106

MINUTE, CARRINGTON TO HEATH

London, 6 August 1970

Secret


Five Power Defence Arrangements and British Military Presence in
South East Asia

You will have seen the telegrams I sent from each of the capitals I visited during my tour of consultation on this subject in the light of the DOPC and Cabinet discussions on 22nd June and 23rd July. This minute summarises the results and indicates the next steps towards establishing the new political commitment and the continuing British military presence we propose within the framework of Five Power Defence Arrangements.

General Reception

2. I visited Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra and Wellington, in that order. In each capital I had a private talk with the Prime Minister (Tun Razak was deputising for Tunku Abdul Rahman), followed by a discussion with the principal Ministers at which officials were also present. There were also meetings of officials. The Annex to this minute shows the way in which I presented our proposals.1

3. There was a warm welcome for our intention to maintain forces in South East Asia beyond the end of 1971; acceptance (subject to two or three points) of the size and composition of our proposed military contribution, based on the forces at A of paragraph 23 of DOP(70) 10; and an acknowledgement that we could no longer continue the Anglo–Malaysian Defence Agreement, which should be replaced by new political arrangements directed towards a consultative commitment undertaken equally by all five Commonwealth Governments.

The Political Commitment

4. As I expected, I was pressed at the outset in both Kuala Lumpur and Canberra to continue the AMDA. The Malaysians had a general distrust (which Singapore shared) of the Australians, and of the degree to which they could ever be relied upon to act if there was a commitment confined to consultation. They came round to the view, however, that it would be unrealistic to resist our proposals.

5. The Australian Prime Minister put up a show of urging me to preserve AMDA; but it was quickly apparent that the Australians did not really expect us to do so.2 I was relieved to find that Australian Ministers and officials—though there remained some doubt about Mr. Gorton’s own position—fully recognised the difficulty which the Malaysians would have in accepting any formal or public distinction between East and West Malaysia in the context of the new political arrangements; at the same time, they can certainly be expected to look more closely at any consultation issue affecting East Malaysia, if this ever arose. For our part, I am sure that we shall have to be ready to go as far as Mr. Gorton did, in his parliamentary statement ofFebruary, 1969,3 in accepting a commitment to consult about externally-promoted insurgency—even though we may be able to avoid any specific reference to this threat in whatever document replaces the AMDA.

6. I believe that we may be able to secure agreement that this document should be fairly general in substance and informal in character. As a result of their desire to preserve an image of non-alignment with their neighbours, the Malaysians favoured a loose form of document such as a communique, with or without a declaration, for the purpose of establishing formally the Five Power arrangement. The Australian and New Zealand Government were thinking along similar lines. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew was ready to fall in with whatever suited his Commonwealth partners.

Military Contribution

7. All four Governments recognised that our contribution of forces would have a primarily political, rather than a military, significance. They welcomed our specific proposals, and there was less pressure than I expected that we should do more. It emerged that the Australian and New Zealand Governments regarded our proposed Battalion Group—which they wished to see as a British rather than a Gurkha unit—as an essential element in our contribution.

8. The Singapore Defence Minister would have liked us to keep some Lightnings in the area until Singapore’s Hunter Squadron had been effectively established; 1 gave him no encouragement, but said that I would consider his request. The Australians and New Zealanders particularly urged the need for a few RAF MRT4 aircraft, and for a RN submarine; I said, without comment, that I would consider these possible additions, and I persuaded the Australians in return to examine whether they could contribute to a submarine presence and share in the Long Range Maritime Aircraft task.

9. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew urged, and the Australians and New Zealanders warmly agreed, that the logistic and administrative arrangements for the overseas forces in the theatre should be organised in the cheapest possible way; and that, for this purpose, there should be the maximum co-ordination and, where feasible, integration of functions and facilities. I shall be following up Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s suggestion that the British, Australian and New Zealand forces should make use, wherever possible, of the civilian schools, hospitals and recreational facilities in Singapore.

10. The Singapore Prime Minister also insisted—though the separate locations could be expected to increase logistic costs—that the Malaysians would ask for some British ground forces to be stationed in Malaysia, and that we should accede to this request. He had in mind the need to re-establish confidence within that country and to avoid the appearance that we were concentrating on Singapore. However, in spite of persistent probing, I got no response on this in Kuala Lumpur, where I sensed that the feeling was that locations were our affair; that British ground forces in Malaysia might reflect on the Malaysian ability to handle their own military problems; and that there was, in any event, no accommodation to spare. Both Australia and New Zealand thought we should station our forces alongside theirs in Singapore, and I now intend to plan on this basis.

