Canberra, 31 July 1970
Secret
Without Submission—Visit of the British Secretary of State for Defence, The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington1
The Prime Minister welcomed Lord Carrington in his new capacity as Minister of State for Defence and the opportunity to discuss with him the approach and plans of the British Government for future defence arrangements for Malaysia and Singapore. He noted at the outset that, while the Australian Government did not know what arrangements would ultimately operate in the area, it wished it to be clear that it continued to prefer a continuation of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement if that were possible.
2. Lord Carrington said that he had come promptly following the appointment of the new Government because of its concern to revise arrangements East of Suez as quickly as possible—but that this meant that a good many details remained unsettled, and indeed were open for discussion. He said that he had raised with the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore what he would be putting to Australian Ministers and that he hoped on return to Britain to submit firm proposals to Ministers. He foresaw the possibility of a further meeting—possibly in Five Power context—early in 1971.
3. Lord Carrington said that his Government saw Britain as one partner among five equal partners, with two aspects of future arrangements requiring discussion—the size and composition of the military forces in the area and the nature of the political commitment.
The British Force Commitments
4. Lord Carrington said that his Government’s provisional conclusions as to the British force commitment in Malaysia/Singapore had taken account of the forces which Australia and New Zealand planned to station in the area. He saw the British forces as having equality of status with Australian and New Zealand forces and as complementing rather than adding to those forces. He mentioned that Britain had other defence priorities—in Europe through NATO and because of problems in the Persian Gulf—and problems of resources. If the British commitment East of Suez were not to be too costly, it could possibly become a bipartisan policy. The point about keeping costs down applied with particular force to the logistic arrangements—the possibility of using e.g. Australian vehicles and radio sets for the British battalion group, and of sharing hospital, school and other facilities was mentioned.
5. The British forces mentioned by Lord Carrington as provisionally in mind for the defence of the area were:–
Navy| 5 Frigates or destroyers (one located in Hong Kong)
A share in afloat support
Visits by Royal Navy vessels for training, exercises, etc.
—|—
Army Air| One battalion group, including some supporting elements, stationed in Singapore.
4 long range maritime patrol aircraft
Nimrods
A flight of Whirlwind helicopters
Rotation of aircraft in and out of the area (at the rate of about 600–700 movements a year).
In relation to the Jungle Warfare Centre, there would be British troops at the Centre for a good deal of the time, but the Malaysian Government had raised the question whether, with the British ground forces stationed in Singapore rather than in Malaysia, the proposed command arrangements should be varied with a view to having Malaysian control.
6. Lord Carrington said in answer to a question that the forces in Singapore would be British. It was possible that Gurkhas would be stationed in Hong Kong and Brunei. In response to further questions, he emphasised that any British commitment in Brunei was not associated with the commitment to Malaysia and Singapore.
7. It was agreed that discussions might proceed later in the day between Ministers and officials on details of the British force commitment. Particular points mentioned were the possible stationing of a British submarine in the area; stationing of additional medium range fixed wing transport aircraft; the participation of British technicians and others to help operate the air defence system; and the rationalisation of logistic support arrangements. The question of a British force declaration to SEATO was also raised.
The Political Commitment
8. Lord Carrington explained that the British approach is based on substituting for its former dominant role a five power commitment with the five powers being equal partners and the three overseas nations having the same political commitment. This commitment should be directed to consultation in the event of external aggression or the threat of external aggression. He did not see any possibility of continuing the Anglo/Malaysian Defence Agreement after the end of 1971. He had said this to the Government of Singapore and the Prime Minister had expressed himself as accepting the position, providing a British presence was retained in the area. In Malaysia, there was regret that AMDA could not continue, but an understanding of the position and a recognition of the advantage of a continuing British presence.
9. The Prime Minister expressed regret at the British intention to terminate AMDA and said that he would not want the British, or any other Government, to think that this had the agreement of the Australian Government. However, the Australian Government was pleased at the decision to have a continuing British presence in the area. He noted that it was not yet clear precisely what the five power arrangement would actually mean—what political commitment each Government would accept, what force contributions each would make, whether joint approval by all partners would be necessary, whether complementary forces could give rise to problems if the three Governments were not agreed as to action required in a particular situation and whether there would be a distinction between East and West Malaysia. Australia would want to look also at the circumstances under which consultation would take place—the Australian position included subversion supported from outside.
10. Lord Carrington said that, first and foremost, the British Government regarded retention of a presence in the area as of political significance. It felt that this in itself would contribute to confidence and stability, and would be a deterrent to subversion. Although subversion was a difficult and contentious area, he agreed that any formula that excluded the kind of situation mentioned by the Prime Minister in his speech in February 19692 would not be realistic. He thought it might nonetheless be wiser not to say too much in public, even though there were to be understanding among the Governments. The Prime Minister expressed the view that this might not be possible and it was agreed that there was a need to discuss the issues in an attempt to find a satisfactory formula. Lord Carrington felt that, from the British point of view, it would be difficult to differentiate between a commitment to East and West Malaysia—this point also might usefully be discussed.3 He said also, in answer to a question, that in the British view, AMDA should for practical purposes lapse when new five power arrangements are entered into.
