Canberra, undated
Confidential
West Irian and Papua New Guinea
[ matter omitted ]
(ii) West Irian exile organizations
There are two political organizations in the Netherlands set up by political leaders from West Irian who left the country before the Indonesian take-over. One is the Papuan National Front, chaired by Marcus Kaisiepo, a cousin of the present Governor of West Irian. The other is the Freedom Committee for West Irian, chaired by Nicolaas Jouwe. Jouwe was originally a member of the PNF but left because of personal differences with members of the PNF executive.2
The stated aims of both organizations are legitimate: they wish to attract international attention to developments in West Irian and to ensure that Indonesia fulfils her obligations under the 1962 agreement. Inevitably, however, their activities are bitterly anti-Indonesian and they maintain clandestine contacts with underground organizations in West Irian.
A recurrent theme in their publications is that of an independent West Irian linked to Papua New Guinea.
The Indonesians inevitably nurse some suspicions of our attitude to these organizations and suspect that communications between the Netherlands and West Irian passed via Papua New Guinea (which no doubt is sometimes the case). We have therefore maintained a very strict attitude towards both the PNF and the Freedom Committee. All posts have been instructed to avoid so far as possible having any contact with members of the organizations; requests by Jouwe and Kaisiepo to be permitted to visit Australia have been refused; and letters from them addressed to the Prime Minister and yourself have not been answered. Jouwe transitted Sydney last year en route from the Philippines to the U.S.A. but was only there for a few hours.
The Australian Ambassador in The Hague recently informed Sadjarwo, his Indonesian colleague there, that you had rejected a request by Jouwe to be permitted to visit Australia. Sadjarwo said he thought this was a wise policy for us to adopt and commented that in his opinion exiles such as Jouwe were good people but misguided.
It may be worth telling Malik3 that we have deliberately kept the exile organizations at a distance and have not allowed any of their members to visit Australia or Papua New Guinea.
(iii) Refugees from West Irian
Since the Indonesians took over the administration in West Irian in May 1963, there have been approximately 50 crossings by persons either singly or in groups, involving a total of approximately 700 people seeking permanent residence in Papua New Guinea. Most of these have been prompted by economic pressures or by general discontent. Only 11 of the crossings can be regarded as specifically motivated by political considerations.
Permissive residence in the Territory since that time has been granted to a total of 19 persons. In two cases these have concerned Indonesians …
All the other refugees accepted have been West Irianese. Only one official, Benjamin Tonenggo, a policeman from Merauke, has crossed into Papua New Guinea. He has since been convicted on criminal charges and is at present serving a two-year gaol sentence. Before his last conviction, you had decided that Tonenggo should be returned to West Irian. Though the Indonesians are certainly suspicious of the activities of West Irianese refugees in Papua New Guinea and try to intercept persons attempting to cross into the Territory, they probably recognize that we have attempted to maintain strict supervision over border crossings. They have also been told that we require refugees given residence in Papua New Guinea to refrain from all political activities, although this advice—originally given to Dr. Subandrio4 —may not be widely known.
We have not had any substantial dialogue with the Indonesians on this subject for a long time and it might be useful for you to explain to Malik the general lines of our policy towards refugees, emphasising that only in cases where there are apparently genuine humanitarian reasons for allowing a person to remain in Papua New Guinea is this permitted, and the decision in such cases rests with you and the Minister for Territories.
You might say that it is in both Australian and Indonesian interests for our Governments to maintain a flexible attitude towards tribal movement in the border area, and that where there is any need for discussion on particular cases this is best done quietly and on a commonsense basis.
(iv) West lrianese students in Papua New Guinea
At the time of the transfer of the administration of West Irian to Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio agreed that two groups of West Irianese students, who were studying in Port Moresby … should complete their training at our expense.
[ matter omitted ]
The Indonesians have no strong claims on any of these students. They came to Papua New Guinea while their homeland was still controlled by the Dutch, and the Indonesians have not contributed to their expenses. However, we did consult with the Indonesians about them in 1963 and thus have admitted a legitimate Indonesian interest in their future. There is of course an obvious need for trained personnel in West Irian. It was felt that the Indonesians should be consulted in this case because of our general policy that in all practical questions relating to West Irian, the Indonesians should see that we deal openly with them. If the Indonesians do eventually ask that the students should be returned, it is probable that at least some of them will refuse to go. If that situation arises we would hope that, by pointing out to the Indonesians the considerable unfavourable publicity in Australia likely to be touched off by any move to bring pressure to bear on the students and by stressing our mutual interest in not straining relations on minor issues such as this, the Indonesians could be brought to agree not to press the matter.
