Port Moresby, [23 January 1967]2
We are asking leave to make important additions and modifications to the original recommendations we submitted in August.3 Certain events and developments have brought about a change in our thinking. These alterations are more concerned with timing and speed than the actual subject matter. Our original submission holds good in content and purpose. WHAT should take place remains broadly the same. WHEN it should take place and HOW, or by what means, is what we want to add here.
These changes in our thinking have come about because of a realization that if this present system of colonial or territory government continues, with all its inevitable master–servant overtones, serious tensions will develop, in fact are already developing, that will result in a loss of confidence and a complete breakdown of relations not only between the races here but between the two countries. We now see that deterioration in race relations is taking place faster than we thought earlier. We earnestly desire that confidence be restored and that our progress toward self-government should take place in a spirit of mutual respect and goodwill.
Attachment
SUMMARY OF SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION TO SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT —JANUARY 1967
1. Immediate limited responsible government—or ‘home rule’
For the House of Assembly, this means that elected representatives of the people, through their leaders, must be given Executive authority in all domestic affairs. This will come about when Ministers are put in charge of Departments as listed below under 7. This is the beginning of ‘Home Rule’. (See item 12 in the Detailed Explanation.)
2. Executive or ‘Cabinet’
A true Executive or ‘Cabinet’ must be set up in 1968 with full executive authority. This must be elected or appointed by a Committee representing the whole House of Assembly and be responsible to the House of Assembly, the elected representatives of the people. Members of Regional as well as Open Electorates will be eligible for appointment to this Executive. (See Detailed Explanation item 12). This Executive will serve for a fixed period of four years and will not depend for its life on the confidence of the House. That is, it will not resign if a Government motion is defeated.
3. Need for executive now recognized
The need for some executive authority in drawing up the Budget in the House of Assembly has now been recognized by the Minister for Territories, by the Administrator, Mr. David Hay, and by leading members of the House of Assembly. An executive to deal with finance alone, however, is not enough. The time has come for the representatives of the people to decide on matters which vitally concern them. This can only be done by placing Ministers at the head of those departments which most directly affect the lives, the welfare and the prosperity of the people. No one can deny they have a right to decide domestic affairs.
4. Eight ministers to begin with
This ‘Cabinet’ will be made up of at least eight (8) Cabinet Ministers who will replace the Directors and take charge of Departments as Heads of Departments. (See 7 below and Original Submission Summary page iii.) The rest of Cabinet will be made up of Directors who are Heads of remaining Departments.
5. Provision for extra Ministers
New Ministers will be appointed from time to time to take over other Departments as the House sees fit. Provision to be made for this expansion in amendment to Papua New Guinea Act.
6. Chief Minister, Head of Cabinet
The eight Ministers will include and be led by a Chief Minister who will be appointed first and will be Chairman or Leader of the Executive Council or ‘Cabinet’. (See Original Submission Summary pages ii and iii.) He must have his own new Department, the Chief Minister’s Department.
7. Eight ministerial portfolios
1. The Chief Minister —who will head his own new Department.
2. Minister for Home Affairs (to replace Department of District Administration).
3. Minister for Local Government —(New Department).
4. Minister for Lands, Surveys and Mines.
5. Minister for Labour.
6. Minister for Information and Culture —(reorganized Department of Information and Extension Services).
7. Minister for Local Finance or Assistant Treasurer.
8. Minister for Education.
(See pages 8-10 Original Submission)
8. Position of previous Directors
Previous Directors of the above Departments will then become Permanent Secretaries of those Departments until they are replaced by local officers, which should take place as soon as possible. (See item 13 this Summary.)
9. No Under-Secretaries except as assistants to Ministers
Under-Secretaries subject to Departmental Heads, i.e. public servants, must be discontinued. If it is felt advisable to train junior or future Ministers these members should be appointed as Assistants to Ministers of Departments. (See item 17 Detailed Explanation.)
