Canberra, 19 November and 4 December 1968
Top Secret
Submission No. 306—The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 19681
The Cabinet asked that it be understood from the outset that it saw the Report of the Defence Committee as a wide-ranging analysis containing viewpoints, stated or implied, going in many instances beyond the immediate question of the basis of Australian defence policy or of military commitments, and thus going beyond the range of total detailed endorsement. It would give general reactions but in the circumstances it did not feel it necessary or, for that matter, practicable in the present discussion to take up and debate the Report in full nor to put down such endorsement as might be read as endorsement of any or all of the particular viewpoints advanced. Further, it would not attempt re-drafting but might make comments on particular passages in order to make its own views clearer.
2. This Decision is to be read against this background.
3. At its meeting of 19 November, the Cabinet noted the Report as to Part I and Part II, leading to the recital in paragraph 167 of the strategic interests emerging from the paper as a basis for the consideration of defence policy. The Cabinet noted the individual interests listed in paragraph 167 and accepted them as guidelines, though with the gloss that other strategic interests might well be added—in particular Australia’s interest in developments in the Indian Ocean, the need to emphasize the importance of the Five Power arrangements as a basis for future activities and to obtain the best results from them, including in the sense of stimulating Malaysia and Singapore in their own security and defence effort, and the need to sustain a continuing British interest in the area of South-East Asia.
4. Moving to Part III of the paper (on 4 December) the Cabinet noted in the first place the statement in paragraph 172 of what are described as the basic abiding features of Australia’s strategic situation. From this statement it registered no dissent, but again as a gloss it questioned the assertion of ‘abiding’, expressing the view rather that there was fluidity in the situation and that there was thus a need for the individual elements of paragraph 172 to be kept subject to review—for instance, as a particular example, the changing situations of the U.S.S.R. and China and their effect on the policies of those countries need continuing observation and interpretation.
5. The Cabinet then proceeded to paragraphs 177, 178 and 179, which it regarded as central to future defence policy. In relation to paragraph 177, it felt that the point at issue would be better and more realistically expressed if, in the fifth line, the word ‘complete’ was replaced by the word ‘effective’. Thus, re-stating the point in amended form, the passage would read:–
‘ … it is, taking the long term view, quite unrealistic to take the line that we could rely on the ANZUS Treaty for United States protection of Australia and its Territories and at the same time adopt the policy of effective military withdrawal from South-East Asia as our current commitments there expire, and of rejecting for the future of any further military involvement in Asia … ’
6. At this stage, the Cabinet asked that two specific propositions should be noted as having been examined and accepted.
7. The first was that Cabinet does not reject a future military involvement in Asia. This, which the Cabinet put as an opening proposition, relates specifically to what is put in the final clause of the sentence from the Report quoted in paragraph 5 above and is in further confirmation of the view there advanced.
8. The second proposition concerned Australia’s area of involvement. This proposition, which was accepted, was first that Australia should stand ready to join with the United States in military action in South-East Asia in accordance with SEATO, but second, apart from a SEATO situation Australia would regard Malaya (i.e. excluding East Malaysia) and Singapore as its area of primary concern. This is not to be taken as necessarily defining limits to Australian activity, and all situations must continue to be judged on the merits at the time. But the proposition put forward is intended to indicate at this stage, for policy and planning purposes, what the Cabinet regards as Australia’s particular areas of concern.
9. Having settled these propositions, and having endorsed paragraph 177 as amended, the Cabinet went on to indicate that it endorsed also paragraphs 178 and 179 of the Defence Committee Report, which read as follows:–
[ matter omitted ]2
As a gloss on the observation in paragraph 179 that the achievement of strategic flexibility would not carry the connotation that Australia would ‘necessarily’ have forces overseas continuously, the Cabinet observed that neither should it be assumed that forces would not remain continuously overseas.
10. The Cabinet then opened up the question of the role which Australian forces in the area would fulfil. It recalled its previous endorsement of statements made to Malaysia and Singapore at the time of the Five Power talks, to the effect that Australian forces were not available for use in any local disputes between Malaysia/Singapore and their immediate neighbours, nor for internal disorder except when externally promoted insurgency was beyond the capacity of the local forces to handle. In view of its present decision, however, it thought that more comprehensive attention should be given to defining the role of Australian forces in the area and asked that a further submission be made to it on this point.
11. The Cabinet then brought up the issue of deployment of forces beyond 1971.
12. It began by recognizing, and reaffirming, the commitment—subject to arrangements and further studies mentioned in Decision No. 543 of 19 September 1968—to maintain forces in Malaya and Singapore until 1971.
13. It then indicated that so far as Navy and Air Forces were concerned it would stand ready to allow these forces to stay in Malaya and Singapore beyond 1971 subject, of course, to the wishes of the Governments concerned. It noted that, in any case, it was accepted that the agreement by Australia at the recent Five Power talks to contribute to the proposed integrated air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore would carry certain implications for Australia in regard to the post-1971 period.
14. In the case of ground forces, the beyond 1971 position was left open. The Cabinet specifically indicated that there should be no decision at this stage to withdraw after 1971 and that a ground force presence beyond 1971 is at present neither ruled out nor guaranteed. The general objective is to retain flexibility and to make assessments and judgements as necessary, taking into account the attitude and performance of Malaysia and Singapore, and the attitude and posture in the area of the United States.
15. Resuming at this stage with the paper paragraph by paragraph, the Cabinet generally endorsed the paragraphs from 181 to the end of the Report. In so doing it recorded a series of observations which are set out in the Attachment to this Decision.
ATTACHMENT TO DECISION NO. 762
The following is the series of observations referred to in paragraph 15 ofthe decision:–
Paragraph 185:| Considering the sentence ‘Given the most favourable circumstances, this readjustment period could be short, and thereafter Australian military deployments in South–East Asia would become unnecessary’, the Cabinet felt that its attitude would be more accurately and fully expressed, particularly since there might be other factors to be considered, by indicating that ‘Australian military deployments in South-East Asia could become unnecessary from a strictly military point of view’.
—|—
Paragraph 189:| Consonant with its earlier expression of views regarding the area of Australian involvement (see paragraph 6) the Cabinet preferred that the words ‘and Thailand’ be removed from the final sentence—considering that support was subsumed within the SEATO obligation.
Paragraph 192:| In sub-paragraph (b), the Cabinet noted that its commitments to Malaysia did not extend to East Malaysia—this was put not so that the question of involvement in a particular situation in East Malaysia could not be considered but so that the limit of commitment would be clear.
Although the further detail of paragraph 202 was noted in explanation of sub-paragraph (e) in the list of requirements for forces, the Cabinet indicated, on the ground that no special forces would be sought for the ‘other areas’ referred to, it did not wish to endorse the inclusion of this sub-paragraph.
As a general comment on the preamble, the Cabinet observed that the phrase ‘along with’ was to be read as conjunctive rather than additive.
[ matter omitted ]
1 See Document 99.
2 Not published here. See Document 99 for paragraphs 178 and 179.
[NAA: A5619, C470 PART 2]