resolution in the terms related to Besley on 4 September.
7 The TIC later reported: ‘On 5 September, 700 police marched through Rabaul while a helicopter hovered overhead. This display of police strength is believed responsible, together with radio broadcasts by the Administrator and the Secretary, Department of the Administrator, for a decision by M.A. leaders to advise their village supporters, during the night of 5th September, against going into Rabaul on Saturday, 6th September’ (MIS no. 9/69, 3 October 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/3/15 part 6).
1 Telex 7400, Hay to Ballard, 8 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167.
2 Telex 8794, DOET to Hay, 8 September 1969, ibid.
3 Telex 7522, Hay to Warwick Smith, 10 September 1969, ibid. Hay thought the ordinance itself needed amendment; in discussions with Barnes and Warwick Smith, he ‘suggested that it was necessary to put limits on the powers of local government to avoid a situation, e.g., in which the Mataungan Association, if they won an election in the Gazelle, took over the powers of a regional or provincial government, which was, he thought, quite feasible within the present Local Government Ordinance … The Minister endorsed this view in a general way’ (note on discussions in Canberra, 18 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4189).
4 Unnumbered telex, DOET to Administration, 12 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167.
5 Telex 7654, Hay to Warwick Smith, 15 September 1969, ibid.
6 See submission, Ballard to Barnes, 18 September 1969, ibid.
7 Note for file by Besley, 6 September 1969, ibid.
8 Minute, Besley to Ballard, 8 September 1969, ibid.
9 Telex 8794, DOET to Hay, 8 September 1969, ibid.
10 loc. cit.
11 Telex 9020, DOET to Hay, 15 September 1969, ibid.
12 loc. cit. Epstein’s daily payment was $20 (telex, DOET to Administration, 19 September 1969, ibid.) as compared to Connolly’s $210 (submission, Ballard to Barnes, 18 September 1969, ibid.).
13 Telex 7400, Hay to Besley, 9 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4071.
14 Note for file by Besley, 6 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167. One message Hay may have had in mind was an earlier conversation with Besley in which the latter said that a situation report sent by Hay ‘could be taken … as giving the impression that in addition to maintaining law and order the Administration might be taking action to stiffen the Council’s opposition to the Association’. Besley believed that they ‘agreed that this is a very thin line but that it is important to ensure all steps are taken to mediate so as to bring about some peaceful reconciliation of opposing views’ (note for file by Besley, 5 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4071).
15 Draft minute by A.C.H. Campbell, dated ‘9/69’, NAA: A452, 1969/2889.
16 Minute, Besley to unidentified officer (Assistant Secretary, Social and Community Affairs Branch, DOET), 16 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167. See also minute, Kerr to Besley, 25 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331. Territories had become generally agitated about the political activities of expatriates in PNG. See, for example, paper by Bray, 15 April 1969, and minute, Besley to Warwick Smith, 7 June 1969, in NAA: A452, 1969/3045.
17 Telex 8981, DOET to Administration, 12 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4146.
18 Telex 7655, Hay to Warwick Smith, 16 September 1969 (stamped in DOET, ‘received 15-Sep’), NAA: A452, 1969/4331.
19 Telex 7417, Hayes to Parkinson, 9 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4071.
20 Telex, Johnson to Besley, 18 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2889.