Canberra, 17 October 1969
Independence of TPNG
Some questions for the Department of External Affairs
The possibility of independence for TPNG is sufficiently close to influence, if not determine, all plans for the development of the Territory and its institutions. The development of institutions is carried out by the Department of External Territories in accordance with Cabinet directives. In formulating these directives the Minister for External Affairs participates both as a Cabinet Minister and as the Minister responsible for including in the directive considerations deriving from his responsibility for the external relations of Australia. These responsibilities have both present and future aspects. The relationship Australia will have with the independent PNG, especially the objectives of Australia’s external policy in respect of PNG is a matter for his primary concern, being a matter which clearly extends beyond that area of policy for which the Minister for External Territories is responsible. Because independence is in increasingly close prospect the question of constructing Australia’s relationship with independent PNG has now become a major and urgent, rather than a subsidiary and postponable, question of policy. Accordingly it appears timely for this department to recommend to the Minister that certain pertinent questions should be considered by Cabinet in the near future. The following paragraphs cover in a general way some of the necessary contents of a submission to the Minister.
A PNG foreign service
2. One function of independent government to which planning must be directed at the proper time is that of foreign relations. PNG’s external relations will be very important to it (and to Australia) from the beginning. It would certainly be unwise to assume that PNG can count on experiencing an extended period of calm in its foreign relations upon its entry as an independent nation into the international community and/or that it will have no important decisions to make in the field of foreign policy. It will, on the contrary, require a competent Ministry for Foreign Affairs immediately independence is granted. Such an institution cannot be put together at short notice but will require building up over a number of years. Because the Australian Department of External Affairs is the natural source of guidance for the new M.F.A it is timely for us to consider the form which this guidance should take, and to establish a programme. (Equally, Australia will need to have decided, well in advance of independence, a number of important questions about its own representation in PNG and to have made appropriate preparations. The disappearance of the role of the TPNG Administration and of the Department of External Territories in respect of PNG will involve a sudden accession of heavy responsibilities to the Department of External Affairs, for which advance preparation is needed.)
3. Independence of a country is usually followed quickly by the request of a substantial number of foreign countries to establish diplomatic missions. In the case of PNG, about a dozen countries are likely to apply immediately, including the US, USSR, Japan, Indonesia—perhaps both Chinas, and ten or twenty others within the first year or so. PNG will require an MFA to deal with these missions and sufficient trained officers to maintain a limited representation abroad, say in Australia, Indonesia, Japan and the US.
4. Beginning with a sufficient number of university graduates it would take at least five years of training and experience to prepare a cadre capable of running a foreign service with the extreme minimum of efficiency, even allowing for assistance from outside (i.e. from Australia). Ideally the period of training would take much longer.
5. It is not now readily predictable whether independence will come in five or twenty years. The majority of forecasts appear to favour 5–7 years, although shorter periods have also been predicted. A full-scale programme launched now to develop a PNG foreign service may conceivably produce one before there is any need for it, [and] may indeed help generate pressures for premature independence. This is a matter for judgment, but one may observe that the danger of arriving at independence without any capability to handle the foreign relations of the country is a more serious risk than acquiring that capacity before it is vitally needed. It would seem most desirable to make a start with the nucleus of a foreign service in the immediate future. This could take the form of a Foreign Affairs Section in Port Moresby, serving the Administration but not fully integrated into the Administration. A senior External Affairs officer should be in charge, assisted by a small number of others, and some PNG trainees of the best available quality. While the basic purpose of the section would be to train the foundation members of the PNG Foreign Service, it would also have immediate practical functions. The section would receive from External Affairs, Canberra, copies of all correspondence with a foreign content concerning or of interest to PNG, e.g. reports of UN proceedings, correspondence with the UNHCR and the Indonesian Government relating to West Irianese refugees, reports of events in and concerning West Irian, Indonesian political attitudes to PNG etc. It would regularly or as required, produce political information for the Administration {and} for the House of Assembly. It would provide answers to parliamentary questions on foreign affairs and speakers to address House committees, and would participate in briefing political representatives going abroad for official purposes, e.g. to join a General Assembly delegation. Members of the Section would be present at important border liaison meetings and at other meetings with the Indonesian administration of West Irian. The trainees could service such meetings, make the records, etc. The Section would arrange details of visits of important foreign visitors to TPNG and provide escorts for them. Trainees would also be sent to the Department in Canberra for experience and to posts abroad. The question of permanent attachments should also be considered at some stage. Just as the British used to set up a small net of foreign representation from colonies approaching independence in anticipation of the event, we could for instance have a permanent post for a PNG officer in our Embassy in Djakarta at least.
6. As time passed, the Section would build up archives containing a great deal of basic reference information on functional and policy matters, legislation, treaty series etc., and a group of indigenous officers experienced in making use of it.
7. There is an important duality. First, the foreign service must learn its job. Second, those who are to exercise national authority should learn, before they begin to do so, the nature of foreign relations and the functions and capabilities of a foreign service.
8. In the case of PNG the people who will constitute the independent government are probably in large part those already involved in government, and it is by no means too soon to begin their acquaintance with international affairs. Of course it is not simply a matter of becoming aware of techniques but even more so of learning to perceive what PNG’s national interests actually are.
9. Reverting to the question of prematurity, i.e. of producing a cadre of trained foreign service officers too far in advance of independence, this need not be a problem. The foreign service training would produce persons usable in other branches of the Administration. Their time in the F.A. Section would have broadened their experience and acquainted them with administrative techniques, and they would of course be qualified to return to foreign service work if and when the need arose. Indeed the longer the period before independence the more officers would have passed through the Section and the larger the cadre to draw upon when the time comes. Twenty or thirty such officers would not be any too few. The possibility is also to be weighed that the Australian Government which has accepted the obligation to prepare TPNG for independence may soon be asked in the UN pointedly what preparations it has made in respect of a foreign service for the independent state. There would seem much to be said for anticipating this inevitable question by setting in motion a programme which we regard as suitable rather than waiting to be hustled into action by international pressure.
