Port Moresby, 23 December 1969
Confidential
I refer to your letter A.109 of 7th August1 and to a letter on your file 68/3943 dated 3rd November and signed by Mr. Besley.2
I have been giving a good deal of further thought to the best organisation of intelligence machinery in the Territory in the light of your letters and in the light of a subsequent further report from Mr. Barbour, of which Mr. Besley will have a copy.3
So far as internal organisation is concerned, my mind now runs towards a single unit which will be an integral part of the future government of the Territory and which should have localisation as one of its early aims. I am not, however, yet in a position to give you my more detailed views. The fact is that there is as yet some difference of opinion within the Administration which I am anxious to resolve by further discussion on the question of administration, direction and exact function of a single intelligence body. I hope to have further discussions on this with Departmental Officers later in January before returning from leave.
So far as the T.I.C. is concerned, it is true that under the present system, officials who have no direct responsibility for administering the Territory take part in making assessments of internal developments and that normal reports as well as assessments have a wide circulation within and without the government. It is also true that up till now the Commonwealth authorities, e.g. the Army, have not placed before the T.I.C. their own reports on, for example, the morale and discipline of the Army, although these are of considerable importance as part of the overall security situation in the Territory.
If the Minister decides that, for the reasons stated in your letter, the T.I.C. should be abolished or modified, I would see no difficulty in principle in preparing adequate reports for the Minister within the Administration. My own inclination, however, is against modifying the present system beyond what is necessary to avoid including in the T.I.C. reports information for which there is no justification on a need-to-know basis. Given the serious lack of trained staff, the intelligence process is in my view best regarded as a joint effort by Administration and other Commonwealth authorities in the Territory. The safeguard against the inclusion in T.I.C. reports of matter which is appropriate only for the Minister and Department of External Territories lies in the T.I.C. Chairman being alert to the Minister’s wishes in this matter and ensuring that they are observed.
If the decision is that the T.I.C. should continue, then I have the following comments:
(a) The T.I.C. would be basically an Australian-staffed body serving an Australian interest. Its staff would be Australian and its files for Australian eyes only. It would, as a body, be moved in due course to Australia4 to an eventual High Commissioner’s office.
(b) The Chairman should be a senior Administration officer, available full-time for intelligence duties.
(c) The members of the Committee should be persons without operational or policy responsibilities. They should include the Head of the Intelligence Branch, senior officers, at a level below that of Departmental Head or equivalent, of the Division of District Administration, Police and Army, and the ASIO representative, and such representatives from Australia (e.g. External Affairs and External Territories) as are decided upon. Administration representatives should, in terms of security and numbers, be such as to ensure that Administration views are effectively presented in reports and assessments.
(d) There should be a T.I.C. staff which would prepare drafts of reports and assessments for the T.I.C. on the basis of evaluated material provided by the Intelligence Branch. The staff would have access to other material, including material from service and ASlO sources, at the discretion of the Chairman, T.I.C. Its work would be directed by the Chairman. Given that the T.I.C. organisation will not be part of the apparatus of the Territory after independence, and given the shortage of trained staff in the Administration, it is probably best that the T.I.C. staff include a nucleus of trained officers from Australia, from the services or ASIO, as well as D.D.A. and other Territory departments.
(e) The T.l.C. should prepare regular reports of main internal developments, and such special assessments as are requested by the Administrator. It would not have the job of reporting on or reviewing the state of the Territory as a whole, that would be for the Administrator, with the Minister informing the government as he thinks fit.
[NAA: A452, 1968/3943]
1 Document 306.
2 Document 327.
3 Barbour had sent to Hay a formal report of his August visit to PNG, copied to Besley (for earlier verbal observations on the visit, see footnote 2, Document 327). He identified five problems ‘urgently in need of attention’: ‘(i) the recruitment of indigenous personnel; (ii) the appointment of sufficient suitable staff; (iii) the scope of the Branch’s intelligence role; (iv) the collection of intelligence in the field and reporting to Headquarters; (v) the co-operation between the Branch and the Administration … As to (i) there were some indigenous officers and cadet officers appointed prior to December, 1968. These apparently all proved totally unsuitable. There appears to be little likelihood of obtaining suitable indigenous officers and men to staff the Branch in the future from the ranks of the R.P.N.G.C …. As to (ii) there has been no change since my 1968 visit [see Document 186] in the prospect of appointing suitable European officers from the P.P.N.G.C …. The Branch urgently needs officers to extend its representation into more Districts and to staff its headquarters for the preparation of intelligence reports and analyses … As to (iii) the absence of clearly visible “threats to security” seems to have created uncertainty in the Administration as to the extent to which Special Branch should participate in the general field of intelligence reporting and analysis. This has resulted in tentative considerations of the need for another intelligence apparatus, especially since the importance of intelligence has begun to be better appreciated in the Administration. It appears to me that it is the limited definition of security which causes the confusion. A broader interpretation would overcome this problem. It would not be difficult to accept that the sort of intelligence we are talking about is required for “national security” purposes. This partly prompted me to suggest in my 1968 report that the title of Head of Special Branch might be changed to “Director of Security and Intelligence”. In any case, I would suggest for consideration that the functions of the Branch be developed to embrace intelligence collection in the wide sense. There seems to be a clear need for this in the Territory and it would resolve problems of duplication and parallel reporting which have been developing. The gaps in the intelligence apparatus which the J.I.C. and the Administration have been identifying could be simply filled by allotting this role to the Special Branch. It may be appropriate to change the title to “Intelligence Branch” … If this course were adopted, the problems at (iv) above would be overcome … As to (v), it is likely that clarification of (iii) would bring about a better appreciation of the Branch as the Territory’s own (and only) security/intelligence organisation … If, on the other hand, it is decided that a civilian organisation provides better prospects for overcoming some of these problems, then I would support the proposals submitted by Mr. Besley to the informal meetings convened by Mr. Furlonger [see footnote 3, Document 327]’ (attachments to letter, Barbour to Besley, 15 December 1969, NAA: A452, 1968/3943). Besley subsequently commented to Ballard: ‘I feel strongly that Whitrod must be in charge’ (marginal note, 16 December 1969, on Joe. loc.).
4 The word ‘or’ should perhaps have been inserted here.