The Form of the Commitment
11. Lord Carrington said that, in discussions with Malaysia and Singapore, it had become clear that, although there had been British expectations otherwise, there was no pressure for a formal treaty arrangement to succeed AMDA. It seemed that a meeting of the five powers, followed possibly by a communique with a suitable and possibly quite loose declaration attached, would be acceptable to those Governments. He saw advantages and disadvantages in each course—treaty or communique—and expressed the British Government as being flexible on the point. He mentioned in passing that there was uneasiness in Malaysia about using British forces stationed there for SEATO purposes—although there might well be a distinction between ground forces on the one hand and aircraft and naval ships on the other.
Command Arrangements
12. It was agreed that the command arrangements to be made for the forces in the area would need to take full account of, and be consistent with, the political commitment to consult. It was on the one hand important to avoid the problem of control by the three outside powers and at the same time a situation in which those powers did not retain full control over their own forces. Lord Carrington expressed the view that it may be best to allow command arrangements generally to evolve. This matter would need further examination.
13. In relation to air defence, Lord Carrington said that the British were prepared to join in the efforts now being made and were willing to move ahead quickly. Malaysia and Singapore seemed anxious for the new machinery to develop. He asked whether the British Commander-in-Chief might now start preparing for the new air defence arrangements, on the understanding that the British would take part. Australian Ministers made the point that it would be desirable to discuss integrated air defence machinery only in the light of the arrangements made to succeed AMDA and that some of the Malaysian problems stemmed from a lack of full understanding of the Rules of Engagement. They suggested the possibility of avoiding a full five power air defence higher authority by arranging some form of consultative group associated with a two power higher authority.
14. It was agreed that the command arrangements required further examination, and that they must in essence be clearly subject to political decision.
Naval Facility at Cockburn Sound
15. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Lord Carrington said his Government had not given thought to possible British use of the facilities. He was willing to consider this, but thought it unlikely that the British could participate in the capital expenditure.
Facilities in Singapore
16. Lord Carrington said he had told the Prime Minister of Singapore that the British would not be prepared, in view of their heavy capital investment in the past, to make payments in the nature of rent for facilities they use in Singapore. This would be unacceptable politically to his Government. However, he saw value in being associated with use of the Stores Base at Singapore and suggested that there might be further talk among officials on the point.
Press Statement
17. A copy of the statement for the press as agreed at the conclusion of the meeting is attached.
ATTACHMENT: STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING TALKS
BETWEEN LORD CARRINGTON AND THE PRIME MINISTER
Following visits to Singapore and Malaysia, the British Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington, is visiting Australia for preliminary consultations as part of the British Government’s study of matters involved in its decision to continue a British military presence in Malaysia/Singapore.
The Prime Minister and other Ministers met with Lord Carrington this morning. The Prime Minister welcomed the British Government’s decision to continue to make a military contribution in the area. He explained the Australian Government’s position on the basis of his statement to Parliament on 25 February 1969 and this position will be taken fully into account by the British Government in reaching its decision.
At the conclusion of the meeting the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington expressed themselves as well satisfied with the exchange of views and affirmed the intention to maintain the closest consultation.
Lord Carrington will continue discussions with the Minister for Defence and the Minister for External Affairs this afternoon.
1 McMahon and J.M. Fraser (Minister for the Army, 1966–68; Minister for Defence, 1969–71) were among the other Australian ministers present. Australian officials attending were Sir R. Randall, Sir A. Tange, General Sir J. Wilton, Sir K. Waller and R.N. Townsend (Deputy Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department). Carrington was accompanied by Johnston, UK Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials, and naval officers.
2 See Document 103.
3 How to define insurgency was a major point in further discussion with Carrington conducted by McMahon and Fraser on 31 July 1970. Carrington described insurgency as ‘a grey area’ because in an emergency it would be difficult to draw a distinction between an externally inspired insurgency and a purely internal revolt. Carrington asked whether Gorton’s passages on insurgency in his parliamentary statement of 25 February 1969 also applied to East Malaysia. Fraser confirrned that they did. Australia looked at East Malaysia slightly differently from West Malaysia. Nothing had been said which precluded the use of Australian forces in East Malaysia, but the decision whether and where to deploy its own forces rested with the Australian Government. Carrington responded that politically within the UK, the Conservative Government would have great difficulty accepting in Malaysia a commitment to a wider geographical area than that accepted by Australia. Britain would be in an awkward position if in a Five-Power communique Australia specifically excluded East Malaysia. McMahon and Fraser assured him Australia would not take that position and that, over East Malaysia, Australia was solely concerned not to become involved in inter-regional squabbles such as the Philippines claim to Sabah. Fraser suggested that if the commitment to consult were to cover insurgency, this could be achieved in a number of ways. ‘One forrnula which attracted us was consult in the event of any forrn of armed attack organised or supported from outside, or the threat of such attack.’ Carrington repeated his concern that Australia might exclude East Malaysia. Fraser responded that Australia would have equal difficulty if the UK excluded insurgency. Carrington said that seemed a ‘fair outcome’. He found Fraser’s formula ‘attractive’ (NAA: A5882, C0988, record of meeting, 31 July 1970).
[NAA: A5873 VOLUME 2]