(v) New Guinea border5
Joint marking of the border between West Irian and Papua New Guinea began late in June and two of the seven agreed positions between the North Coast and the Star Mountains have now been determined and marked. The marking of position No. 3 in the Sekotchiau area should be completed by the time you visit Djakarta, and it is hoped to finish at least six of the positions by the end of September. Relations between the Indonesian and Australian teams have so far been excellent and we have assisted the Indonesians to a considerable extent with transport and fuel supplies.
There will need to be a further meeting towards the end of this year or early in 1967 on procedures for marking the positions from the Star Mountains to the South Coast. On the principle of rotation this meeting should be held in Djakarta. We will also, in due course, need to exchange notes with the Indonesians to confirm the findings of the surveyors and accept the markers which they have erected.
At the Canberra meeting last May the Indonesians said that what is at present being marked is the position of the meridian forming the border rather than the border itself. We have no reason to believe that this indicates any disposition to go back on their 1964 acceptance of the position of the border as defined in international agreements. It is rather that they are concerned about how to handle the question of villages or village lands which may be found to be astride the border. In commenting on the results of the May meeting, you said:
‘Agreement to the marking of the meridians in the first instance does not imply any commitment to vary the border. I would have a strong and clear view that the border should follow the 141st meridian scrupulously and that the movement of villages (or arrangements for cross border movement) would be the most practical way of dealing with the occasional instance in which the village lands straddle the meridian.’
When the lines between the fourteen positions are surveyed, some village problems may arise. For example, it is quite likely that the meridian in the Bensbach area will be found to pass close to the West Irianese village of Sotar, cutting it off from what have been traditionally regarded as village lands. It may be desirable for us to keep in mind the need to offer small-scale financial and technical assistance to the other side if it is agreed that the meridian should in all cases be maintained as the border and if this should involve (as with Sotar or other villages) the possible movement of a village site and the clearing and development of new land.
(v) Health co-operation
You agreed in 1964 that we should explore the question of co-operation between the Administrations in Port Moresby and Sukarnapura in the field of health. As a result, Dr. Suling of the Indonesian Ministry of Health visited Papua New Guinea in August of that year and both sides agreed to exchange information on various topics relating to human and animal health. Dr. Scragg paid a return visit to Djakarta and to West Irian early in July this year. He found this to be of considerable value and it is likely that as a result of his visit the exchange of information (which until now has been minimal) will improve and relations between the health services in the two halves of the island will grow closer. Dr. Scragg invited his counterpart in West irian, Dr. Budihartono, to attend a medical congress in Papua New Guinea at some time in the future.
(vii) Wider co-operation between West Irian and Papua New Guinea
Indonesia has followed a policy of non-interference in respect of Papua New Guinea. While the reasons partly are found in Indonesian–Australian relationships generally, it seems reasonable to assume that they favour for the present a mutual ‘hands off’ policy. They are still uncertain about their grip on West Irian and do not wish, by interfering in Australian New Guinea, to stimulate counter-action from our side of the border. They are also sensitive about the repercussions in West Irian of progress in Papua New Guinea. For example, Drs Legowo (Secretary for West Irian Affairs to the Foreign Minister) recently told the Embassy in Djakarta how important it was from the Indonesian viewpoint that there should not be dramatic political advances in Papua New Guinea before 1969.
This probably means that for the present the Indonesians are not looking for an appreciable widening of contacts and co-operation between the two halves of New Guinea, although Malik did say to an A.B.C. reporter that ‘the two countries shared a common responsibility and task in West Irian and New Guinea’. This way of putting things is at the least a refreshing change from the jargon of neo-colonialism and the way Malik cut through Indonesian inhibitions over joint work on the border also illustrates a practical and direct attitude. Perhaps we should be willing to show ourselves responsive to the principle of there being wider contacts between the two Administrations in New Guinea. In practice, any developments could be handled cautiously and kept on a small scale.6
[NAA: A 1838, 3036/14/1 part 5]
1 Hasluck announced on 3 August that he would visit Djakarta for a ‘few days’, beginning on 8 August. Alluding to changes in the Indonesian Government following the failed coup of late 1965 (see footnote 9, Document 12), Hasluck commented that ‘the Australian Government believed … it would be very useful for him to take an early opportunity to meet the leaders of the new Government in Indonesia and to gain first-hand knowledge of their thinking about the future and about their current and long-term problems’ (cablegram 2304, DEA to Washington, NAA: A6366, JAI966/05T). Hasluck’s remarks came on the heels of strong indications by Djakarta that the ‘confrontation’ of Malaysia would soon be officially ended (see savingram 33, Djakarta to DEA, 28 July 1966, NAA: A6364, JA1966/0 IS).
