Canberra, 15 December 1969
Constitutional Development Committee—briefing papers
Attached are two copies of the briefing papers2 prepared following your conference with the Secretary last week.3 These are being forwarded in draft form on the basis that we assume you will let us have your formal comments at the conclusion of the current meeting of the Committee. We also assume that you will do nothing to prejudice the approach that is being followed.
2. The Minister needs to write to the Prime Minister before his meeting with the Committee members on 2nd February and we would appreciate it if you would let us know any points you feel he would need to raise with the Prime Minister.
Attachment
SERIES: B
PAPER: 2 (FINAL)4
PARLIAMENTARY ORGANISATION
Unitary And Federal Systems
(1) The policy of the Government and the Administration is to seek a strong central government within a unitary system.
(2) Experience with federations (e.g. Central Africa and West Indies) not happy.
(3) Basis of federal system is the division of sovereign authority between central and local organs—similarly in a unitary system {of} government local authorities may have additional functions, e.g. the county is the education authority in England. Compare relationships in Australia with those in Northern Ireland.
(4) If a Federation desirable it [is] crucial to decide where the specified powers and where the residual powers lie, e.g. with central or regional authorities.
(5) There is a wide range of federal authorities.
- under the Malaysian situation the federal government can direct the Malay states on all matters except the affairs of the Sultans, religion and Muslim law.
(6) Government’s policy is opposed to the secession of any part of the Territory and federalism based upon the acceptance of sovereignty of states would be inconsistent with this and should be opposed by Official Members.
(7) The present difficulties with Gazelle Council have a direct bearing on possible regional authority.
(i) balance needs to be struck between the degree of central control which can be maintained and conferring a degree of local autonomy which could lead to secession
(ii) there is scope within the Local Government Ordinance for the exercise of local authority (probably all the local authority which can be sustained without {fragmentation})
(8) A distinction must be drawn between those nations in which a federation was established well before independence and those established at the time of independence.
[ matter omitted ]5
SERIES: B
PAPER: 2 (FINAL)
PARLIAMENTARY ORGANISATION
Bi-Cameral – Unicameral Systems
(1) A second chamber could act as ‘house of review’—provide more stable, better balanced and better considered legislation.
(2) Volatile character of House of Assembly tempered by second chamber.
(3) Delaying power on legislation—21 day rule does not provide enough cooling off time.
(4) Second chamber functions—
(i) provide full and free debate on matters of public interest.
(ii) maintain oversight of regulation making power and review subordinate legislation.
(iii) a power of veto on private members bills but only power to delay government legislation.
(iv) limited authority over finances.
(5) A second chamber would give a greater opportunity for reflection and taking account of the views of the people through debate and consensus rather than by way of numerical voting as in House of Assembly. Decision making through debate and consensus is more in harmony with Papuans and New Guineans’ traditional ways.
Nature of second chamber
(6) Envisage directly elected from each of the 18 districts. No educational qualification but substantial residential and possibly age qualification.
(7) Requirement for some official representation in second chamber, e.g. up to 2 nominated officials—however desirable to keep all executive representation in House of Assembly.
Problems posed by establishment of second chamber
(8) A second chamber with power of delay on government legislation could make it more difficult for Government to legislate—gain in speed in a unicameral system could be offset by the passage of inadequately presented and considered legislation.
(9) Extra cost and possible duplication involved.
(10) There is sometimes conflict between Houses in all systems and although not necessarily a bad thing it could create problems in an unsophisticated electorate.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 3 (FINAL)
PARLIAMENTARY ORGANISATION
Position Of The Judiciary
(1) Judiciary must be impartial and independent.
(2) Judges should not be removed until they retire at a fixed age.
(3) Some future Committee will no doubt wish to consider best method of appointing Judges in the future to ensure that they are impartial and competent.
(4) Similar principles apply to Magistrates.
(5) Some newly independent nations have established a Judicial Services Commission—on the whole it is considered better results are obtained by people who work within the spirit of the Constitution rather than by the setting up of the series of checks and balances involved in a Judicial Services Commission.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 4 (FINAL)
[PARLIAMENTARY ORGANISATION]
Relationship Of The Executive To Legislature
(1) The Australian Government believes it is fundamental that Ministers who take political decisions must have an electoral base and must be forced from time to time to confront electors in order that they will keep in touch with the attitudes of the electors and develop the knack of finding solutions which are acceptable to public opinion and compatible with good principles of public administration.