10. The Deputy Leader of the House
The Chief Minister will appoint his Deputy Leader in the House. He will have Ministerial rank and salary. He will be chairman of the Parliamentary Executive. (See item 12 of this Summary.) Next to the Chief Minister this will be the most important position in the House.
11. The House Steering Committee
The House of Assembly will elect it own Steering Committee consisting of one less than the number of Ministers. They will be the Chairmen of the Parliamentary or House Committees and others. Together with the Ministers they will form the Parliamentary Executive. (See next item and page 12 Original Submission.)
12. The Parliamentary Executive
This will be made up of Cabinet Ministers, on the one hand, and members of the House Steering Committee on the other. This will be the most powerful body next to Cabinet. It will be the policy making body for the House of Assembly during the transition period to self-government (see Original Submission page 12 and pages 24–26). This will correspond to theA.L.P. ‘CAUCUS’ in Federal Parliament.
13. Advancement of local officers to senior positions in the public service
Replacement of expatriate officers by local officers must be carried out with vigour and determination. This is top priority and very urgent. Able men must be picked out, given special training if necessary, and put into positions of senior responsibility. (See Detailed Explanation item 16 and next item below.)
14. Success of the preceding item 13 depends on the quality of Australian Advisers, guides etc. and on a new Public Service Board
This demand for rapid advancement goes hand in hand with the demand for a completely new attitude in Administration as outlined under item 15 below. The key to success of this advancement lies in the outlook, psychology and quality of Australians who will be assisting and guiding indigenous appointees to senior positions. (See Detailed Explanation item 16.)
15. Australian policy on administration must change completely
That means there must be a radical change of outlook and purpose in Australia’s Administration of Papua New Guinea. Australians must no longer be masters but advisers, assistants and guides. The old colonial or ‘master-servant’ outlook must cease and the way of government based on this must stop too. (See items 6 and 7 in.Detailed Explanation.)
16. Public Service Board to replace Public Service Commissioner
Advancement of local officers also depends on the appointment of a Public Service Board to replace the present Public Service Commissioner. This will mean an amendment to the Public Service Ordinance so that local officers who are of mature age and experience, but lack present rigid academic qualifications, may be promoted to senior positions. It is unreasonable to force a public service system on to this country which may suit Australia but certainly does not suit us at this stage of our development. It took Australia 60 to 80 years to develop this system and there are now thousands of educated people offering to enter the public service. We only have a few. It is wrong to exclude a man who has other good qualifications but has not had the chance to pass certain examinations. These hard barriers to advancement must be removed by a new Public Service Ordinance.
17. The basis for continuing Australian domination is false
Just because Australia makes grants of money to Papua New Guinea this does not give her the right to control this country indefinitely nor dominate its leaders or to deny to them the right to begin and govern their own country. This is contrary to the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination. This cannot go on. (See item 9 Detailed Explanation.)
18. New framework after 1968 must be a ‘caretaker Administration’
Australia’s main function in Administration must in future be a handing over or Transition Commission whose chief work will be to bring about the hand-over of power. Australians must now progressively step down, hand over, step aside, and stand by as advisers and consultants. (See item 11 Detailed Explanation.)
19. High Commissioner to replace Administrator
The day of the autocrat and Administrator is over. In a country preparing to undertake responsible government there is no place for the Administrator or Assistant Administrator. (See item 13 Detailed Explanation.) A High Commissioner is more in keeping with a period of transition.
20. Deputy High Commissioner
The Deputy High Commissioner must be a Papuan or New Guinean, a public servant of high standing, integrity and ability. (See item 13 Detailed Explanation.)
21. External Affairs to deal with Papua New Guinea not External Territories
Under item 14 in the Explanations we give the reasons for this important change in relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea. In the future we will be separated from Australia and our relations then will, on the Australian side, be controlled by External Affairs. This should commence now. (See item 14 Detailed Explanation.)4
DETAILED EXPLANATION OF SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION PLACED BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
For reasons which we give in detail here and which are outlined in the Summary, we now press for constitutional changes involving the setting up of an Executive and the granting of nothing less than limited self-government in 1968. On the part of the metropolitan power, we are asking for a complete change in attitude and policy in regard to the function and purpose of Australia’s role in administering Papua New Guinea. (See items 7 and 8 below.)
