Canberra, 10 June 1971
Secret
The Prime Minister
You asked for a note of the main points made by Ministers during the Cabinet discussions on 8 June.
2. The attached paper has been prepared in response. It makes no attempt to reflect the ebb and flow of discussion. Its object is to provide you with a relatively unvarnished summary of the main points.
3. I should perhaps add that it has never before been practice for those attending meetings of Cabinet or its Committees in a secretarial capacity to make any record of what is said during the Cabinet discussions apart from the Cabinet decision1 and the manuscript notes we make at the time.
4. The attached notes are supplied to help you in reviewing the points made, on the basis that the Cabinet Minute itself does not on this occasion provide any background. It is, however, different from an ordinary Cabinet Minute in that it is not designed to record agreed conclusions or points of emphasis—rather, it records points as made.
Notes
1. The Cabinet was invited by Mr. Gorton to note the Strategic Review Report2 on the footing that it involved ‘a considerable variation from previous approaches’.3
2. A variation from previous policy was identified—see Page 3 of Submission from the Minister of Defence—as more emphasis than hitherto given to continental defence—in other words to ‘Fortress Australia’ .4
3. There was a clear view in Cabinet against exaggerated emphasis on continental defence and the Cabinet indicated, in terms, that it did not accept the concept of ‘Fortress Australia’. On the contrary, it reflected a strong feeling that to do so would seem to be a sudden switch in policy when the Cabinet’s view was that policy should remain very much as it is—and in accordance with paragraph …5 of the Report, that is to say that Australia participating in forward defence where she can and maintaining an overseas presence.
4. Referring to the concept of ‘forward defence’ the Cabinet reflected a view that Australia should sustain a forward defence element for as long as she can and ‘not to depart from a wish and a will to have defence as far away from Australia as possible’.
5. Consistent with this position the Cabinet did not accept an emphasis suggesting that the one test in the acquisition of arms or capacity should be whether such would contribute to the defence of continental Australia.
6. In so far as it made reference to the force capabilities required, the Cabinet did so in passing with the understanding that the particular requirements for force capabilities were to be taken up later in separate papers. The Cabinet did not refer in any specific way to the requirements of force size composition or capabilities except to indicate that as a basis for planning it was prepared to see an army of existing size (in terms of 9 battalions) and manpower structure, noting that the existing formations are under full strength. At the same time, the Cabinet made clear that its reference to the size of the army was subject to considerations of balance between various commitments and that defence planners should ‘act rationally’ in fitting their proposals into the overall economic context and financial capability of the nation. There was considerable argument about the interpretation of paragraph 167 of the Report, the weight of opinion being that the paragraph must be carefully read with all the assumptions and qualifications and against the background of the previous paragraph.
7. The Cabinet’s attitude was against the background of some questioning of the emphasis given to naval and air forces in the case as put and a willingness, reflected in the Cabinet discussion, to see ground troops stationed in Malaysia and other forward areas.
8. Although the Cabinet had put to it a view that large additional funds would be called for to meet defence requirements, it did not assent to this view. Nor indeed was it accepting that it was, at that stage, determining in any way the financial provisions to be made in respect of defence.
9. The whole thrust of the Cabinet discussion was that forward defence stands and the inclusion in the Cabinet Decision of a reference to paragraph 167 of the report was precisely to minimize impressions which Cabinet felt might otherwise be conveyed by paragraph 184 of the report or any impression that Australia is becoming isolationist.
1 See Document 112.
2 See Document 107.
3 See Document 108
4 This is a reference to paragraph 5 of Document 108 and its cross-reference to paragraph 184 of Document 107.
6 The paragraph reference here is blank in the original but, for the point being made, see paragraph 1 of Document 106.
[NAA: A5882, CO1191]