- in addition there is a need for the executive to regularly confront the members in the House of Assembly to answer questions and be exposed to public tests of their effectiveness as Ministers—also keeping in touch with public opinion as represented through House.
(2) The basic principle is whether the executive and legislature are to be separate e.g. U.S.A. or whether the executive and legislature are to be interlocked—in neither system does the executive have final power.
(3) Under Westminster system and parliamentary system in most European countries, authority is vested in a Cabinet rather than in a President—this seems more in harmony with traditional collective responsibility in P.N.G. society.
(4) Westminster and European Parliamentary systems all involve Parliamentary control of the Executive—if the party holding office controls Parliament there is no conflict.
(5) Under U.S. Presidential System final executive authority is vested in one man and system rests on principle of separation of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial organs through a system of checks and balances.
(6) There is no evidence in P.N.G. that there is a substantial group of people (like U.S Secretaries) who would not stand for political office but would be prepared to accept ministerial appointment.
(7) Under present system executive chosen from members representing a geographical cross section of Territory—if adopt U.S. system then possibility of executive being drawn from elite in one area or one interest group—academic attainment no guarantee of ministerial wisdom. In both U.S. and Westminster systems executive is responsible to legislature for provision of funds.
Organisation Of The Executive
(1) Need for a Head of State and sometimes this combined with head of executive (e.g. U.S.A., Kenya, Tanzania).
(2) Value in collective responsibility of executive (e.g. decisions taken by Cabinet or Cabinet committees) which diminishes the onus on the individual and emphasises decision by consensus—this more in harmony with Territory traditions.
(3) Selection of executive from among the members of the House of Assembly to be by vote of legislature—use of ministerial Nominations Committee desirable and approaches consensus tradition.
(4) Organisation of executive where collective responsibility accepted must be a matter for executive itself however allocation of portfolios a matter for the Administrator
- not a matter for legislature even under Westminster system e.g. establishment of Department of Education and Science.
(5) The Department has undertaken to prepare for the Administration an appreciation of possible methods of giving executive authority to people who are not elected members of the House. In discussion with the Minister the possibility was canvassed of letting the House itself elect some members to the House so that they could perform ministerial functions while the House wanted them to do so. This particular point is one which will be discussed with the Minister in February.
SERIES: B
PAPER 5 (FINAL)
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT WITHIN LIMITS OF PRESENT ACT
(1) Text of Sections 24 and 25 is as follows:6
[ matter omitted ]
(2) Attached is a copy of the Approved Arrangements.7
(3) Present arrangements do not devolve functions to the extent to which this may be done under the Act.
(4) Under the present S.25 would be possible to obtain de facto self government—
(i) would be within the scope of the legislation for Ministerial Members to exercise their functions so that they stand between the Departmental Head and the Administrator.
(ii) could establish by convention that the Administrator would act on their advice.
(5) The Minister’s view is that there is room for a gradual {evolving of the convention that the advice of the A.E.C. is accept[ed]}
(i) starting in the social welfare area
(ii) not applying to certain defined area
(iii) but with new arrangements for the A.E.C. under which papers are circulated in advance and/or other procedures are adopted for ensuring that there is time for mature consideration by the Ministerial Members.
(6) The Minister sees no difficulty in increasing the number of Ministerial Members or having Ministerial Members covering the whole field outside the reserved areas.
(7) When considering the Departments to which Ministerial Members shall be appointed each case should be examined individually i.e. Departments such as Land, Social Development, Transport, (Forests) could go to a Ministerial Member straight away. On the other hand Treasury, D.I.E.S., Law and the Department of the Administrator present special problems.
(i) under present financial arrangements there could not be a Ministerial Member for Treasury but there are arguments for retaining an Assistant Ministerial Member in this position
(ii) D.I.E.S. has special significance with regard to the A.B.C. and newspaper propaganda and should not be handed to a Ministerial Member, but having had an Assistant Ministerial Member before it is probably a bit difficult to backtrack to complete official control
(iii) in the case of law a Ministerial Member could be appointed for Corrective Institutions and/or Police.