The reasons for this are as follows:
1. Federal Government delaying meaningful preparation for self-government
There is a widespread feeling amongst our thinking people that Federal Government is temporizing and foot-dragging; that is, it is delaying fulfilling the many promises that have been made to prepare Papua New Guinea for self-government. Some of our people, because of this, question Australia’s good faith to give us self-government when we ask for it. It is not a good thing when mistrust like this creeps in, but this is hard to combat in the face of the Minister’s recent speech in the House of Representatives in which he threatens reduction of the Commonwealth grant if there is any further disagreement on the part of the House of Assembly with Federal Government’s ‘fundamental policies’. The Minister is demanding complete and unquestioned subservience. How can we voice our wishes under these conditions?
2. Present system obsolete and dominating
(a) The present system and purpose of Administration is out of date, autocratic, unrealistic and inflexible. In spite of many advances in the introduction of political institutions and machinery, this administrative system is perpetuating the domination and control of Federal Government in the internal affairs of Papua New Guinea to the exclusion of our own leaders. This means that, in the House of Assembly, politicians have been excluded from the place of executive authority and local Public Servants are excluded from appointment to senior positions. This is seriously hindering preparation for self-government.
(b) We want to make it clear that we do recognize there have been outstanding instances of advancement of local officers to senior positions. It is worth noting that some of the most outstanding examples have taken place in the Department of Public Health. Another example is the appointment of the Assistant Electoral Officer. But these are the exceptions. We are racing against time and it should be quite clear that these appointments are not only too few but much too late.
In spite of these we still contend that, in the whole field of executive authority, in the making of policy and in the exercise of governing power, all decision making still remains the prerogative of expatriate officers. In other words not one single Papuan or New Guinean is in a position to make a decision that cannot be vetoed or countermanded by an Australian or by Australians.
To have to admit this fact in 1967, twenty two years after the end of World War II is a most serious indictment of Australia’s record of government in Papua New Guinea.
3. Present system causing serious deterioration in race relations
This domination and exclusion is already resulting in disillusionment, friction and steadily deteriorating race relations. We cannot visualise a change over to self-government at any time in the future except under greatly worsened conditions and with the strong possibility of a complete and irreparable breakdown of amity and goodwill. This alone is sufficient reason for a complete reappraisal and review of the present system without any further delay.
4. To delay action will risk great trouble in the future
This deterioration of race relations on its own is a serious enough situation to warrant emergency action. When this is aggravated by inept mishandling of sensitive situations, and by overriding contempt of local opinion on explosive issues, this becomes a matter of major concern to every citizen and one on which we cannot afford to be silent. We, in this country, see, hear and know what is going on below the surface. We say that the necessary action must be taken now to rebuild confidence and avoid the sort of breakdown which has crippled other countries and which will bring great suffering to us, our people and our children in the future. Australian politicians and public servants will not suffer, for many of them will, by then, be back in Australia. This is a very big task. If the Select Committee do not see this or fail to convince Federal Government they will not escape the verdict of history and the condemnation of future generations.
5. Insecurity causing flight of good public servants
Many expatriate public servants sense or fear this. To them, the future becomes increasingly insecure and uncertain for them and their children and they see no alternative but to return to Australia. Because of this, and because they cannot give their best, we are losing and will continue to lose some of our best men who want to do a worthwhile job and who are certainly not afraid of self-government. We, the people of Papua New Guinea, cannot afford to lose these men. The Australian Administration in Papua New Guinea may think it can because it would readily replace a good permanent officer who has years of experience, by a new contract officer, a green recruit, who can give little and may even be a liability. With criminal disregard for the consequences to this country this is actually what is happening. We are throwing away one of our greatest assets in public administration, i.e. men of experience, integrity and devotion to duty, who like us and like our country. These men and women are a vital asset at this stage of our country’s development and we think it’s worth a supreme effort to hold them.
