Canberra, January 19662
Secret
[matter omitted]3
Attachment A
THE SITUATION IN WEST NEW GUINEA
[matter omitted]4
8. The border situation
The International border between Australia and Indonesian territory has not yet been accurately surveyed, but it is hoped that a joint survey team will commence this task in the not distant future.
The Indonesians are steadily building a series of administrative posts in the border area, mostly at the northern end, and small detachments of Indonesian and Papuan troops are stationed at each. The basic task of these posts is border surveillance, with some spasmodic patrolling, and the apprehension of refugees attempting to cross into Papua and New Guinea. A stern view is taken of these border crossers and many reports have been received of punitive action in the form of beatings, imprisonment and shootings.
The majority of refugees are turned back at the border by the Australian authorities, however, in the past twelve months six applications for political asylum have been accepted, two from Indonesians and four from Papuans. One Papuan has been granted permissive residence and the other five applications are still under consideration.
One of the applicants for asylum was an Indonesian army corporal who deserted from the elite SILIWANGI Division.
It is reliably reported that a number of Papuans are in hiding from the Indonesians in dense jungle country near the Tami river in West New Guinea. These people had been involved in anti-Indonesian activities and many had tried unsuccessfully to cross the border.5
[matter omitted]
Attachment B
INDONESIAN INTEREST IN PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA
[matter omitted]
2. Indonesian subversion
To date there has been very little evidence of lndonesian subversive activities in Papua and New Guinea. However, Radio Sukarnapura has increased the frequency and subversive content of its anti-Australian broadcasts and it is reportedly planning to increase the power of its transmissions.
There are indications that ‘East Irian’ has recently been included in Indonesia’s list of target areas for its psychological warfare programme. No attempt has yet been made to influence the native population on the Australian side of the border, however, on the rare occasions when an Indonesian manned ship calls at Territory ports the crew makes attempts to subvert the native people by propaganda means such as referring to their similarity of skin colour, and their common dislike of the white man.
[matter omitted]
4. The Indonesian Embassy
On several occasions the Embassy in Canberra has contacted West New Guinea students in Port Moresby, either by letter or per medium of lndonesian visitors, and tried to persuade them to return to their homeland. These students frequently receive copies of Embassy newsheets and other propaganda, and early in 1965 two students were invited to Djakarta on a conducted tour and efforts made to subvert them, without success.A West Papuan, Moses WEROR, is a Third Secretary at the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra and appears to have the special responsibility for maintaining contact with the students in Port Moresby.
5. Papua and New Guinea native reaction A very large majority of the native population in Papua and New Guinea is anti-Indonesian in outlook, due mainly to the reports of ill-treatment and suppression of the West Papuan people which have filtered out, and partly to the usually adverse press publicity accorded to Indonesian political manoeuvres. Propaganda by individual Australians has no doubt also accounted for this anti-Indonesian feeling.
Indonesian visitors to the Territory have been greeted somewhat less than enthusiastically by the local population.
Frequent references by both native and European politicians to the possibility of an Indonesian takeover in Papua and New Guinea has given rise to local suspicion as to Indonesia’s intentions towards the Territory.
On the other hand the suggestion of a coalition with West New Guinea to form a sovereign state has met with some approval in Papua and New Guinea, as has the proposal for a Greater Melanesian Federation embracing West New Guinea, Papua and New Guinea, Nauru, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, New Hebrides, New Caledonia and Fiji.
[NAA: A1838, 3036/14/1 part 5]
1 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
2 Precise date unrecorded.
3 The papers were provided to Davis under cover of a letter of 1 February 1966 from Brigadier C.C.F. Spry, Director General of ASIO.
4 Matter omitted refers, inter alia, to the political, economic and military situation in West Irian.
5 An unnumbered cablegram of 12 January to Geneva described the refugee problem and Australia’s response to it in the following terms: ‘The great majority of border crossings from West Irian into the Territory of Papua and New Guinea are by persons who in no sense can be regarded as refugees. In the main persons cross into the Territory in the course of tribal movements. For the period beginning with the establishment of the Indonesian Administration in West Irian in May, 1963, and ending November, 1965, a total of seven crossings were made by groups or individuals requesting entry into Papua and New Guinea on political grounds … In these few cases where application has been made for permissive residence in Papua and New Guinea on political grounds, the Australian Government makes a judgement as to whether there is a genuine case for admission on the facts, so far as they can be determined, of the case. Where there is a “prima facie” case for believing that the person concerned has a well-founded fear of persecution should he be returned the application for asylum in Papua and New Guinea is referred to Canberra where it is decided by the Minister for Territories and the Minister for External Affairs’ [On file NAA: A 1838, 3036/14/1/6 part 3].