(iv) there should not be a Ministerial Member for the Department of the Administrator although there would seem to be no objection to having one for Local Government within that Department.
(8) If it is decided to retain an Assistant Ministerial Member for Treasury it might be worthwhile to keep a few more for appointment to Departments which remain reserved.
(i) in this case it would be desirable to review both the titles of the office and its status and functions to increase the stature of the position.
(ii) note that the Army in Port Moresby, without apparent support from Defence, has suggested that there might be a case for an Assistant Ministerial Member. The Department will consider this further but such should not be proposed by the Official Members in discussion in the Select Committee.
(9) It is important that the Select Committee and the House of Assembly fully understand the basic concept of the Ministerial Member system and its relevance to the present financial arrangements
(i) The Territory has ‘representative government’ not ‘responsible government’
(ii) ‘responsibility’ lies in the Minister’s responsibility to the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Minister is fully responsible for all acts of the Admin.
(iii) Sections 24 and 25 of the PNG Act enable Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members to take decisions as delegates of and on behalf of the Administrator
(iv) but responsibility still lies to Parliament for these actions and Official Members are not responsible in the strict sense to the House of Assembly
(v) as, however, M.M.’s and A.M.M.’s were chosen and removed by the House of Assembly it would be expected that decisions taken by them accord with the views of the House and that advice given and decisions taken by the Minister and the Administrator would then accord with the view of the House.
(10) Present economic development programmes have been established within the framework of the current constitutional structure
- future changes in the constitutional arrangements could necessitate alterations to future economic plans.
(11) An increase in ministerial powers under S.25 should involve some changes in financial arrangements
(12) The Minister sees no specific objections to the idea that the Australian grant could be earmarked for projects which might have difficulty in gaining support from the House of Assembly
- the possibility that particularly the overseas allowance for expatriate Public Servants could be funded in this way was also discussed with the Minister.
(13) The financial dependence of the Territory on Australia is likely to remain for many years yet and it would be directly contrary to Government policy if a demand to move to responsible self-government were to develop because the Ministerial Member system had not evolved to the extent that has been contemplated by Cabinet.
SERIES: B
PAPER : 6 (Final)
PARTY SYSTEM AND ITS RELATION TO THE EXECUTIVE
(1) There is no Government objection to the establishment of political parties which desirably should be national in character.
(2) A problem would arise in the event of a political party securing a majority at the elections—should such party be entitled to fill all ministerial positions or should these be allocated on a pro rata basis?—the possibility that minority groups be given recognition according to proportion of seats held {should be} canvassed.
(3) Would be large regions unrepresented if a strictly party basis adhered to.
(4) The Administrator and the Ministerial Nominations Committee consult for the purpose of reaching agreement on a list of elected members to be submitted to the House for appointment to ministerial office
(i) the Committee meanwhile discussing likely candidates with Members of the House
(ii) it is sought through the Ministerial Nominations Committee to get a balanced, negotiated, agreed arrangement in which the Administrator has a say as well as the House of Assembly.
(5) Any suggestion that the Ministerial Nominations Committee be abolished or the system revised should be referred for advice.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 7 (Final)
OFFICIAL MEMBERS
(1) The role of Official Members is to present the views of the Government
- the Government must ensure that its views are put to the House of Assembly in the way it wants them presented.
(2) Official Members have no electoral base and need not have a vote for the purpose for which they are in the House of Assembly. This is essentially a matter for Government and not the Select Committee;
(3) The proposition that the number of Official Members could be reduced to a minimum of three, i.e. one generalist who would also be a member of the A.E.C., the Secretary for Law and the Treasurer—would be acceptable to the Minister
(i) changes in the Official Members would be best presented in the Select Committee report as having emanated from the officials themselves and as having Government support
(ii) this particular change will have to be mentioned in the Minister’s letter to the Prime Minister before the Select Committee meets the Minister in February
(iii) administrative arrangements would have to be made which would take into account the work load carried by these officials.
(4) Official Members should not back stop Ministerial Members on Ministerial Member functions unless it becomes necessary to make a statement of Government policy which the Ministerial Member concerned is unable or unwilling to do.
