Port Moresby, 23 November 1969
614. Confidential Immediate
Gazelle Peninsula
Following is my appreciation as of today 23 November.
1. The Council though elected by a relatively small percentage of voters (20%) is the lawful council. Although it lacked purpose and drive in mid-year, it has shown increased vigour and determination in the past month. Its executive know their own minds. They have been fortified by the House of Assembly endorsement of the Commission report and the Administration statement of 13th November.1 They firmly believe they are entitled to full Administration backing and that the Administration will be failing in its duty if it does not exert its authority on the Council’s behalf in the Gazelle. Without full Administration backing the Council cannot expect to command respect and authority. The Council wishes to take the initiative through summonses for non-payment of Council tax. In the medium term it is interested and active in land questions and is fully co-operating in Administration land2 in the Kerevat area. The executive is (reluctantly) prepared to continue discussions with the M.A., subject to consultation with full Council. They are strongly opposed to a referendum but will entertain a proposal for an earlier election (e.g. in late 1970) provided it is on the basis of the recently proclaimed Council area. They are opposed to current M.A. proposal for two councils.
2. The M.A. has a well organised, determined and in some respects fanatical leadership group with a following that includes many younger elements in the Gazelle, both the semi-educated and some of the well educated. The leadership group works by consensus. Its nominal head is Damien Kereku. Its most influential member at this stage appears to be John Kaputin. The place of Tammur appears secondary, although he is a useful spokesman. Their influence is estimated to cover one third of the population of the Gazelle, with no well defined area, but particular strength in Matupit and along the south coast to the Kokopo sub-district. They mustered 2,900 men to march in Rabaul on 14th November. We must assume this is a minimum which could be put on the streets for demonstration or similar purposes. M.A. claim substantial support amongst Tolais in Moresby. This is probably true for the tertiary students but several senior Tolais in the public service have signified their disapproval. The stated aim of the M.A. has always been the withdrawal of the proclamation establishing the so-called Multi Racial Council. More recently, leaders have been talking of self-government and of taking power to run their own affairs. They say they do not respect the existing law in the Territory because it is imposed by Australia. In discussions in Moresby yesterday the M.A. did not press for the abolition of the Council. It also dropped referendum proposal. Instead it suggested a dual system of local government with the M.A. being recognised as a proper authority in the Gazelle, alongside the Council (on the analogy of different church denominations). This, together with the establishment this week of an M.A. market outside the town, suggests that an early M.A. aim could be to declare themselves a legal authority in the Gazelle, with equal status to the Council. Apart from anything else, this would in their eyes authorise them to use for M.A. purposes the $27,000 subscriptions paid to the M.A. by many Tolais as tax to be held in trust pending the re-establishment of the old council. Initiatives of this kind must be expected. M.A. activity will probably take this form rather than actual physical clashes with the Council. They say, however, that they will resist force with force. This presumably means forceful resistance to any interference with their activities (marches, market etc), to any arrests or to jailing after sentence in the courts. In assessing their capacity for forceful resistance we must assume that they will be disposed to use native weapons and normal riot weapons such as bottles and clubs. Their leaders are believed to be familiar with resistance literature and no doubt have the capacity to make and use such weapons as petrol bombs (though there is no evidence of this). However, it is probable that in the ultimate no more than a small, determined, hard core would be likely to be involved in extreme violence of this kind. The possibility of bloodshed has figured in conversations with myself. Indeed, Emanuel has reported that M.A. have stated they could envisage provoking the killing of some members by the police to achieve their political purposes should all else fail. In short, the M.A. believe they have the initiative and incidents which could lead to violence can be expected at any time. The fact that they accepted an invitation to come to Moresby for talks does not indicate any weakening in their resolve. Indeed, if they do not get their way openly they could well resort to underground means.
3. The M.A. claims it is not as such anti-European. But its leaders are personally anti-European. While no threats have yet been made, action against individual Europeans should not be excluded. The present tension is bound to affect the morale of Europeans in Rabaul and the Peninsula.
4. Apart from the M.A., resistance to the Council in an organised but passive way comes from the various Kivung groups3 which previously had refused to join the Council. They still support the M.A. against the existing Council but will probably resist any M.A. attempt to get them into an M.A. council.
5. There is a further grouping of opinion, probably as much as one third of the total which has remained on the fence and has gladly taken the opportunity of avoiding paying Council tax.