6. ‘Master-servant’ outlook and regime must go
The underlying cause of all this is an out-of-date, internationally discredited, ‘Master’ or Colonial type of regime and a governing system still loaded in favour of expatriates, who make all the decisions. It is a system of government with its roots deep in a colonial past that we are trying to break free from and our progress towards political responsibility is hindered and thwarted by the thousand and one exclusions, inequalities and inconsistencies that arise from this ‘master-servant’ mentality or outlook.
7. Reversal of Australia’s role—advisers not masters
The solution lies in a complete reversal of this uneven balance. The Federal Government must step down, hand over and stand to one side while our leaders begin to learn how to run our country. This will take the heat out of the whole situation overnight and will immediately reduce racial tension. As long as Australians are masters there is no chance things will improve. When Australians are no longer masters but advisers and friends the tide will turn. Furthermore, when this time comes, and our leaders have to make the final decisions and are uncertain about what to do, they will not hesitate to turn to Australians for advice. As advisers instead of masters, Australians will hold a position of trust and esteem. Those Australians who cannot adapt to this new role will prefer to go. The best, those who can really help us, will stay. Please note that we say that Federal Government (and that includes the Australians who represent the Federal Government here) must step down and stand to one side. We deliberately do not say, evacuate. We contend that it is possible for our leaders to begin to assume the mantle of government, while Australians, who become advisers remain close by our side.
8. We will need advice and help for many years
We are fully aware that we will need Australia’s help and advice for a long time to come. Nothing sobers a man, and makes him realize his limitations, like responsibility. We say to Australia, give us this responsibility and hold our friendship and respect. Give us a chance to learn while we can still turn to you expatriates for help and advice when we need it.
9. The reason given for Australia’s continuing control is false
This leads us to challenge the false premise supporting Australian control. That is the pretext (the excuse) that Australia must retain major control of Papua New Guinea affairs as long as, and because, she contributes the greater part of our revenue. It is a false and out-of-date idea that grants-in-aid must have strings attached. This is also completely contrary to the United Nations Charter and the Declaration covering the right of people to self-determination and control of their own affairs and of their own natural resources, even before independence. Australia knows she could not gain support for this before the United Nations where she outwardly acknowledges our right to self-determination. Australia also knows that she must give, and go on giving even long after independence, because, in Papua New Guinea, her basic interests are involved. Australia is well aware she must retain our goodwill and friendship at all costs. The reason for this is defence.
10. Our goodwill vital to Australia’s defence
We know very well that Australia’s defence is our defence. But likewise, Australia must realize that our goodwill and friendship are absolutely vital to HER defence. It is the height of folly to spend 20 million dollars a year on defence and then jeopardise everything by throwing away our friendship and trust and goodwill. For that is what is happening now.
11. New framework a caretaker administration or Transition Commission
We therefore advocate a new and imaginative approach to the whole problem of government. Whatever form this new government assumes, on Australia’s side, it must be primarily a caretaker or inter-regnum administration, preferably a Transition Commission. Charged with the specific function of handing over, it must implement that by putting into top positions those Papuan and New Guinean Public Servants most ready for advancement. All departments must be re-organized systematically with a view to progressive handling over of control to Papuans and New Guineans.
12. Immediate responsible government
On our side, it will mean that selected members of the House of Assembly, through their leaders, must accept responsibility for full executive authority in all domestic affairs. This implies an Executive Council or ‘Cabinet’ elected or appointed by the House of Assembly and responsible to the House of Assembly, the elected representatives of the people. This is RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. This has no connection with the Under-Secretary system which we repudiate and think should be discarded. (See item 17 below.) Instead of a few Ministers, we now see a new ‘Cabinet’ or Executive made of eight Ministers and as many Directors as are necessary to manage the Departments. We also contend that this Executive must hold office for a fixed term of four years.