(5) If there is to be a second House there would need to be Official Members in it without vote and without portfolio—2 Official Members in second chamber would be required.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 8 (Final)
A.E.C. AND MINISTERIAL SYSTEM
(1) The Council is the principal instrument of policy for the executive government of the Territory
- subject to the duty and responsibility of the Administrator acting on behalf of the Australian Government to administer the Territory.
(2) The Council should become a forum for collective policy formulation by the Administrator and holders of ministerial office.
(3) The Committee should consider the effectiveness of the Ministerial Member system in achieving these objectives.
(4) The number of officials on the Council could be reduced to the Administrator and one other.
(5) It is understood that the Chairman of the Select Committee has asked Ministerial Members, Departmental Heads and Official Members to appear before the Select Committee in connection with the Ministerial Member system and that the Administrator has told officials that they should not communicate but that the Government’s views should be conveyed to the Committee by its Official Membership.
- it seems that there should be no objection to Departmental Heads and other officials attending the Committee to explain how the present system works and to explain Administration policy, but that they should not answer questions seeking their own personal opinion.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 9 (Final)
REGIONAL ELECTORATES
(1) There should be no discrimination regarding qualifications for elected members of the House of Assembly.
(2) There is a disproportionate number of expatriate elected members, 11 of whom represent regional electorates.
(3) House {will} reach the stage after two terms where possible to do without educational qualifications, regional electorates and undue numbers of expatriates.
(4) The Territory should now move to a House based directly on one man, one vote.
(5) The Minister considers the establishment of a House of Review to be a desirable development which could facilitate the discarding of regional electorates from House of Assembly.
(6) A view has been expressed that the best procedure in respect of bicameral legislature is to move the present regional seats into the second chamber.
- these would then be directly elected as at present but with a{n age qualification and a} residential qualification requiring …8 years residence in the region. The educational qualification would disappear. This seems a satisfactory legislative arrangement but have to bear in mind that cases where speedy legislation was required (e.g. the Development Bill)9 have nearly always been at the Government’s request and would probably make this impossible.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 10 (Final)
ROLE OF SELECT COMMITTEE
(1) Committee’s role is to examine present constitutional arrangements and make recommendations in its report as to future arrangements.
(2) Press reports suggest Arek has complained of the recent changes in the Ministerial Member Arrangements
(3) The Government looks to the Committee to advise it and the House of Assembly on changes which the majority of the people want—not on views of the Members themselves which may vary from those of the majority of the people.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 11 (Final)
ROLE OF OFFICIAL MEMBERS ON SELECT COMMITTEE
(1) To ensure that the Government’s viewpoint is adequately presented, understood and accepted by the Committee as far as they can achieve it.
(2) Elected members are in the House of Assembly as representatives of the Territory electorate and are able to put forward their own views. Official Members are appointed by Commonwealth nomination and represent the Government and the Administration. They should present only the Government’s view and they should support Government policy even if they are personally not in agreement.
(3) Promote an understanding by Members of the present constitutional arrangements generally and the Papua and New Guinea Act in particular and the possibility for changes within the terms of the Act.
(4) Seek to ensure that Committee’s deliberations are not dominated by any individual or group of Members and that the views of less literate members of the Committee are not swamped.
(5) Make certain that all questions are analysed in sufficient depth and that all Committee members are aware of the implications of any recommendations they make—e.g., the implications of taking a decision means accepting the responsibility if it goes wrong.
(6) Remind Committee that Committee’s role is to report to the House on what the people of the Territory want.
(7) To keep the Government informed (through the Administrator and Secretary, Department of External Territories) of the Committee’s discussions. In order to do this:
(i) provide regular reports on proceedings to Administration and Department;
(ii) provide a full appreciation after each meeting;
(iii) be briefed before each meeting in11 subjects which are likely to arise (this is the point at which Official Members own ideas should be debated).
(8) If items arise for which Official Members have no instructions they should arrange deferment until they have relevant instructions.
SERIES: B
PAPER: 12 (Final)
BASIC PRESENT POSITION
(1) Papua is a dependent Territory and New Guinea is a Trust Territory. In both cases the Australian Government is responsible for the Administration and the Government.
(2) At the present stage of development the Administrator is responsible under the Papua and New Guinea Act for administering the combined Territory on behalf of the Commonwealth.