6. If, as seems likely, the present talks between the Council executive and the M.A. break down, the Government broadly has the following options:
(a) to support the Council fully in the knowledge that at any time from now on, sooner probably rather than later, a direct clash with the M.A. involving the police is inevitable. This firm Administration position could be presented against the background of continued readiness to hold further test of public opinion by means of new elections or even a referendum (as stated in the House of Assembly on 13th November). This course would not be followed provocatively. Mass issues of summons would be avoided. It is seen as a holding operation to enable the Council to function. Given the numerical strength of the M.A., it would be necessary to hold at least the present police strength (500) in Rabaul and to be prepared to reinforce that strength at short notice. For this purpose we would need R.A.A.F. Hercules on call. Once committed, the Administration could not withdraw and it would need an assurance that, in an extreme emergency army units could be made available. Such an emergency is not seen as likely provided no restrictions are placed on amount of force police can use in extreme cases. It is relevant in this connection that unless the army pay problem is solved,4 there could be further disciplinary trouble in the army in early December. This course of action could best be carried out if a state of emergency were declared, which would permit searches, freezing of M.A. funds, curfew and preventive detention of leaders. It is realised that, in the absence of legislation in the Territory, such a declaration would present some difficulty not least because of likely public reaction.5 We are preparing legislation for the Territory House of Assembly which, if the situation deteriorates, would have to hold special meeting to consider it. The advantages of this course are that it would indicate that the Government is determined to maintain the law and exercise its authority in the face of a deliberate challenge, the outcome of which is being closely watched throughout the Territory. The Administration would be following a clearly expressed view of the House of Assembly. The disadvantages of the course are the risk of violence involved, the possibility that the police resources would not be able to cope without the aid of the army, unless a state of emergency were declared, the repercussions against the Administration amongst the articulate younger groups in Moresby and in the press.
(b) for the Administration to intervene directly by ordering either an immediate referendum or an immediate new election (which the M.A. at present would not accept) or by suspending the Council and replacing it by a commission on which both Council and M.A. were represented. Such a course of action would be a blow to the Council and its supporters. They would see it as an M.A. victory. Moves for early self-government and perhaps separation would receive enormous impetus. Moderate opinion, both in the Gazelle and in the rest of the Territory, would be dismayed and the capacity of the Administration to govern effectively would be seriously suspect. These obvious disadvantages have to be seen against the advantage of avoiding the substantial use of armed force possibly over a prolonged period.
7. Alternative 6(a) is supported by myself and senior advisers and we propose to act accordingly.
[NAA: A452, 1969/4331]
1 A statement by Johnson responded to the commission’s report; a summary of the statement reads as follows: ‘(a) Difficulties were seen in adopting the recommendation involving compulsory acquisition of land to resettle local native peoples. The Administration was not prepared to introduce further legislative proposals for compulsory acquisition beyond those already proposed. The Administration agrees with the Commission that a long term solution to [the] local land problem lies in resettlement schemes outside the Tolai area. (b) The Administration proposes to invite a representative group of local Gazelle leaders to Port Moresby for discussions to open the way for arrangements acceptable to the Tolai people. (c) The Administration does not have a closed mind to the idea of a referendum by secret ballot after a suitable cooling off period. All sides would need to agree in advance to accept the result. Alternatively, an election might take place in the second half of 1970. (d) An intensive drive to collect Council taxes is about to be conducted which will be accompanied by the issue of summonses. The Administration will uphold the lawful right of an elected Council to collect taxes. (e) Mataungan opposition to the multi-racial Council has not taken advantage of the normal democratic means available for its expression. Rather, the association chose methods which place at issue the observance of the law and the democratic process’. The House adopted a motion by Johnson ‘that the House take note of the [report] and endorse the Administration proposals to support the lawful actions of the Council and to offer the opportunity for consultation with all interested groups in the Gazelle Peninsula’ (memorandum, DEA (M. W. Hughes (Acting Head, Dependent Territories Section)) to UNNY, 20 November 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331. For a verbatim copy of the statement, see NAA: A1838, 936/4/16 part 2). Johnson’s statement was made after a policy discussion in Canberra on 10 November between Barnes, Warwick Smith, Hay and Ballard. A proposal floated, but not mentioned in the statement, was that the Council might be replaced with a commission during a cooling-off period—‘It was agreed that a Commission could only be put in when [the] Council had the upper hand. A downgrading of MA authority and upgrading of MRC authority. [The] Minister saw the Council’s continued operation as part of Australia’s policy of political development—it has the support of the U.N. and is a necessary preliminary to self-government. The phrase multi-racial should be abandoned’. At the conclusion of the meeting, Barnes ‘reiterated that the Government must be firm in its policy’ and there was agreement ‘that [the] Council should not be weakened and MA not antagonised and way be left open for mutual negotiations. Taxes must be collected in the interim. Would need to be careful about the use of compulsory acquisition—investment problems. House of Assembly backing is necessary and full implications of the backing must be made known to the House. The MA is a form of secessionist movement. If the House supports tax default summonses then it must support [the] consequences’ (minute, Kerr to Ballard, undated, NAA: A452, 1969/4331 ). Three days later, referring either to Barnes’ or Johnson’s statement, Warwick Smith spoke to Barnes and ‘expressed his concern about the approach in the present statement which too much tended to identify the Administration with the Council. He said that he was concerned that the Administration might find itself in a position that the Council could not be sustained and that it was presented either with the alternative of seeking military assistance which the Government might not be willing to provide, or with having to back down with a resultant loss of face … The Minister confirmed that he felt that in principle the Administration had to support the duly constituted Council’ (note for file by Ballard, 13 November 1969, ibid.).
2 A word appears to be missing here.
3 See Document 241.
4 See Document 338.
5 For background, see editorial note ‘Internal security planning’.