2 An anonymous DOT paper dated ‘April 1968’ explained the origins and development of the PNF in the following terms: ‘In December, 1961, as a step toward self-government for the territory, the Netherlands Government inaugurated a Netherlands New Guinea Council and approved the adoption of a national anthem and flag. The membership of the Council was largely indigenous and from the outset it was opposed to Indonesia’s claim to Netherlands New Guinea and supported continued Dutch tutelage until such time as the territory became independent. The Council, however, was short-lived as the Netherlands Government’s acceptance of the Bunker proposals, under considerable international pressure, led to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority assuming control of the territory in August, 1962. The embryo political parties represented in the Council provided the leaders who later resisted the Indonesian succession and left to carry on their opposition abroad as the Front Nasional Papua (FNP—Papuan National Front) … The FNP established itself in the Netherlands and was directed by an executive which included M.W. Kaisiepo (Chairman), Nicolaas Jouwe (Vice-Chairman), Fillemon Jufuway, Origines Ong Kubuan and Herman Womsiwor. All were former members of the Netherlands New Guinea Council, Kaisiepo and Jouwe having held executive positions … This executive remained at least formally united ‘until the latter half of 1964 when the FNP split into two separate organisations: “The Freedom Committee for West Papua/West New Guinea” (KKPB) headed by Jouwe, and “The High Court of the Chamber of Representatives of West Papua/Melanesia” led by Kaisiepo who also describes himself as “resident-in-Exile”. This split occurred because of personal animosities among the leaders of the FNP rather than because of differences on points of principle … Both groups established representatives in New York and in 1967 the Freedom Committee was reported to have moved its permanent headquarters there. In addition a small group of West lrianese residing in TPNG led by Benedictus Sarwom has set up a branch of the FNP in Port Moresby. It does not as a body carry on its activities publicly. Sarwom has been corresponding with both nationalist factions but, while he supports the general objectives of both, he has not committed himself to exclusive support of either group’ (paper entitled ‘Activities of West Irian Nationalists Abroad’, NAA: A452, 1967/4460).
3 Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of Indonesia.
4 Foreign Minister of Indonesia, 1957-66.
5 See editorial note ‘Survey of the border between West Irian and PNG’.
6 In discussions on 9 August, Hasluck said to Malik that ‘East New Guinea would one day be independent and he thought would be well prepared and with its population would be capable of a genuine national existence’. Conversation subsequently moved to the New York Agreement (see paragraph 8,Document 12), which Malik said would be implemented by Indonesia (record of conversation between Hasluck and Malik, 9 August 1966, NAA: A 1838, 3034/10/1 part 28). H.M. Loveday, the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, later wrote to Jackel that in January 1967 Malik had raised privately with Hasluck ‘the possibility of Australian assistance to Indonesia in West Irian, particularly on the training side, and … of possible training in Papua/New Guinea’. Hasluck responded ‘frankly that the Government would not be prepared to have trainees from West Irian in Papua/New Guinea because of the potential political problems—and he enumerated these—which they could cause’. Hasluck told Loveday that he thought Malik ‘fully took this point’ (letter, Loveday to Jockel, 3 February 1968, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part I). Hasluck was later described by Plimsoll as taking a ‘cautious’ view generally about exchanges between PNG and Irian: ‘He did not want opinion in any of the countries or territories concerned to get the impression that any close co-operation was likely to develop. Behind the idea of [previous] co-operation of the Dutch [with Australia] had been the notion of a possible ultimate common future for the two territories. But now the only course was for the two territories to go their separate ways’. Expressing a DEA view, Jockel felt that ‘we should be careful about pointing up relations with West Irian at this particular time’ because the ‘Territory may be heading for a lot of internal dissent and turmoil’ (minute, Jockel to J.M. Starey (Acting Head, Malaysia and Indonesia Section, DEA) and H.D. Anderson (Assistant Secretary, South-East Asia Branch, DEA), 28 March 1967, ibid.).