Other Issues

11. Among the lesser issues which I discussed were:–

(a) Integrated Air Defence System: I found it necessary to make clear that we would play a part in this important feature of the defence arrangements. But the establishment of this system still presents considerable difficulty. The Australians are particularly sensitive about the position of their aircraft, and the need to avoid an air defence commitment inconsistent with the Five Power Consultative commitment we envisage. All four partners have agreed, however, to co-operate with the Commander-in-Chief Far East in progressing the physical work needed to establish the system by September next year on the understanding that there is parallel work between the Governments to work out satisfactory proposals for a higher air defence authority.

(b) Consultative and Command Arrangements: there was a general feeling that there will need to be some Five Power Consultative arrangements probably centred on the local Governments and the High Commissioners in Malaysia and Singapore, and that they should be allowed to evolve gradually. The Australian and New Zealand Governments are keen that, with the Five Power arrangements, there should be a joint or integrated British, Australian and New Zealand command, if only for training, logistic, and administrative purposes. I accepted this approach though I stressed the need to avoid anything elaborate and any semblance of a white man’s club.

(c) C.J. W C. The Malaysians felt that in the light of our proposal to end the AMDA, it would be necessary for them to establish more clearly in public their ownership of the Centre (without changing in any way the facilities to be provided). We must wait and see what they have in mind; but I hope that we shall not run into difficulties which will delay the establishment of the Centre in April, 1971.

(d) Our SEATO Commitment: there was considerable interest in whether we proposed to declare our forces—and especially our Battalion Group—to SEATO, since this could have both political and logistic implications. I said that we would reach a decision on this as soon as possible.

Immediate Next Steps

12. It was agreed that the next steps should be as follows:

(a) Political Commitment. We should circulate to all four capitals, simultaneously and as soon as possible, drafts of the documents which we would propose for formalising the new political arrangements between the Five Powers, and for replacing the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.

(b) Military Contribution and Support. We should issue planning assumptions and instructions to CINCFE based on what the Cabinet agreed before my tour, to enable him—in consultation with the appropriate representatives of the four Commonwealth Governments—to formulate proposals for the location, organisation, and support of our forces in close association with those of the Australians and New Zealanders. These proposals, with the best possible assessment of their financial and manpower implications, will contribute to the decisions we shall be taking in the autumn on the full scope of our continuing military presence in South East Asia. They will also provide a basis for negotiations on ‘real estate’ with the Singapore Government, and on the final support arrangements with the Australian and New Zealand Governments.

(c) Air Defence. We should draft and circulate for agreement by our partners the guidelines for CINCFE’s further work on the establishment of the 1ADS, while looking to the Australians to make the initial running on proposals for a higher air defence authority.

13. The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will jointly set this work in hand, and I propose to keep in close touch with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Five Power Meetings

14. I visualise that there should be a meeting of Five Power officials toward the end of this year to take stock, settle the more detailed issues, and prepare the ground for a Ministerial conference to set the seal on the Five Power defence arrangements in the early part of 1971. Our partners may wish us to hold this meeting in London.

Recommendation

15. In the light of the way in which the four Commonwealth Governments responded to the proposals which the Cabinet endorsed, I do not consider that there are any new issues on which Government decisions are required straight away. I therefore invite you, and the other members of the DOPC to whom I am copying this minute, to note:

  1. the outcome of my consultations, as set out in this report;
  2. the subsequent steps required to be taken, as set out in paragraphs 13–14 above.

The US in Vietnam

A turning point for the US in Vietnam was the Tet offensive conducted in the South in January and February 1968 by the Vietcong, South Vietnam’s communist guerrilla force. Major cities such as Saigon and Hue came under attack and although the Vietcong lost nearly 50,000 men a military defeat became a psychological victory with the realisation in the US that the war could not be won by military means. In March 1968 President Johnson ordered a partial halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, in May tentative talks began with representatives from Hanoi in Paris, and at the same time Johnson announced that he would not stand as a candidate in the November presidential elections. Taking office as a Republican US President in January 1969, Richard Nixon announced the withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam in June. In July, on the Pacific island of Guam, he launched a policy of ‘Vietnamisation ’, which meant handing over ground .fighting to South Vietnam. In April 1970 the President announced that another 150,000 troops would leave. From a peak of 540,000 in 1968, US troop numbers in Vietnam fell to 160,000 in 1971 and to 24,000 by December 1972. The last US troops left in March 1973. In other ways, the US was escalating the conflict. The secret bombing of communist bases in Cambodia began in April 1969 and in March 1970 the pro-American general Lon No overthrew the government of Prince Sihanouk. Peace talks with North Vietnam began in Paris in August 1969 but little progress was made and in May 1970 the US resumed large-scale bombing of the North. The escalation did not stand in the way of a hitherto unimaginable development. In July 1971 it was announced that Nixon would visit China in February 1972, the ground having been laid by the secret visit of his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, shortly before the announcement was made.

1 Not published.

2 See Document 104.

3 See Document 103.

4 Medium-range transport.

[UKNA: FCO 24/646]