London, 25 January 1962
Top Secret UK
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Australia and New Zealand Defence Planning
Introduction
1. In a recent message to the Prime Minister, Mr Holyoake, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, raised important questions concerning the defence implications for New Zealand of the Greater Malaysia proposals and of the current study ‘British Strategy in the Sixties’ .2 The Prime Minister has invited the Commonwealth Relations Office to combine with the Ministry of Defence in the preparation of a draft reply. To assist in preparing this reply we have been asked by the Ministry of Defence for a statement of our views on the points raised about New Zealand’s future defence planning.
2. In his interim reply to Mr. Holyoake, the Prime Minister has undertaken to have full consultation with the New Zealand and Australian Governments before firm decisions are taken on United Kingdom long-term defence policy for the Far East. This makes it necessary for our assessment to cover Australia as well as New Zealand.
Aim
3. To examine the defence implications for Australia and New Zealand of the Greater Malaysia proposals and of the current study ‘British Strategy in the Sixties’.
Far East defence interests
4. The Far East defence policies of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are designed primarily, by support of SEATO and in the case of the United Kingdom by undertaking to assist Malaya and eventually Greater Malaysia in external defence, to prevent a power vacuum which would encourage the spread of communism in South East Asia.
5. Within this overall concept there is first of all the United Kingdom obligation to contribute to the defence of Australia and New Zealand.
6. There are also purely United Kingdom commitments for an independent contribution to the nuclear deterrent against China, for the defence and internal security of Hong Kong, for the external defence of the Maldives and for the defence and internal security of the Western Pacific Territories. For this last commitment there are certain understandings with Australia and New Zealand. United Kingdom present commitments for defence and internal security in respect of Singapore and the Borneo Territories will be subject to change under the current proposals for a Greater Malaysia.
7. In addition there is a residual commitment for all three countries, as a result of a public declaration made in 1953, to join with the other nations who took part in the United Nations Command in Korea to resolve promptly and in unison any unprovoked breach by the Communists of the Korean Armistice.
Effect of Greater Malaysia on Defence planning
8. The outcome of the talks held in November 1961 with the Tunku 3 on the formation of the Federation of Greater Malaysia included an agreement that the existing Malayan Defence Agreement would be extended to the whole of the proposed Federation with a special proviso for Singapore. Under this agreement the United Kingdom would be permitted to make such use of the base at Singapore as she may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth Defence, and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia. As long as the spirit and letter of the agreement is observed by all parties the United Kingdom will be able to meet her international obligations in the area, in particular her commitments to SEATO, from bases in Greater Malaysia. It must however be appreciated that even with the agreement certain circumstances may arise which might inhibit our freedom of action. Despite these uncertainties, we expect Singapore will continue to be used as the main base for as long as possible. No one can say for how long this will be.
9. Australia and New Zealand are associated with the existing Malayan Defence Agreement and will have the opportunity of continuing to be associated with it when it is extended to all the territories of Greater Malaysia.
10. When sovereignty over Singapore passes to Greater Malaysia the United Kingdom’s right to the base will depend on the agreement and so ultimately on the willingness and ability of the Federal Government to implement it. In practice it would be difficult to conduct unrestricted operations from the Singapore base if the population were actively hostile. Consequently Singapore can already be regarded as a base where freedom of action is likely to be hampered by local susceptibilities, i.e. it is what has been described as a Class II base.4 The present Malayan Government, however, is strongly anti-communist and values Britain’s military presence, and it is this Government that, at least until the next elections in 1964, will constitute the Government of the proposed Federation. Should the present anti-communist Government of Malaya, which at present constitutes the government, fail to maintain its hold on the administration as a result, for example, of a reverse at the next general election there might well be such a change in the Malayan attitude to the defence agreement that the continued use of Singapore as a main base would become unproductive.
11. The United Kingdom will gradually be relieved of its commitment for internal security in Singapore with a resultant reduction in the element of the Army garrison at present maintained for this purpose alone. However, the United Kingdom capability to provide the forces to meet other continuing defence commitments in the theatre will generally be unaffected.
