London, 5 February 1962
Top Secret
In my message of the 20th October1 I gave you an account of some of the long term defence issues we are facing and said that we would wish to examine in consultation with you and New Zealand these major and far reaching questions as soon as our studies had taken a more definite shape.
2. As you know we have had an initial success in our talks with the Tunku. His statements since he returned have varied considerably but all the evidence that I have is that he fully intends to adhere to the agreement we reached. Moreover, so long as South East Asia is in its present disturbed state any anti-Communist Government of a Greater Malaysia is likely to welcome the presence of Commonwealth forces and to recognise the necessity to assure us continued use of the base at Singapore even if this involves some political embarrassment. Furthermore, the economic effects particularly in regard to employment of the removal of our forces will remain a weighty consideration for all politicians in Singapore.
3. We cannot safely assume that in the long run there may not be political changes in Malaya and it is clear that no defence understanding or agreement is a substitute for sovereignty in giving security of tenure. But in present circumstances I think that it is justifiable that we should plan on a continuance of an arrangement that gives us reasonably free use of the defence facilities in Singapore and Malaya. On this basis we are proposing to maintain in the area, if and when a Greater Malaysia is successfully set up, slightly greater naval and air forces than at present together with appropriate ground forces. These would comprise not only our contributions to the Commonwealth Brigade Group but also I would hope three more major units and a variety of supporting and administrative units. This will be so even when local forces have taken over our existing internal security responsibilities in Singapore for which at present we notionally allocate the larger part of our ground forces. The First Sea Lord will give you the picture of our probable future deployment in more detail when he is in Canberra later this month.
4. Against this background we should hope that for the time being you and New Zealand will continue your existing contributions to forces and plans for operations in the area.
5. We should I think be clear about the circumstances however unlikely in which there might take place such a deterioration in our relations with Greater Malaysia that it would no longer be worth while relying at all on the use of the Singapore facilities in war or basing forces there in peace. We should on the one hand consider what would happen if the whole of our policy in association with you, New Zealand and the United States of maintaining the morale and stability of the countries of South East Asia in their struggle against Communism might fail and that faced with a collapse of this policy in Indo-China, Siam and Greater Malaysia might go soft. On the other hand, for one reason or another, Chinese and insurgents’ pressure might be withdrawn for several years. In such a situation a future Government of Greater Malaysia might, owing to the absence of a visible threat, be unable to resist the political pressures to throw us out or make our continued presence not worth our while.
6. In the first of these two cases the defence of New Zealand and Australia on and around the mainland of Asia would clearly have become impracticable and we should all have to consider a strategy for your closer defence. Under the second possibility SEATO policy would not have collapsed entirely and there might still be scope for some means of keeping SEATO going without the facilities of Malaysia. In this case also our military contribution would, it seems to me, inevitably have to be mainly based on Australia.
7. The primary questions in these eventualities of what is practicable and what is the best strategy are ones which we should be glad to discuss with you and New Zealand when you are ready. We are, moreover, as you will see from the Defence White Paper which is to be issued in February developing the equipment and training of mobile forces relying on sea and air transport. Perhaps you and Holyoake, to whom I am telegraphing similarly, would let me know what you think about the practical consequences of the appreciation I have set out above. We shall be thinking further about all this and I shall keep you in touch with any conclusions we may reach.
8. Meanwhile we must, I think, be very careful to take no action and to make no statements in public that would suggest that we do not require or do not intend to use the defence facilities in Malaya and Singapore for as long as we need them.
1 Macmillan’s message (I) argued that over the next ten years ‘local susceptibilities’ could make it difficult to use Singapore as a base for operations, in which case the UK’s SEATO role might change; (2) raised the possibility of the UK having a seaborne-airborne capacity as a substitute for ‘old-style bases’; (3) made clear that UK forces earmarked for internal security duties would be withdrawn once Malaysia was established; (4) emphasised that it was imperative for the UK to reduce overseas expenditure, including military costs (NAA: A6706/1, 61, message, Macmillan to Menzies, 20 October 1961). Commenting, Bunting advised Menzies that, although details and timescales had not been mentioned, the message foreshadowed a UK rundown in Southeast Asia; ‘we cannot take this hint too lightly’ (ibid., minute, Bunting to Menzies, 1 November 1961).
[NAA: Al209, 1962/790]