Canberra, 26 May 1966
Top Secret
Plan ‘Pygmalion’
This plan was amongst those on which you attended a military briefing in the Operations Centre in the Department. It is an Australian Joint Service Plan for the conduct of military operations in Papua/New Guinea to contain and deter Indonesian covert activities in that area.
2. Plan Pygmalion has been developed so far as an outline plan (copy attached)3 and has been endorsed in this form by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Commander Papua/New Guinea Command has been appointed Force Commander for the purpose of the Plan (his Directive is at annex E to the plan)4 and the Chiefs of Staff Committee has agreed that he should proceed to the further development of his actual operational plan based on the outline plan.
3. In general concept, the following sequence of operations is planned:—
(a) Increased surveillance of the border and nearby coastal areas as soon as the requirement is realised.
(b) Despatch to Papua/New Guinea of additional forces from Australia to permit the conduct and maintenance of sustained operations.
(c) Extension of the surveillance role to operations designed to eliminate Indonesian forces and deter Indonesia from continuing hostile activities.
(d) Despatch to the theatre of additional forces from Australia either as a result of Indonesia’s increased scale of operations or a prolongation of her small scale effort requiring relief of combat forces in the border area.
4. The total forces which might eventually be required from Australia would, as indicated in paragraph 3(d) above, depend on Indonesian actions and reactions. Planning at this stage, however, envisages the despatch to Papua/New Guinea of the following main elements:—
(a) Navy : 4 minesweepers and 2 general purpose vessels;
(b) Army : 1 SAS squadron, 1 infantry battalion, light aviation and logistic elements;
(c) Air : 6 Caribou and 6 Iroquois aircraft with logistic support.
5. The Chiefs of Staff Committee has noted that while the Army has the capability to implement the plan and concurrently maintain forces in South Vietnam and Malaysia, the Navy could only meet a Pygmalion situation by reducing its contribution to anti-confrontation activities5 or when, in approximately 12 months, additional patrol craft become available. The Air Force could meet a Pygmalion situation but in the short term this could have some effect on the availability of helicopters for Army training.
6. In view of the sensitivity from the policy viewpoint of planning to meet covert Indonesian action in Papua/New Guinea, Plan Pygmalion is distributed and handled on a strict ‘need to know’ basis.
7. The Department of Territories is consulted and kept informed as appropriate.
8. It is suggested that at this stage, you note the outline plan in order that the draft operational Plan may be developed by the Force Commander. It is normal contingency planning against a threat which was not considered imminent and which may now be diminishing as a result of developments in Indonesia.6
[NAA: A1946, 1968/710]
1 G.E. Blakers, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defence.
2 Allen Fairhall, Minister for Defence.
3 Not printed.
4 Not printed.
5 See footnote 2, Document 12.
6 Fairhall ‘noted’ the submission on 27 May.