10. The structure of the PNG MFA and the extent of Australian participation in it will have to be considered. Much will depend on the acceptability of Australian advice, whether we wish for and can achieve the sort of relationship that the French have with more dependent francophone states in Africa etc. This latter subject is further discussed below.
Australian representation in PNG
11. (I) Personnel At independence there should be a nucleus of trained External Affairs Officers ready to move immediately into the Australian mission. They should be familiar with PNG and some at least must be able to speak Pidgin, because this will remain the only means of communication with large and important sectors of the community. The present Administration of TPNG and the Department of External Territories are of course the major repositories of expertise both in local knowledge and of languages and would seem a natural source of personnel to staff an Australian mission in Port Moresby, but British experience in Africa indicates that colonial administrators are not readily acceptable as members of diplomatic missions in the country of their colonial service.
12. If there is to be a Foreign Affairs Section as recommended above, then the External Affairs Officers who serve in it would be able to acquire there the necessary expertise in PNG politics, language etc. Service in Port Moresby before independence could be on a two year basis and bear many similarities to a normal overseas posting.
13. (II) Property On the assumption that we will intend Australian influence in PNG to be greater than that of other countries, the Australian mission should be of adequate size and quality (the Australian Chancery, Djakarta, is both an example and an object lesson. Its facilities are better than usual for Australian Missions, and it is even riot-proofed, but it has proved too small within three years of its opening). Plans for the mission buildings—Chancery, Head of Mission’s residence and staff quarters, should be prepared well in advance. They should bear no relation to existing standards in Port Moresby, which are generally low, having been built within a different financial context. Other foreign missions will be obliged to build because of the general shortage of accommodation and some, e.g. the Japanese and Indonesians, will doubtless take prestige considerations prominently into account. Existing government buildings, including the Administrator’s residence, must be expected to be occupied by indigenous officials and notables.
14. Land should be reserved in the name of the Australian Government for all these purposes as early as possible, with careful attention to siting.
Australia’s relationship with independent PNG
15. Australia’s interests in PNG will be greater than those of any other country. To begin with material interests: investment, already substantial, will probably be considerably greater by the date of independence. We shall wish to have enough influence to protect that investment and future economic opportunities against policies of economic nationalism and against the strong competition to be expected from other foreign interests, especially Japanese interests.
16. If a great deal of Australian influence were to be replaced by powerful rivals, our economic stake would be diminished but we would not necessarily free ourselves of our obligations to provide support (e.g. aid, finance, military assistance) for PNG. And we would of course stand to suffer more than economic damage. A government that chose to act capriciously in the manner of many other newly independent countries, could make trouble for us by acting provocatively towards Indonesia or towards its neighbours to the east; by squandering its assets on expensive armaments and prestige activities as Ghana, Guinea, UAR, Indonesia, Somalia etc did; allowing commercial pirates to bribe their way into choice logging and mineral areas in a way which would impoverish PNG’s patrimony; engage in hasty and ill-considered political policies which would result in social disorders, tribal animosities and possible secession of areas such as New Britain and the Solomons to form political entities even more vulnerable to outside exploitation and political and economic regression.
17. A situation of chaos in the islands across our northern approaches may not threaten Australia’s security. That is it may not imperil Australia’s survival. However, on a pessimistic reading it could do that. Given the precedents available, one need not assume limits to the capacity for folly of newly independent governments. Thus an alliance of PNG with Communist China cannot be dismissed as impossible. Other plausible nightmares may be conceived including Congo-style interventions in support of warring factions. It would, of course, also represent something of a disgrace for us, and the complete failure of our aspirations for the people of the area. Resumption of control would not be a practical possibility, and we would be likely to have quasi-Liberias and Haitis as neighbours for the indefinite future. The prospect of an economically ransacked PNG, a perpetual financial burden and source of political anxiety to Australia is not unreal, or even unlikely, assuming a few bad political mistakes.
18. Looked at from PNG’s point of view, the most difficult problem will be to follow a steady political and economic course in the face of communist and other foreign political pressures, nationally backed economic aggression and the economic inducements offered by foreign interests to officials and political leaders to grant economic concessions. It would be of great assistance to have a sufficiently close relationship with the ex-metropolitan power to enable the government to accept advice without domestic political embarrassment. To maintain such a relationship for any length of time would require considerable political skill on both sides, and a period of extended and purposive preparation.
19. France has managed to achieve a relationship with some of the Francophone African States, Ivory Coast is a notable example—under which strong French influence is fully acceptable. French advisers have been giving the Ivory Coast Government competent advice on foreign relations and on economic and administrative matters for the last nine years, apparently without their presence giving rise to any serious resentment from those obliged to accept the advice. The example is one which we may wish to follow. We would certainly be remiss if we did not make a thorough study of the French techniques and experience to see what there is in it for us to learn and profit from. It would seem unwise not to go beyond study of the British experience of decolonization. The British objective has never been the same as the objective we are likely to seek in PNG. Our probable objective of close continuing involvement is much closer to that of the French.
20. Conclusion What seems to be required is:—
(i) a decision in principle that preparations for the establishment of a foreign service for PNG and for Australian representation in PNG be begun in the near future;
(ii) the establishment of a study group under the control of the Department of External Affairs, with External Territories and other participation as appropriate, to formulate recommendations {in to the shape of our future relationship with PNG and, as an early step,} as to what should be done to implement (i) above, taking into account British, French and other relevant experience.
[NAA: Al838, 936/3/24 part 1]