Canberra, 4 July 1966
Top Secret
Papua and New Guinea—threat to internal security
The purpose of this submission is to report to Cabinet that there is some industrial unrest in Papua and New Guinea and to seek Cabinet’s endorsement of action contemplated should the unexpected but extreme situation occur in which the Police and if called out the Pacific Islands Regiment refuse to act to control disturbances. 1
Background
2. The situation has arisen out of the reconstruction of the Public Service under the 1963 Public Service Ordinance. The focal point of expressions of discontent in the Public Service is the level of salaries fixed for indigenes (Local Officers) which are lower than those applicable to expatriates (Overseas Officers).
3. The indigenous Police and army personnel were not at the time directly affected by the reconstruction of the Public Service but have been dissatisfied with their pay and conditions. The basis of pay for both forces has now been converted from ‘cash and kind’ to a full cash basis as for the Public Service with effect from 1st July, 1966.
4. A claim by the Public Service Association on behalf of Local Officers of the Public Service is being considered by the Public Service Arbitrator. Because the Arbitrator was injured in an accident, proceedings have been delayed. They resumed on 21st June. Some expressions of discontent have been directed at this delay.
The situation
5. Pertinent features of reports made from time to time over recent weeks by the Administrator and the Local Intelligence Committee for Papua and New Guinea include planned demonstrations by students (now reported to be deferred), some work stoppages within and without the Public Service in Port Moresby, Rabaul and Sogeri over wages, advocacy of and planning for strike action in the Public Service and amongst the Police both in Port Moresby and elsewhere, attempts by students to associate Police with planned action, and a recent demonstration by indigenous Army personnel over pay.
6. The main reason for concern is uncertainty about the attitude of the indigenous personnel in the Police Force and the Army. The Local Intelligence Committee reports in the following terms—
‘Despite the fact that the announcement of the new pay scales for the Police and Army led to an immediate reduction in tension, the situation is still considered serious. Should unassigned cash in hand, as a result of the new wage rate, not measure up to expectations, the situation could deteriorate.’
The basic issue
7. The disparity between salary levels for indigenous and expatriate public servants arises from the policy of fixing indigenous salary levels that meet basic needs and yet take account of the needs of the economy of the Territory. There is, of course, the further significant principle that persons employed by the Administration and in other ways by the Government should not become privileged groups when compared with those engaged in production.
8. While the Territory is moving towards political self-determination there exists the contradictory situation that it is becoming increasingly dependent on outside financial assistance. Nothing should be done, therefore, that will permanently accelerate this trend.
9. Public Service salaries must be financed from the funds available (from the Australian grant and local revenue) in competition with the heavy demands of expanded economic development programmes as well as expansion, at the expensive tertiary levels, of education and training.2 As an indication of the budgetary implications of changes in levels of salaries and conditions of service for indigenous Administration staff, the reconstruction of the Public Service cost an additional $2,000,000 in the financial year 1964/65; the recent approvals in respect of the police are expected to cost an additional $635,000 for pay and $1,000,000 in respect of housing for 1966/67;3 and in respect of 1965/66 it was estimated that indigenous staff of the Administration would be paid $10,200,000 but that if they were paid at expatriate rates, the cost would be, $41,800,000.
10.Public Service salaries have a significant influence on the levels of pay outside the Public Service. If too high, levels of wages can have an adverse effect on the capacity of the Territory to market the primary products on which its economy depends.
The risk
11. The greatest danger is that some demonstration will be organised and an irresponsible act by someone will spark off trouble. It is assessed that any civil disorder would develop along racial lines.
12. While any outbreak of trouble is likely to occur only in the Port Moresby area there is a possibility that it would be followed by outbreaks in the distant areas of Rabaul and the Highlands with possible development of Territory-wide strikes or other trouble paralysing essential services and endangering European lives.
13. The occasions of greatest risk of trouble are assessed to be—
(a) when the Arbitrator announces a decision; and
(b) in the second half of July when the effect of the first pay under the new pay code is apparent to the Army and Police.
14. At this stage it is assessed that while indigenous Police are unlikely to join with other groups in demonstrations or incidents they might refuse to act against indigenous demonstrators.
