London, 26 April 1961
Secret
Implications of Signing the Treaty of Rome
[…]
Commonwealth aspects
16. A decision by the United Kingdom to join the Six would clearly have major political implications for the Commonwealth. We should be entering a relationship with Europe different from, and in some respects closer than, that which we have had with Commonwealth countries since they became independent. It would appear to public opinion in other Commonwealth countries to mark a turning away from them. Our ability to retain the confidence of the newer members particularly would be adversely affected by the fact that, on some major world problems, the European countries with whom we should be identifying ourselves adopt a markedly different attitude from their own. Close political consultation with the Commonwealth could continue (e.g. Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meetings), but the possibility of strain between the UK and the other members must not be overlooked. Although the Commonwealth is a flexible concept, we would find it harder to take their interests into account where these conflict with those of our European partners, and hence more difficult to secure their support for our policies.
17. Our economic relationship with Commonwealth countries would be more directly affected. For us to join the Six would reduce or remove their privileged position in a number of ways—not only in respect of access to our market for their goods (since we could not secure the continuation in full of their present preferences and duty-free entry), but also in respect of access to the London capital market and to employment in the United Kingdom, and the operation of our anti-dumping laws in their favour. Through the common commercial policy, our direct commercial relations with them as between Governments would be severely curbed, if not ended, —e.g. ultimately we should not be able to conclude on our own behalf a trade agreement like that concluded with Australia in 1956. They might fear—however mistakenly—that our economic policies might come under pressure from the Six in a way that might increase the strains on sterling and so endanger their reserves, without their having any direct voice in the matter. Consultative arrangements (e.g. the meetings of Commonwealth Finance Ministers) would still continue, but our own freedom of subsequent action would be reduced and in the eyes of the rest of the Commonwealth this might impair the value of such consultation.
18. However true it may be that joining the Six would be in the longer–terrn interests of the Commonwealth, both politically and economically, there would be some economic damages in the short-terrn to some Commonwealth countries. They could not be expected to place the same value as we do on mending the division in Europe, or to surrender willingly their present economic advantages in hopes of benefiting from future economic expansion in Europe.
19. Similar considerations arise in relation to our dependent territories though here, except in the case of those approaching independence or with advanced constitutions, the issue is rather one of accepting limitations on our freedom to take certain kinds of action to forward their economic interests.
Agriculture
20. As mentioned earlier (paragraph 8) we believe that one of the implications of signing the Treaty of Rome would be that we should have to accept the long-terrn objective of a common agricultural policy. We do not discuss this further, since we understand it is under consideration by the Minister of Agriculture. But we know it to be his view (with which we agree) that if we are to join the Six at all, it would be better to join them early and influence the development of their agricultural policy, rather than to join later and find ourselves faced with a fait accompli which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to change.
[ matter omitted ]
[UKNA: CAB 134/1821]