(3) This means that he is an Official appointed by the Commonwealth Government to administer the Territory, and subject to legislation by the House of Assembly and to executive decisions by Ministerial Members or the Administrator’s Executive Council (within the constitutional arrangements in operation) to give effect to the policies of the Government.
(4) At the present stage of development legislation by the House of Assembly may be disallowed by the Governor-General (who acts on the Commonwealth Government’s advice), but the practice is to exercise this legal power only rarely, on matters of importance to the Commonwealth Government or technical in character.
(5) Administrative decisions by the Administrator’s Executive Council are in the form of advice to the Administrator, who has power to act differently, but in practice follows the advice to the greatest extent practicable.
(6) Approved arrangements under Sections 24 and 25 of the Papua and New Guinea Act state the powers and functions of Assistant Ministerial Members and Ministerial Members.
(7) Under the current provisions of the Act it would be possible for Ministerial Members to be responsible for the business of a Department subject to any direction of the Administrator.
(8) The Department of External Territories has a statutory responsibility to advise the Minister in relation to all the business of the Department.
(9) Commonwealth Departments operate in the Territory under Commonwealth Acts and are funded directly from the Commonwealth Budget—attached is a list of such Departments.
[ matter omitted ]12
SERIES: B
PAPER: 13 (Final)
COMMITTEE MEETING WITH MINISTER IN FEBRUARY
From the Minister’s point of view, the object of February’s meeting would be to engage in an informal exchange of views and the Minister should not be expected to commit the Government to future policy positions—
(i) this can only come later in the Committee’s work when it has firmed up its own ideas, but before it has committed itself to its report;
(ii) this approach would not rule out the Committee raising any item it wanted to.
[NAA: A452, 1969/3605]
The United Nations resolution on PNG, 1969
The General Assembly’s 1969 resolution on New Guinea—and the official Australian response to it—provided a departure from the annual round of public acrimony over the Territory. As noted in a DOET press release, the resolution was ‘in contrast to the tone of those of the past 3 years, which called for an end to all racial discrimination (1966 and 1967), and for a new House of Assembly election in order to transfer effective power to the people … together with an early target-date for independence’.1 Moreover, Australia had voted in favour of the resolution. While the 1969 version reaffirmed earlier resolutions—a clause from which the Australian representative resiled in his explanatory speech—it otherwise simply called for Australia to hand over executive and legislative power ‘in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples’ and to ‘intensify and accelerate the education and technical and administrative training’ of indigenes.2 The resolution also requested the Trusteeship Council to appoint non-members of the Council to its periodic visiting missions—and to do so in consultation with Australia and the Committee of Twenty-four.
Australia’s relative satisfaction with this outcome had not been matched by optimism during preparations for the vote. The Australian delegation had been anxious in the committee stages when a prolonged tussle developed over the paragraph on future visiting missions. In its groundwork for the Fourth Committee, the Afro-Asian group had approved a draft in which the Assembly decided that the Trusteeship Council and the Committee of Twenty-four would jointly appoint a special visiting mission to Papua and New Guinea ‘consisting of members to be selected from the two bodies on the widest geographical representation, for the purpose of obtaining first-hand information on the progress made towards the implementation of [resolution 1514]3 and report thereon’.4 This draft was chosen in spite of the objections of Liberia’s Fahnwulu Caine, a member of the 1968 UN visiting mission to New Guinea. When the Fourth Committee met, the Afro-Asian draft was distributed at the same time as an amendment by Caine, in which he changed the contentious paragraph to one that ‘recommends’ to the Trusteeship Council that it ‘consider’, in consultation with Australia and the Committee of Twenty-four, the inclusion of non-members of the Council in its ‘periodic’ missions to New Guinea. Ahead of the Committee’s consideration, the Australian mission believed the position was invidious:
The United Arab Republic, although it guided the [Afro-Asian] draft through 3 weeks of mendacious and unscrupulous lobbying did not sponsor it … After this afternoon’s meeting, the UAR representatives were peddling copies of the draft, trying to get more sponsors … [UAR] said that Australia had accepted the formulation in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, dealing with a special visiting mission. Unfortunately the UAR has this evening and all tomorrow morning to hustle up other sponsors and they will probably succeed in doing so. It is hard for us to counter their mendacious tactics … So the present position is bad. We will do what we can to get support for the Liberian amendment but we do not think it has much chance of being adopted … The wording of paragraph 5 is clever. Only a few delegations realize that its intentions are to reduce the position and authority of the Trusteeship Council and put Australia in the position of either accepting a visiting mission loaded against it or taking the consequences of failing to comply with an Assembly resolution directed specifically against it.