15. On the basis of assessments of senior Army officers there is the possibility of serious trouble with Army personnel.4
Approach in handling the situation
16. I have consulted with the Minister for Defence5 and our two departments have consulted informally.
17. At this stage it is not expected that a situation will arise that cannot be contained. Steps have been taken to minimise the possibility of disturbances and to cover the effect of any disturbance that might occur. These include warnings to students of disciplinary action if they demonstrate and the enactment of legislative provisions to give control over meetings and processions.
18. At the same time it seems prudent to plan now against the possibility that the position may deteriorate. The Police Commissioner has plans for the swearing in of special constables if the regular force were to refuse duty. Some 300 men are listed as possibles in Port Moresby, though how many would respond cannot be tested without risk of undesirable publicity. This would be done if deterioration in the situation warranted it.
19. Should a situation develop that cannot be handled with the resources of the Territory it is doubtful whether reliance could be placed on civil assistance from Australia. Police volunteers could be used from Commonwealth controlled forces or, if agreed by the respective Governments, from the States. Because of the risk of undesirable publicity volunteers could not be called until the need to use them was reasonably certain. The situation envisaged is one which arises from refusal of the police and the Pacific Islands Regiment to act, combined with disturbances on a scale that could not be controlled by the available Europeans sworn in as special constables. Warning time before action is essential is therefore likely to be short. The possibility of sufficient pre-planning and advance action to enable police assistance to be provided very quickly should the need arise, but with the pre-planning and advance action kept within the limits needed to avoid leakages of information about the circumstances to which the planning is directed, is being explored. A further submission will be made to Cabinet before any approach is made to the States.
20. In the event that police assistance from Australia cannot be provided within the limitations referred to or in the event that the situation arose before arrangements for the police had been set up, military assistance, as a last resort, would be necessary. I am assured that at least a company of infantry could be moved at short notice if authority were given. The company is not trained in measures in aid of the civil power but Army Headquarters has ordered on a confidential basis that the company officers are to study the relevant techniques. Because of the sensitivity of the subject, an extension of training beyond this scope has not been authorised. The Army also does not hold the special equipment usually required for riot control measures. The Departments of Defence and Territories, in consultation with Attorney-General’s Department, are examining legal and procedural requirements.
21. I consider that the situation must be dealt with by standing firm on the industrial front and living through any trouble that might develop as a consequence. The alternative of increasing salary levels under pressure would encourage further pressure and lead towards a: situation in which the burden of too high wage levels would render impossible the already difficult task of building up a degree of economic self-reliance in the Territory to match the trends in political development.
Recommendation:
22. I recommend that Cabinet approve that plans be prepared for the provision of military assistance as a last resort. (In this regard I envisage that the necessary proclamation by the Governor-General permitting the use of military personnel would be recommended on the basis of a special Cabinet approval, or if the emergency became too pressing, after consultation with the Prime Minister.)
[NAA: A5841, 262]
1 Concerns over unrest in the army and police force were accompanied by fears that planning for civil disturbances was inadequate. In the first half of 1966, the Administration and Territories assessed that existing contingency plans and associated institutional structures were designed for a war situation and were ‘inappropriate for dealing with threats to security … arising internally’ (note for file by J.L. Legge (Defence Liaison Officer, DOT), 5 April 1966, NAA: A452, 1966/2664). It was also thought that legislative provisions for internal action were insufficient (see minutes, Ballard to Swift, 1 June 1966 and undated, ibid.).
2 See introduction.
3 See editorial note ‘Industrial unrest: announcements on police and PIR conditions of service’.
4 The MIS for June, dated 8 July, read: ‘Dissatisfaction over pay and conditions of service continues amongst police, army, public servants and students in the PORT MORESBY area … Future reaction by Local Officers of the public service and students will depend on the outcome of public service arbitration … We believe that the new police-army pay scale will precipitate some form of positive protest by members of these two services against Government policy in respect of wage differentials. The most critical period is likely to be 14th to 31st July’ (NAA: A452, 1966/842).
5 Allen Fairhall.