13. High Commissioner to replace Administrator
The Administrator must be replaced by a High Commissioner who will supervise this transition as smoothly and rapidly as possible. The Deputy High Commissioner will be a Papuan or New Guinean chosen by the High Commissioner from a panel submitted by the House of Assembly. Assistant Administrators must be discontinued as there is no place or counterpart for this position in a ‘responsible’ government. They have played their part in a centralised system of colonial administration. In the transition period we are entering the position of Assistant Administrator will only confuse and hinder the smooth process of change over.
14. Papua New Guinea to come under Department of External Affairs
The most significant departure from existing conditions and relations with Australia will be our demand that Papua New Guinea is removed from the Department of Territories and immediately placed under the Department of External Affairs. This is consistent with the new status of a developing, semi-autonomous country. We should no longer be regarded as a ‘Territory’ of Australia or any other country. We are heading for self-government and adulthood as a nation. Our national identity and growing self awareness and prestige makes it absolutely imperative that all our dealings and relations with Federal Government should henceforth be handled by the Department that will, in the future, handle diplomatic relations with this country.
15. External Affairs responsible for basis of future association
Furthermore, since Defence and Foreign relations will be two of the very last functions to be relinquished by Australia, it is logical and proper that External Affairs should, from now onwards, be in a position to lay the groundwork for future co-operation and association under whatever agreements or treaties will be mutually acceptable to both countries.
16. Reasons for confidence in success of handover
A great many ‘expert’ observers will oppose this idea of a start to gradual handover in 1968 on the grounds that we do not have enough trained or experienced men either in the House or in the Public Service, and that those we do have will, if Australia[n] control is even partly removed, fall flat on their faces under the stress of responsibility. We will answer these objections under three headings:
(A) New Attitude On Indigenous Rule
Everything depends on a complete face-about, a volte-face, in policy and outlook on indigenous rule, and on a new type of administration as well as a new outlook in public servants and officers.
(B) Younger Politicians Emerging
The 1968 Elections will show that we will have the men for Ministerial positions. We predict a new type of politician will emerge in 1968—younger, better educated and with greater understanding of policies.
(C) Advancement Of Local Officers
We already have amongst local officers the men for top positions in the Public Service but they are buried in second rate and subordinate positions.
In greater detail
(A) New Attitude On Indigenous Rule
We have enlarged on this in items 7 and 8, but refer to it again here because, without this completely new outlook on the rightness of indigenous rule, and a complete faceabout in policy, and without the kind of men who can put this policy into effect, no mere change of name or machinery will work. It is a new chapter in the history of Papua New Guinea and in Australian relations with this country. A change of name like High Commissioner will make no difference unless the High Commissioner acts the part.
(B) Younger Politicians Emerging
At least 25% of the new membership of the House of Assembly (84) will have to be of ministerial calibre. This will depend on how fast Electorates wake up to the fact that the men they vote for must be capable of ministerial duties. Many voters see that already but it will be brought home to them forcibly by the new look of the younger, educated, politically astute type of men offering themselves as candidates in 1968, and by the message which these young men have to give. But even the best of them will have to learn their job on the job as Ministers and this will take time. We do not foresee many Under-Secretaries being returned in 1968. Those who have consistently voted with the Administration have laid themselves open to the deadliest criticism from their opponents. They have been ‘Collaborators’ in the eyes of the voters.
(C) Advancement Of Local Officers
1. There is no doubt that a wealth of top leadership lies buried simply because most Australian officers do not see a potential executive in a man they assume, without question, to be their subordinate. This is borne out by the overwhelming experience of our best local officers and also of those young men going into the Administrative College for extra training.
