Canberra, 25 October 1966
I have received the letter which you sent me on 7th July1 together with a copy of the report of the Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs2 after its visit to Papua and New Guinea.3
I would be glad if you would convey to the Committee my appreciation for their report. I concur with the views of the Committee in many respects but there are points of difference. In particular I do not agree that at the present stage of the economic and political development of Papua and New Guinea it is in the best interests of the Territory or of Australia to try to determine the ultimate constitutional goal or the precise form of association that may be appropriate.
It is, of course, extremely difficult during the course of a fortnight’s visit to sum up the total situation in a Territory of such diversity. It is, perhaps, a pity that the Sub-Committee were not able to spend longer in the Highlands, where nearly half of the population live, as I believe the people of this area will exercise an increasing influence in the years to come.
Nevertheless because the interest of the various organs of the United Nations, and of foreign countries, in the Territory is clearly growing, I am glad that the Sub-Committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee should have paid this visit to Papua and New Guinea.
[NAA: A1838, 936/1/3]
Bougainville copper: negotiations between the Commonwealth and CRA
Following talks of February and March,1 Commonwealth and CRA representatives met in June, August and October to continue negotiations on an agreement to cover mining in Bougainville. 2 Dialogue was at times tense, with the company commenting in August that it had been ‘disappointed with the tenor of the discussions and felt that [CRA’s] high rate of past expenditure [on the island] had militated against good conditions … [it] had regarded the whole negotiations as a package deal in which the value of the whole to the Territory should be considered … It was felt that some of the terms suggested to them bore little evidence of realisation of this’. 3
Negotiations were also affected by time constraints, with Warwick Smith explaining to Treasury that ‘We are under pressure to complete negotiations as early as possible in order to finalise all formalities including the passage of Territory legislation before the next Territory election in 1968’.4 Specifically, it was thought that agreement would have to be reached with CRA in time for a first and second reading of the draft in the House during March 1967. In the words of a Territories officer, this would avoid ‘seeming to “:steam roller” it through [the] House’ at the eleventh hour. 5
1 Hasluck asked Barnes for any views he might have on the report under reference (NAA: A1838, 561/6/1 0).
2 Established on 27 February 1952, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs consisted of Coalition senators and members of the House—in lieu of the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) refusal to join—who were empowered to discuss and make recommendations on foreign policy issues. The ALP accepted membership of the Committee in May 1967.
3 Inter alia, the report noted the sub-committee’s assumption that independence was ‘inevitable’ and argued that ‘The most difficult dilemma posed by this situation is whether economic viability must precede political competence, or vice versa, or whether some other synthesis is possible … We believe that the Australian government should make a categorical statement now rejecting “Seventh Statehood” as an option open to the people of Papua/New Guinea. The longer the present ambiguity remains, the more difficult it will be to resolve this issue on a rational basis … We deduce from the evidence that the “crunch” situation will develop after the 1972 elections to the House of Assembly. We refine this to the period 1973–75, i.e., prior to the election of 1976. This process could be accelerated by the development of any dramatic frictions in the interval … What steps should be taken by the Australian government in anticipation of the crucial period? Our conclusion is that certain step by step increases in responsibility should be accorded to the House of Assembly to the point where sovereignty was assumed … It is manifest that such a process requires skilful manipulation, but we strongly emphasise that this will be easier prior to 1976 than afterwards … We have noted the internal expression of the fear of independence. This is, we believe, a neurosis induced by several factors … We reject the neurosis as being a proper foundation for policy and cannot countenance the influences that further it’. The sub-committee envisaged PNG being linked to Australia by treaty obligations after independence (undated report by Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, NAA: A1838, 561/6/1 0).
1 Documents 11 and 33.
2 See minute, Gutman to Warwick Smith (on meeting of 28-29 June), 21 July 1966, NAA: A452, 1966/2475; DOT notes of discussion, 19 August 1966, NAA: A452, 1967/11 07; and notes of discussion, 12-13 October 1966, ibid.
3 DOT notes of discussion, 19 August 1966, ibid. These notes were marked: ‘Departmental use only. Not supplied to CRA or Admin’.
4 Memorandum, DOT (Ahrens) to Treasury, 27 October 1966, NAA: A452, 1966/5530.
5 Minute, A. Geoghegan (Investigation Officer, Economic Policy Section, DOT) to I.R. Grigor (OIC, Economic Policy Section, DOT), October 1966 (exact date unknown), ibid.