Canberra, 29 June 1973
Confidential
Five Power Arrangements
When the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of Cabinet considered my earlier Submission on this subject on 29 March it noted my proposals for a phased withdrawal of Australian forces from Singapore and Malaysia and in particular the proposals that:
(a) after April 1975, the only Australian forces remaining in Singapore would number up to about 150—comprising technical aid, training and exercise personnel and their support—to be retained only if it were then decided that they served the Government’s policies in the area; and
(b) the Butterworth Force of two Mirage squadrons (1,500 personnel) be planned to be withdrawn during 1976, leaving only a small group for technical assistance projects.1
2. The Committee authorised me to inform the Governments of New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom of those proposals, and in particular the terminal date of April, 1975 for Australian personnel contributing to the support of New Zealand and United Kingdom personnel in Singapore. The Committee noted that I would report on the reactions of the four Governments.
Views of other Governments
3. I have now visited Wellington, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and London for consultations with the Governments in those capitals.
4. I got a good hearing in all four capitals. Our views are well understood. I can say candidly, however, that none of the four welcomed what I outlined. All would have preferred a different Australian policy.
5. The New Zealanders, who appear to want to leave forces in Singapore even beyond April 1975 if they can, would prefer that we were staying too. They do not share the thinking that has led us to decisions about withdrawal, and consider those decisions to be damaging to our relations with South East Asian countries. However they understand our viewpoint and accept our intentions and have declined to line themselves alongside the British in trying to dissuade us. Their only plea has been over a number of practical difficulties which our withdrawal will cause them. I believe they have strong hopes, which I think we should try to meet, of our being as helpful as possible in the sequence in which we withdraw particular services from their people in Singapore, especially in regard to communications.
6. In Singapore I formed the impression that the Government there would prefer that we did not withdraw our forces. However the Singapore leaders are in my view reconciled to our departure. I believe they made up their minds some time ago not to argue the issue with us, and I do not expect there will be recriminations later. However, they do attach importance to the continued availability of our Mirage aircraft there.
7. In Kuala Lumpur I found the Malaysians indifferent about our intentions in Singapore, but concerned about Butterworth, and seeking some flexibility in our intentions regarding the RAAF Mirages there. I will return to this aspect later.
8. Our proposals are unwelcome to the British Government from both practical and political standpoints. In any case they believe our views on withdrawal to be ill–advised. In London Carrington urged me to consider leaving more of our support forces in Singapore, for a longer period, than we have envisaged so far. He described our proposed terminal date of April 1975 as ‘very unwelcome indeed’. He also hoped we would not make advance announcements about our final decisions when taken—he spoke particularly of the Mirage squadrons.
9. I do not think either Britain or New Zealand has reached a final decision whether to leave forces in Singapore after April 1975 but all the indications are that their policy thinking and planning runs strongly in this direction at present, notwithstanding our known intention to withdraw. They have already had bilateral staff discussions on the matter and appear to be planning on a fairly detailed basis.
Conclusions
10. Following my consultations abroad I am firmly of the view that we should hold to April, 1975 as the terminal date for withdrawing forces from Singapore excepting technical aid, training and exercise personnel and their support—a maximum of 150 men of all three Services. I consider that we should proceed towards this goal along the lines set out in my earlier Submission.
11. I believe we should not conclude or state anything finally definitive about Butterworth. We have already given notice of our intention not to be committed there indefinitely, and the year 1976 will have entered into the calculations of our partners. I suggest that we rest on this for the time being.
12. My reasons for proposing this flexibility about our Mirage aircraft are these:
(a) Unlike the forces stationed in Singapore, the Mirage squadrons make a significant contribution to the development of the local defence forces by providing a realistic training environment and a continuing demonstration of complex operational procedures.
(b) In Kuala Lumpur it was apparent to me that the Australian Air Force contribution was basically what Malaysia really valued in the Five Power Arrangements.
(c) Tun Razak2 personally ensured that I clearly understood that Dr. Ismail’s3 remarks in Canberra about ‘possible overcrowding’ at Butterworth by 1976 did not reflect the Malaysian Government’s view and should not be taken up by us in our policy planning. I was told at the highest level that Malaysia would move its own people and aircraft out of Butterworth if that became necessary to make room for our Mirages.
(d) Also as regards 1976, the latest intelligence confirms that Malaysia’s phasing-in of its own F-5E fighter aircraft will now be delayed for practical reasons beyond that year.
(e) I am quite certain that flexibility in our approach to this matter will be a big ‘plus’ in our relations with the Malaysian Government. It will not hinder or embarrass their efforts to achieve a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. It might indeed help them by encouraging a more confident approach on their part.
(f) There will be nowhere suitable in Australia to locate squadrons withdrawn from Butterworth until 1976 at the earliest.
(g) Singapore attaches importance to the continued presence of our Mirage aircraft.
Publicity
13. Whatever now be decided it is important to our relations, especially with Singapore and Malaysia, that our partners be informed before any publicity is given by the Australian Government to its decisions.
Recommendations
14. I recommend that Cabinet:
(a) agree now to the proposals for withdrawal from Singapore in my Submission of 26 March—para 1(a) above
(b) take no decision at this stage on the actual time of withdrawal of our Mirages from Butterworth (including Tengah) but agree to review the matter not later than March, 1975.4
1 Submission no. 231, Five Power Arrangements, 26 March 1973, and Cabinet decision thereon no. 392 (FAD) in NAA: A5915, 231. Barnard’s March submission revealed that Australia had 3,380 servicemen in Malaysia and Singapore (1,530 in Malaysia at the Butterworth Air Force Base in the state of Penang, and 1,850 in Singapore). In total an ANZUK force of 7,100 was established when the Five-Power Defence Agreement was set up in 1971. An Integrated Air Defence System was formed at Butterworth under an Australian commander. ANZUK was disbanded in 1975. Australia and New Zealand withdrew their troops in January 1974. New Zealand then established its own national force, which remained until 1989. UK forces were withdrawn under another Labour Government in April 1976. But the Five-Power Defence Agreement still continues. Under its auspices training is conducted and joint exercises are held. Also, a small Royal Australian Air Force contingent is still maintained at Butterworth. The UK values the agreement primarily for the facilities it provides for the training of British forces. The other four countries see the agreement in the same light, but they also value it because it represents a stabilising influence for regional security.
2 Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 1970–76.
3 Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Home Affairs, and Minister of Trade and Industry, Malaysia, 1970–73.
4 Cabinet approved these recommendations—decision no. 823—on 2 July 1973 (NAA: A5931, CL285).
[NAA: A5931, CL285]