2. Apart from this it must be emphasized we should not be concerned about producing ‘carbon copies’ of Australian officers. Certain fundamental qualities will be common to both. Integrity, efficiency, scrupulous impartiality, meticulous honesty in finance, and exemplary conduct, will be amongst the qualities expected of any man posted to a top position. But just as in India, of the present day, what an Indian civil servant regards as priorities today is totally different from that of the former British raj. So we are bound to find the same thing here. We are convinced that we have the men for many top Departmental positions and also for a number of senior Field appointments.
17. Failure of Under-Secretary system
We wish to clarify our position on the Under-Secretary system and give reasons why we repudiate this system outright. We cannot, in the future, tolerate any subservience by elected members of the House of Assembly to bureaucratic or departmental control. This is not only a continuation of Australian colonial superiority but domination of elected members by public servants and this is the opposite of responsibility to Parliament and the people. The Under-Secretaries have been trained not for ministerial responsibility in some future Cabinet, but as departmental subordinates and have laid themselves open to the charge that they are now the amenable tools and yes-men of a bureaucracy committed to carrying out Australian policy. Every Under-Secretary has unwittingly forfeited his representative status. And, through no fault of their own, a lot of good men will, after 1968, never sit in the House of Assembly again. Administration approval of a candidate will be like the ‘kiss of death’ in the general elections of 1968.
18. Federal Government years behind in implementing United Nations agreement and keeping up with world opinion
(i) We think it is appropriate and timely for you, the members of the Select Committee on Constitution, to remind the Federal Government that it is not we who are advanced or premature in our demands but the Australian Government that is behind the times. It is now recognized that the policies put into effect after the war by the late Mr. Eddie Ward5 and which were regarded by his opponents and many Australians at the time as ‘advanced’ were, in fact, ten years or more behind the times even then. Australian policies in Papua New Guinea have been slipping further and further back ever since.
(ii) Perhaps we should remind Federal Government of the Declaration on the Granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1960 and to which Australia was a party. The Declaration states that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights and is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. It states emphatically that ‘immediate steps shall be taken in trust and non-self-governing territories… to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire…’6 That was six years ago. We submit that Federal Government as a signatory of that Declaration should begin to ratify those ‘immediate steps’ and implement the provisions of the Declaration. We consider the terms of this Supplement to our earlier submission very moderate compared with the ‘transfer of power’ provisions adopted by the General Assembly.
(iii) In the face of this, the recent changes in the Department of Territories indicates a hardening attitude on the part of Federal Government and highlights the concentration and centralising of greater powers in Canberra on matters affecting Papua New Guinea. The time has come to clarify the situation so that our people here as well as the people of Australia may become aware of Federal Government’s failure to prepare us for self-government and to fulfill its obligations as a member of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
[NAA: A452, 1966/2760]
1 The group wrote to Guise in his capacity as Chairman of the Select Committee. According to the typewritten text, the group consisted of Albert Maori Kiki, Michael Somare, Oala Oala-Rarua (President, Workers’ Association, Port Moresby), Elliot Elijah (training officer, Department of Trade and Industry Co-operative Centre), Sinaka Goava (student, Administrative College), Kamona Walo (student, Administrative College), Joseph Kaal Nombri (student, Administrative College and President, Territory Students’ Federation), Ebia Olewale (education officer), Ilomo Batton (doctor stationed in Daru), Gerai Asiba (student patrol officer), Reuben Taureka (Acting Assistant Director, Medical Services) and Pen Anakapu (student, Administrative College) and Cecil Abel However, a copy of the submission in NAA: A452, 1966/2960 has an anonymous annotation claiming Goava, Batton and Asiba did not sign the document by the date of submission. In terms of leadership, Newby told Territories that ‘the prime mover of the group is Cecil Abel’ (minute, officer unidentified (Acting OIC, Information Section, DOT) to Warwick Smith, dated ‘3/67’, ibid.).
2 Though dated 23 January, the submission was not presented to the Select Committee until 16 March (see footnote 4, Document 98).
3 See footnote 3, Document 58.
4 The summary was signed by Abel and Maori Kiki.
5 Minister for External Territories, 1943–9.
6 Ellipses in source document.