Canberra, 11 July 1966
Top Secret
Papua and New Guinea-threat to internal security
Minister advises Cabinet of industrial unrest in Papua and New Guinea and seeks approval to prepare plans for last resort military assistance should civil disturbances take place. Minister points to possibility New Guinea Constabulary and Pacific Islands Regiment taking part in, or not opposing, civil disturbance.
2. We agree with covert planning envisaged in the Submission.
3. Industrial unrest stems from decisions on Public Service salaries and Army/Police pay and conditions. Minister proposes Commonwealth Government must stand firm on industrial front and live through any trouble that might develop as a consequence.
4. It is not clear Australia can live through consequences of massive civil disturbance in Papua and New Guinea. Possibility of disturbance in Papua and New Guinea will probably exist for some time to come. Basis of present unrest may not provide best position for a stand on principles by Australia in the face of local and international opposition.
5. We suggest further discussions by main policy departments to present Ministers in clear terms with an assessment whether our basic aims and principles in Papua and New Guinea are sufficiently at stake, as seems to be implied, to risk and even to court civil disturbance.2
[NAA: A5841, 262]
Minute, Ballard to Swift, undated, NAAL A452, 1966/2664.
Following Cabinet’s decision on military aid to the civil power,1 Defence, Territories and the Administration attempted to formulate mutually acceptable plans. Two themes dominated discussions. The first was a general policy issue—that of defining situations in which military assistance would be given. In early consultations, Defence was unhappy with Territories because ‘at least some people in Territories … were inclined to disregard the need for arrangements to enrol special constables in the Territory, preferring to leave emergency action to Australian troops from the mainland’.2 Thus when the Administration submitted contingency plans that envisaged the possible use of defence forces in a ‘minor’ role,3 Defence objected. Port Moresby’s plans were, in fact, an attempt to act in accordance with Cabinet’s wishes by ‘making the utmost use of local resources in an emergency, so as to avoid, if at all possible, the need to call in military assistance’.4 But Defence insisted that its forces would only become involved in the ‘last resort should an internal security situation develop to the stage where it could not be controlled by civil resources’; it would not accept use of military forces ‘in lesser situations of political or industrial unrest’.5 Territories was obliged to accept this principle and agreed that the ‘resources to be employed in dealing with [internal security situations] should be clearly defined and that cross-references to more serious situations involving use of military assistance should be avoided in plans for lesser situations’.6 The disagreement meant that the Administration’s plans had to be revised and were not endorsed until January 1968.7 In the interim, there were no moves toward detailed contingency plans for the use of military forces—and, indeed, renewed controversy erupted in May I969 over the fondamental problem of determining the grounds that justified military intervention.
A second major theme of interdepartmental dialogue on PNG’s internal security was that of legislation. At the same time that contingency planning was identified as inadequate, the legal framework for emergency action had been deemed deficient.8 In broad terms, the debate that followed revolved around the provision of legal cover for military involvement and for the various forms of physical action that were thought to be critical to controlling an emergency situation. In the second half of 1966, Ballard pushed for arrangements that would allow the initiation of military action without a formal call-out because he disliked the ‘delay in [the Governor-General] making the [required] Proclamation and the … adverse publicity attendant upon the making’.9 Consistent with its view that military assistance was a ‘last resort’, Defence rejected this idea, and Territories had to content itself with a minor concession from the Attorney-General’s Department on the matter of publicity.10 Other questions remained. A call-out under the Defence Act removed legal prohibitions to military intervention, but forms of intervention both by the army and civil authorities had to be delineated in PNG law.11 This, in turn, was politically sensitive. Territories decided on a two-phase approach. To begin, the Administration would institute lower-profile changes such as provisions for the closing of roads and powers of arrest and search for military personnel assisting police.12 This would be done through amendments that were to be ‘introduced [into the House] as inconspicuously as possible and should not appear to be rushed through as provisions specifically related to an internal security situation’.13 The second phase would be to table more explicit and drastic emergency legislation when ‘a situation of the kind with which it is designed to deal has actually arisen’.14 It was considered that the House would not otherwise pass such measures. As Cleland wrote, ‘after mature thought this proposed [emergency] bill should not be introduced at this stage … it would require very good public relations and explanations beforehand’.15 Ballard also believed premature presentation ‘could draw strong criticism in both the United Nations and Australia’.16
The implementation of this two-stage tactic became problematic. It was not until August 1968 that legislation enabling military assistance to the police was put to the House.17 Ironically, after being passed, the provisions were judged ineffectual by AttorneyGeneral’s. An alternative was found,18 but this was not brought before the House by the end of 1969.19 Similar difficulties plagued the quest for stronger public order powers short of specific emergency legislation. By the time violence broke out in the Gazelle Peninsula in December of the same year, changes had been neither tabled nor drafted.
