Canberra, 1 June 1973
Secret
Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—1973
PART 1: Introduction
Australia is remote from the principal centres of strategic interest of the major Powers, namely Western Europe and East Asia, and even those of secondary interest, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the North West Pacific. Having ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty we are not a factor in the Powers’ nuclear calculations and dealings. We are not a principal party in the shaping of any regional affairs relevant to their interests, nor are we under present threat from our immediate neighbours.
2. Because of its location and size Australia is a difficult country to invade, conquer and occupy. Moreover, we are a Power of sufficient substance to discourage any thought that we may be susceptible to low-level pressure. Our wealth and sparse population contrast with the large and poor populations of neighbouring countries. Access to the resources we can supply will be increasingly important to Western Europe, Japan and North America. This gives them a growing stake in Australia’s security and undisturbed economic development.
3. For the foregoing reasons, it can be said that Australia is at present one of the more secure countries in the world.
[ matter omitted ]
Part IV: The Australian Interest
General
1. Australia’s nearer substantial neighbours are countries with large populations whose history and societies are fundamentally foreign and with whom, excepting Japan, there are few substantial ties of importance to our national development. Across the major fields of its national life Australia’s basic affinities are with Western Europe and North America. Including Japan, these countries are also our major market and the major source of our immigration, imports and technology. Australia’s long-term development substantially depends on the readiness and capability of the ‘Western’ community to co-operate with us.
(i) Importance of the Western Defence Connection
2. Association with Britain and America give us advantageous arrangements in the strategic and defence field, including important access to classified defence technology, doctrine, logistic support arrangements and to intelligence. and policy consultations. We also benefit from military training and joint exercising and from collaboration in such fields as communications and maritime surveillance by advanced technological means.
3. These practical defence relationships, particularly with the US, are critical to the present capability of our defence forces and to their effective development.
4. There is advantage to Australia in Britain’s continuing defence involvement in South East Asia. This is generally welcome in the region and supports Australia’s own efforts to contribute to strategic confidence and stability there. It retains, and may eventually stimulate, a West European interest that is helpful in restricting scope for the Great Powers to win influence and to compete; and Britain’s status with all those Powers is a useful factor to us in diplomatic exchanges concerning South East Asia. It is also in our national defence interest to keep Britain, a principal friend and ally, involved and interested in our own strategic area. It is desirable that Australian policy regarding the Five Power Arrangements have regard to this interest and seek to retain a British military presence.
[ matter omitted ]
B. South East Asia
(i) The Forward Strategy
15. For much of the last two decades, the Australian outlook was dominated by anxiety about communist expansion into a weak and unstable Asia and the possibility of ultimate pressure on Australia. Australia looked to a ‘forward defence’ against China and North Viet Nam and the secure establishment of independent nation states in South East Asia that might serve as a strategic shield. We therefore encouraged and supported substantial involvement by Britain and the United States: our own efforts were very often dependent on them, but never of direct significance to the military outcome of any of the various campaigns.
[ matter omitted ]
17. Many of the contingencies that preoccupied earlier strategic policy now appear remote. But our present favourable strategic position would be prejudiced were developmen:ts in future to allow significant external encroachment into the region, particularly by the USSR or China, or to lead to indifference or unfriendliness to our interest among the regional Powers.
(iii) The Australian Interest
18. Australian strategic and defence policy therefore retains an interest in the national stability of the South East Asian states and in their regional consolidation. Australia’s interests are served by any reduction in tensions that exist between China and North Viet Nam on the one hand and the US and the ASEAN states on the other.
[ matter omitted ]
(vi) The Five Power Arrangements
[ matter omitted ]
31. Under present policy Australia is committed to honour the Arrangements ‘pending neutralization’. The immediate question for policy, therefore, is whether, and to what extent and for how long, Australia should retain a military presence in Malaysia and Singapore, as desired by those two Governments, and by Britain and New Zealand or should seek to display its strategic interest by programmes for bilateral and multilateral military exercises (so far as these are practicable) and defence aid. In our view a continued presence would be an assurance of Australia’s continued interest in their security.
[ matter omitted ]
Part VII: The Development Of Australian Defence Capabilities
[ matter omitted ]1
B. General Assessment
14. The present strategic situation contrasts strongly with that which faced Australia ten years ago and which contributed to the substantial expansion of Australian defence forces and capabilities in the 1960s. Important changes within the region which have led to this result include many-sided growth in the ability of South East Asian states to control their own national affairs and to resist interference and pressure from outside; and the re-orientation of Indonesian policy and the sharp decline of its naval and air capabilities necessary to any significant external aggression.
15. This assessment of the situation Australia is likely to face in the next decade does not mean that Australia can dispense with defence strength.
16. There are factors of stress and instability in our immediate neighbourhood and in the South East Asian region. While present trends are believed to be favourable, possible uncertainties particularly in the longer term need to be borne in mind.
17. A fundamental change in our position is that while Australia may still look to its major allies, particularly the US, for strategic support in circumstances going beyond those they will expect us to handle ourselves, it must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defence against any neighbourhood or regional threats. This need for greater self-reliance and the ability to act independently call for the maintenance at all times of defence strength which is adequate for immediate purposes and may be expanded if necessary.
[ matter omitted ]
1 Paragraphs are numbered by part or section, not consecutitively throughout.
[NAA:A5931, CL1030]