Far East future Defence policy
12. Our commitments in the Far East could not be met entirely by reinforcements from outside the theatre or from the United Kingdom in time to deal with all emergencies. In any case such an arrangement would fail to provide an effective military presence which we consider to be essential to prevent a politico-military vacuum, or visibly to demonstrate our intentions to honour our obligations in the area. We believe therefore that in the foreseeable future conventional forces will still need to be based in the Far East to meet circumstances short of global war.
13. If facilities in Singapore and elsewhere in Greater Malaysia were either severely restricted or denied to the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, the problem of deployment to meet our commitments within the theatre would be greatly aggravated. United Kingdom policy would still be to prevent the spread of Communism in South East Asia either by support of SEATO or by other means, and to assist in the forward defence of Australia and New Zealand. Our interests would be identical with what we estimate to be two of the major defence interests of Australia and New Zealand and would require the establishment of base facilities on land in the theatre.
14. Only Australia can provide the security of tenure and industrial backing that we require for an alternative main base to Singapore. We would expect from our identity of interest that both Australia and New Zealand would contribute to its establishment. In addition to the main base in Australia we would require forward operating facilities in the South East Asia area if we were to continue to meet our presently defined SEATO commitments. We would, however, expect the Malaysia bases to be available for her external defence. In our opinion it would be prudent to discuss now with the Australian and New Zealand Governments what alternative arrangements should be made in the event of the Malaysian bases being denied to us or becoming so restricted as to be unproductive. 5
Co-ordination of Far East Defence
15. The Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve at present pools the resources of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand allotted to this theatre. We believe that only by continuing these arrangements can the efforts of the three countries be combined to exert their influence to the full in this area. It follows that it would be desirable as far as possible for the three nations to have a degree of standardization and a common source of supply and logistic support, at least for the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. As at least a United Kingdom main base will need to be maintained in the theatre to meet our future commitments, we can reassure Australia and New Zealand that the United Kingdom will remain in a position to provide the logistic support for the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve.
Conclusions
16. For the foreseeable future the United Kingdom will continue to have defence interests which will require forces to be based in the Far East. We shall continue to use our present bases in Greater Malaysia, including Singapore, for as long as possible.
17. If the main base in Singapore should be denied to us or become so restricted as to be unproductive in the future the continuing defence interests of the United Kingdom, together with those of Australia and New Zealand, will necessitate the provision of alternative main base facilities in Australia. Certain operating facilities forward of the main base in Australia would also be required to meet presently defined SEATO commitments. A preliminary examination of these possible contingencies should be undertaken with the Australian and New Zealand Governments as soon as possible .
18. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand should be reassured that the establishment of Greater Malaysia will in no way lessen the intention of the United Kingdom to discharge her defence obligations in the Far East. This has been reflected in the current review ‘British Strategy in the Sixties’ which inter alia provides for the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve and its reinforcement.
19. Since it will be necessary to maintain a United Kingdom main base in the theatre in order to meet future commitments, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand can be assured that the United Kingdom will remain in a position to provide the logistic support for the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. Clearly a degree of standardization of military equipment between the countries would be advantageous and simplify logistic support problems.
1 COS (62)41, Annex. The UK Chiefs of Staff approved this report on 23 January, inviting the Ministry of Defence to use it as a basis for the preparation of draft telegrams from the UK Prime Minister to Menzies and Holyoake.
2 See Document 10.
3 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, 1957–63; of Malaysia, 1963–70.
4 See Document 10, paragraph 2(d)(ii).
5 In approving this report, the Chiefs of Staff Tagreed that it would be prudent to hold exploratory talks about planning a main base in Australia, ‘in spite of attendant financial and political difficulties’, and that ‘Australia and New Zealand would have to be brought into such planning at an early stage’. On the other hand, if it became known that the UK was planning to use alternative facilities in Australia ‘it might prejudice the continued use of facilities in Singapore’. Ministerial approval would be necessary before any planning for a base in Australia could begin (UKNA: DEFE 4/142, COS 7(62)1, 23 January 1962, Confidential Annex).
[UKNA: DEFE 11/245]