1 Document 46.
2 On 13 July, Cabinet ‘gave its approval for planning to be put in hand for the provision of military assistance as a last resort. It directed that this planning should be kept under the strictest security … However, recognising the grave consequences which could attend such a step, the Cabinet indicated that it would wish to explore without delay any possibilities which existed, or might arise, of reducing the risk of disturbances occurring which could get out of hand. The Cabinet noted that one such possibility was a settlement of the Pacific Islands Regiment pay issue and that the Minister for the Army would shortly be bringing a submission to the Cabinet on this matter. However, in considering this, Cabinet would need to be informed about other facets of the total problem’ (decision no. 329, NAA: A 1209, 1969/9031 part 7).
1 See footnote 2, Document 50.
2 Minute, A.M. Morris (Assistant Secretary, Defence Liaison Branch, DEA) to A.H. Borthwick (Acting Head,Pacific and Americas Branch, DEA), 15 September 1966, NAA: A 1838, 689/1 part 3.
3 Memorandum, Administration (D.M. Fenbury, Secretary, Administrator’s Department) to DOT, 9 November 1966, NAA: A452, 1966/2664.
4 Letter, Warwick Smith to Cleland, 17 September 1966, ibid.
5 Letter, Blakers to Swift, 12 December 1966, ibid.
6 Memorandum, DOT (Swift) to Administration, 18 August 1967, ibid.
7 Memorandum, Administration (D.O. Hay, Cleland’s successor as Administrator) to DOT, 30 November 1967, and memorandum, Defence (L.G. Poyser (First Assistant Secretary, Defence Planning, Defence)) to DOET, 23 January 1968, ibid.
8 See footnote 1, Document 46.
9 Minute, Ballard to Swift, undated, NAA: A452, 1966/2664.
10 Memorandum, DOT (Swift) to Administration, 18 August 1967, ibid.
11 Memorandum, DOT (Swift) to Administration, 12 October 1967, ibid.
12 loc. cit.
13 Draft memorandum, DOT (Swift) to Defence, undated, ibid. See also note by Ballard and Legge, undated (c. August-September 1969), ibid.
14 Draft memorandum, DOT (Swift) to Defence, undated, ibid.
15 See minute, Fenbury to Hay, 2 October 1967, ibid.
16 Note by Ballard and Legge, undated, ibid. The two-step method was challenged by Fenbury—who wanted to introduce emergency legislation immediately (see minute, Fenbury to Hay, 2 October 1967, and minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 2 August 1968, ibid.)—but the method was retained (see, for example, telex 270/6090, DOET to Administration, 22 August 1968, ibid., and telex 681, Ballard to L.J. Curtis (Secretary for Law, PNG), 22 November 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/5637) with slight modification.
17 Memorandum, DOET (Ballard) to Administration, 13 September 1968, and memorandum, Administration (Hay) to DOET, 14 November 1968, NAA: A452, 1966/2664.
18 Minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 11 December 1968, and memorandum, DOET (Warwick Smith) to Administration, 1 March 1969, ibid.
19 See paragraph 26, interdepartmental report on military aid to the civil power, 30 December 1969, under cover of memorandum, G.L. Prentice (Secretary, Defence Committee) to Defence Committee, 22 January 1970, NAA: A 1209, 1969/9031 part 2.