_Against expectations, the UAR did not find other sponsors and the original sponsors began to have doubts about persisting.5 Thus, the UAR sought a compromise with Australia whereby the substance of Caine’s amendment was accepted with deletion of the word ‘consider’. The Australian delegation afterward reported to Canberra in more hopeful, if still cautious, terms:
There is good will towards us among some members of the Afro-Asian group, but it is hard to channel it into definite positions, and the moderates lack drive. Our arguments have made some impression on more reasonable delegations. What worries us is that it is so easy for extremists to seize the initiative. But given Caine’S strong stand [and the UAR’S move] there is a good chance of something reasonable emerging which we can accept. We would not like to go further than that.
_
Such caution was justified. In a final Afro-Asian meeting, the Kenyan delegate said he would not accept the new draft unless Papua was within the scope of the visiting mission—even though 24 hours before he had indicated that Kenya’s sponsorship of the earlier Afro-Asian draft had only happened because the Australian attitude had been misrepresented to him. When the Committee met, the ‘picture was a confused one’ and the Australians thought it a ‘grave possibility’ that a change in their position with the introduction of the Kenyan formula would in turn prompt ‘somebody like Upper Volta or Togo [to] think that the whole thing was a trick on the part of the administering power and [to] say that the Assembly should use its own authority … to send a visiting mission of its own’. In the event, Caine simply ignored the Kenyan proposal and put the UAR–Liberia amendment, which was passed by the Committee. Reflecting on the outcome, the Australian mission wrote:
One important consideration is that although we have voted for a resolution reaffirming past Assembly resolutions, all the really objectionable features have disappeared … [This is the] result of the war of attrition waged between the extremists and moderates over the past three weeks. During this battle, the extremists concentrated on the idea of the Assembly itself sending a visiting mission and in their single-mindedness omitted to make the customary accusations against the Australian Administration6
The Fourth Committee decision was affirmed by the General Assembly on 16 December.
1 The memorandum was for Johnson’s attention.
2 On file, a minute is inserted between the covering memorandum and the papers. It is assumed that the papers match those sent to Port Moresby. Referring to papers mentioned in Document 342, the minute comments that the ‘only papers in which significant changes were made were Nos. B4 ([para]5); B5 (5–12); B7 (3); B8 (4) & (5); [and] B9 (6)’ (minute, Wheen to Ballard, 11 December 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3605).
3 See Document 342.
4 The word ‘draft’ is handwritten at page top. All papers below are dated 10 December.
5 Matter omitted lists nations which had used the federal system.
6 See editorial note ‘Changes to the Papua and New Guinea Act’.
7 See Document 197.
8 Ellipsis in the original.
9 See Document 347.
10 This word appears to be superfluous.
11 This word should probably read ‘on’.
12 The lists includes the departments of Air, Army, Civil Aviation, Defence, Interior, National Development, Navy, Postmaster-General’s, Prime Minister, Shipping and Transport, Treasury, and Works—plus ABC, CSIRO and the Public Service Board. Under ‘Instrumentalities on a commercial basis’, the attachment cites the Australian Services Canteen Organisation, Commonwealth Development Bank, Commonwealth Savings Bank, Commonwealth Trading Bank, Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, TAA, Qantas, Reserve Bank and Overseas Telecommunications Commission.
1 DOET press release, 19 December 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4973.
2 Resolution 2590, 16 December 1969, in Yearbook of the United Nations 1969 , New York, 1972, p. 620.
3 See footnote 7, Document 14.
4 Cablegrams 2478 and 2501, UNNY to DEA, 10 December 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/5571.
5 Cablegram 2516, UNNY to DEA, 12 December 1969, ibid.
6 Text in parenthesis in this quotation is an editorial interpretation of a textual corruption in the original.