Canberra, 3 November 1969
Secret
During your last visit you mentioned to the Secretary your concern about the present Territory Intelligence set up. You seemed to be thinking of the establishment of a cell in the Administrator’s Department to serve I assume in some kind of co-ordinating role.
We have been concerned ourselves for some time that the present arrangements are not satisfactory.1 My understanding is that you are producing specific proposals for consideration by the Board.
It seems to me that the starting point in the exercise is to lay down clearly what the Administration’s requirements are and presumably this is being done. The next point to examine is the existing machinery which in a broad way I suppose consists of the Special Branch and the T.I.C.
The Special Branch does not appear to have a clearly defined place in the scheme of things and I think this is one of the facts which makes it less efficient than it ought to be.
The second is that it does not have adequate headquarters staff.2 Our view here is that the staff of the Branch should remain in the Public Service but be responsible to the Commissioner of Police. For that purpose he could have a Departmental Head role as well as being Commissioner of the Constabulary. The rationale of this is that every police force needs an intelligence organisation and it seems to me that the one unit ought to be able to provide both the police needs and those of the Administration generally. As to staffing I have no doubt that A.S.I.O. would favourably consider the secondment of at least one expert who I think ought to be fitted in just below Sheekey.
Another aspect is the present T.I.C. on which there are representatives of other departments. This Committee’s future is under consideration here and our thinking at the moment is directed towards a clean slate approach i.e. the establishment of some machinery in which I see a re-organised and re-designated Special Branch providing a leading if not the leading part designed to serve the Administration’s, the Department’s and the Minister’s needs. This same apparatus might also provide information for other departments e.g. the Defence complex who have been requested to set down and justify their intelligence needs for the purposes of a thorough going review.3 Apart from this review the Secretary mentioned in his letter of 7th August last4 (and subsequently in his telex of 14th August)5 the need to take a look at the activities of the T.I.C. He put the view that it would be more appropriate to introduce other arrangements.
There could be disadvantages in building up a number of small cells, none of them really equipped to do the complete job, with the necessity then of providing a sort of overall co-ordinating machine. If Special Branch is given some teeth and, apart from our own requirements it is necessary to have in mind that this unit now provides the Director-General of A.S.I.O. with information necessary to fulfil his statutory obligations, it could be the backbone of the Territory intelligence apparatus.6 As I see it the Branch will need to include a number of civilian staff at various levels to give the best prospect of maintaining relevance, perspective and freedom from a police or security orientation in the intelligence product.
If the Special Branch is to have the sort of broader role outlined above it would seem appropriate that it should be redesignated—perhaps as the Intelligence Branch. It was previously suggested by Mr Barbour that the head of the Branch might be designated ‘Director of Security and Intelligence’. This is the term used by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Our thinking here is that the word ‘intelligence’ covers the functions adequately, is simpler and does not have quite the stigma that perhaps the word ‘security’ would add.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Board since the Secretary has asked me to let Mr Unkles know that you will be forwarding proposals which he would like the Board and the Department to process fairly speedily.
[NAA: A452, 1968/3943]
1 See Document 306.
2 Barbour had in August conducted a second review of Special Branch (for the original review, see Document 186). In late September, he told DOET that the Branch had three problems: ‘there is no intelligence sense at the field level; (ii) more staff is required at the Headquarters end to assist in sifting analysis and collation; and (iii) the location of Headquarters Special Branch needs to be fixed’. Besley expanded: ‘As far as (i) is concerned there does not seem to be any training at the district level … Barbour’s own experience is that in discussions at the field level he has found that a good deal of information does in fact exist which is just not getting through. This needs pushing … On the staff side at Headquarters Sheekey is very greatly handicapped because he does not have enough people to do the necessary analysis. This needs attending to straight away and in fact is the one outstanding issue from the original Barbour Report … There is a good deal of concern felt in the Territory amongst members of the Branch since they do not feel they have any fixed location. There is also some minor pulling or division of opinion between the Constabulary, the District Administration people and the Administrator’s {former} Department … It now seems to be in the Administrator’s mind to set up another cell in his own Department in the internal security area. This would be done under Hayes and there is reason to suspect that Hayes is pushing a barrow fairly hard’ (note for file by Besley, 30 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1968/3943).
3 Following the meeting of the Defence Committee on 2 September (see Document 311), its chairman, Sir Henry Bland, asked the newly-established Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) to ‘look into the Territory’s long term [intelligence] needs’—a request which ‘arose from the Defence Committee meeting … at which most of its members felt that there was not enough hard intelligence available to them to make the kind of decision they were being asked to make’ (note for file by Besley, 11 September 1969, NAA: Al970/4671). JIO Head R.W. Furlonger thereafter met with Warwick Smith and an informal committee was established (loc. cit.). Several meetings were held before year’s end, during which there emerged ‘two quite different lines of approach, namely (the DOET) line which {is} direct{ed} towards a disbandment of the TIC; and … the line taken by the Defence people which is directed towards repair of the TIC’ (minute, Besley to Ballard, 13 November 1969, ibid.). Territories argued that ‘the situation had changed so much since the T.I.C. was established notably in relation to relationships with the Indonesians that it was better to start from a clean slate’ while ‘others felt that it had taken so long to get any kind of intelligence machinery established that it was better to repair the existing machinery than to go through the agonies of setting it up anew’ (note for file by Besley, 16 October 1969, ibid.) The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major-General S.C. Graham, also challenged DOET’s view of the origins of the TIC, suggesting it was formed ‘for the express purpose of [enabling] Australia to be fully informed of Territory developments … right up to the point of self-determination’—and there was disagreement that an intelligence machine exclusively run by the Administration would be able to determine what material was relevant to Defence needs (draft notes of discussion by Besley, 25 September 1969, ibid.).
4 Document 306.
5 Not printed.
6 In his conversation with DOET, Barbour had also commented on ASIO’s role in the Territory, saying that the Director-General had a statutory role in Australia and its territories, but that Spry had ‘some time ago voluntarily proposed the principle of establishing Special Branch and withdrawing effectively from the Territory. This had a two fold purpose—(i) firstly, to set up a machine which would have a reasonable chance of leaving the Territory after self-determination with some kind of machinery which would fill the role formerly undertaken by ASIO; and (ii) secondly, in the intervening period to provide the kind of information the Director-General needs to carry out his statutory responsibility. As far as the second is concerned … that need is not being filled. The new man on the spot, Boyle, is doing a better job that his predecessor and to an extent the gap has been closed but the real issue is to strengthen the Special Branch so that it can firstly, perform the second function mentioned above and secondly, fill the long term need of the Territory … As far as the T.l.C. is concerned ASIO has no particular role to fill nor indeed any desire to participate. It is apparently an historical accident that they are members of it’ (note for file by Besely, 30 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1968/3943). Sheekey, for his part, had enthusiastically advocated a stronger role for Special Branch: ‘There is no doubt whatsoever that Special Branch can supply the intelligence requirements of the Department of External Territories and the Administration. At present we supply eighty percent (80%) of all intelligence that goes into the T.I.C. monthly summary. In effect the only intelligence we do not now supply is that which comes from Districts where Special Branch is not presently represented, e.g. Bougainville. Special Branch should become the central co-ordinating point for all intelligence in the T.P.N.G …. I think I am correct in saying that we are agreed that Special Branch should become a wholly civilian organisation with a new name … The most immediate problems are the acquisition of suitable staff aid the creation of a proper career structure for the new organisation, i.e. an establishment … We must not lose sight of the long-term aim of training an indigenous security intelligence organisation’ (letter, Sheekey to Besley, 21 October 1969, ibid.).