Rabaul, 9 December 1969
Unnumbered. Restricted. Staff-In-Confidence.
The following is my assessment as at 8am on Tuesday 9th December.
1. A serious threat to security has arisen from use by Mataungans of mobile gangs of thugs who beat up Council supporters and threaten their families. They operate by day and by night. Even when not actually operating, possibility that they may has dismayed and cowed Council supporters and impressed those who have not declared themselves. Equally serious threats arise from the capacity of the Mataungans to assemble mobs of supporters in Rabaul township and threaten such places as the police barracks and courthouse with mass assault by some thousands of persons in the event of arrest of Mataungan supporters. A similar threat could be mounted against the corrective institution. A further threat arises from the possibility that in some areas the pro Council elements will lose patience and thus resort to violent action.2 The mood of the Councillors is one of extreme consternation and anger.3 The threat has not been extended to Europeans or Chinese but could well do so. At present the morale of this sector remains reasonably good.
2. The intentions of the Mataungan Association have always been to win power in the Gazelle on behalf of what they claim are the young, educated and untainted Tolais. The use of pressure and threat of violence have been a normal part of their equipment. The difference now is that force and threat of force are now being openly used.
3. The initiative has tended to rest with the Mataungans because of the legal obstacles to arresting Mataungan leaders, curtailing the mobility of their supporters and forbidding assemblies. The main body of the police is being held in Rabaul against the very real possibility of mass assault on key points. We are confident of defeating any such assaults but so far the Mataungans have had the run of the countryside outside Rabaul. From today strong mobile police Administration patrols are being mounted to make arrests of those involved in previous assaults and of tax defaulters and to show the Administration presence in the Gazelle. We shall mount standing patrols in key areas as soon as possible[,] bringing in extra civilian manpower if necessary. These measures will help restore confidence. The situation has been held during the last 24 hours. Our aim is to restore law and order, to reestablish confidence in the Administration and Council which has been seriously shaken. Against the strength of the opposition this will probably be a lengthy job. I propose to put Ellis in charge for the present and he will have extra staff in the planning[,] operational[,] intelligence and information side.
4. I have given a great deal of thought to the desirability of a special meeting of the House. I am coming to the view that it could be desirable but we should aim at nothing less than a full set of emergency powers.4 The open use of force has presented a new situation and we are gravely handicapped in dealing with it and would still be even if the stage one exercise5 were completed as at present envisaged. I am consulting with Curtis and Newman in this and will send a firm recommendation tomorrow or Thursday.6
5. I propose to return to Moresby on Wednesday if the situation permits.
[NAA: A452, 1969/4001]
1 The telex was repeated to Newman in Port Moresby.
2 Hay had reported earlier that a pro-council party had on the night of the 7th assaulted two Mataungan leaders, including Matthias Toliman’s brother, Michael (telex 10078, Hay to Warwick Smith, 8 December 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4001).
3 The council had met on 8 December. It had ‘deplored [the] trouble started by MA’ and passed a vote of no confidence in Tammur. It also ‘accused Nwokolo of causing the trouble’ and said that he should be deported (telex 10085, Hay to DOET, 8 December 1969, ibid.). In an ‘emotional’ meeting with Hay of the same day, ‘strong resentment was expressed that [the] Administration had waited until blood was shed before acting firmly. Councillors said that if Administration action [was] not now effective, they would not be able to hold their own people back and there would be widespread violence’ (telex 10086, Hay to DOET, 8 December 1969, ibid.). Hay has said that it was ‘very, very heart-rending to hear these things’ and ‘tragic’ to see ‘these old men, a number of them battered and bruised, sitting down and not really knowing what to do’ (Hay interview, 1973–4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 5:2116).
4 See editorial note ‘Internal security planning’ and Document 333.
5 That is, to attempt during a scheduled meeting of the House to embed public order powers in normal legislation—as opposed to progressively more extreme powers, which could be introduced to the House in two further stages as demanded by events on the ground (see minute, A. F. Oyster (Officer-in-Charge, Law Reform and Law Revision Section, DOET) to Ballard, 1 December 1969, and notes of discussion between Territories and Administration officers, 4 December 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/5637). This represented a minor modification of the two-phase approach which had hitherto been used (see editorial note ‘Internal security planning’).
6 In Canberra, the interdepartmental committee on military aid to the civil power had been continuing its attempts to construct a paper for consideration at higher levels (for background, see Documents 273 and 311). There were still tensions with DOET. Referring to changes to a summary paper made by DOET, DEA thought these changes ‘were not happy [ones] as they tend to play down the significance of the use of the army’ (minute, Coles to Doig, 5 December 1969, NAA; Al838, 936/3/21 part 2)—and Defence confided to DEA that it was ‘not happy with the latest draft’ (marginal note by Doig, 10 December 1969, on minute, Coles to Doig and Booker, 8 December 1969, ibid.). When Territories said on 5 December it did not envisage another interdepartmental meeting in the near future (it was busy with the re-organisation of the PIR), DEA warned that ‘whatever happened [it] would hope [to have] adequate warning as the present paper was not something that could be rushed to Cabinet in twenty-four hours’ (minute, Coles to Doig, 5 December 1969, ibid.). External Affairs was therefore surprised when it found on 8 December that Warwick Smith had instructed that the paper on military aid and a submission based on it should go to Cabinet within a week. Coles said the final Cabinet decision on the submission of May was still pending (see Document 273) and insisted that interested departments be consulted in advance or at least have adequate time to brief their Ministers (minute, Coles to Doig and Booker, 8 December 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/3/21 part 2). Afterward, Doig spoke to Poyser of Defence, who said his Minister ‘will take a firm stand on Territories’ proposals if they should press them on’ (marginal note by Doig, 10 December 1969, on loc. cit.). However, Booker noted that ‘Cabinet will conclude today and not meet again until New Year’ (marginal note by Booker, 10 December 1969, on loc. cit.).