Canberra, undated [June 1961]
As you will be seeing the Minister for Trade on Thursday night in relation to the Sandys visit, I am sending you the following as ‘recommended preliminary reading’. It is long. But if you can, please persevere.
2. We had a further interdepartmental meeting this week by way of preparation for Sandys.1 It was a type of rehearsal. We started from the assumption that you and your colleagues will want to regard the visit as opening the political consultation but not completing it. Sandys will make his exposition, and following that, the Australian Ministers will respond in interrogative and probing fashion. But there will be no question of Sandys taking away an answer and therefore no question of any commitments being entered into or pretended.
3. On that assumption we envisage the discussions taking a form something like the following. First of all, on Friday afternoon the Australian Cabinet meets in order to complete its own preparations and its tactics. Sandys appears formally on the Saturday morning when he meets, presumably, the Cabinet. This will be the occasion for his exposition. We think it is likely to be lengthy and we also think it will be mainly political in character.
4. When Sandys is done, you will no doubt take up the running. We felt that you would make a series of observations both as to what Sandys has said and as to what you feel he has omitted or under-stated. This would require Sandys to comment further and open the meeting for general discussion. All of this would be chiefly in a political or broad economic vein.
5. Once these political exchanges conclude, or, anyway, subside, we felt that two new phases would open up. They are the trade and commodity phase and the finance phase. We assumed that under both of these headings our Ministers will want to do a good deal of questioning—deep questioning. We felt also that just as you will have led on the general political and economic side, the Ministers who would lead the specialized questioning would be the Minister for Trade for commodities and commercial policy and the Treasurer for finance. This does not exclude others, especially the Minister for Primary Industry and the Prime Minister. But it seemed wiser to us to have the two Ministers named leading the Australian side for these particular questions.
6. We were not sure how long the Ministerial discussion would need to run. We could see that they might conclude by Monday evening, but that is a matter which can look after itself. However, we did consider whether Sandys or his officers would want to have gaps between the Ministerial meetings so that technical discussion could proceed elsewhere—for example, with Trade or Treasury. We wondered whether we ourselves should seek such discussions. Our conclusion was that we would not take any initiative unless some new line of argument advanced by the UK needs exploration. If, however, Sandys or his officials seek us out for detailed discussions we would make a check with our Ministers and proceed in the light of their views.
7. We next discussed the additional material which we should supply to Ministers for their meeting with Sandys. There are already general papers on the political, trade, and finance aspects. We felt that all that was needed now was a series of points or questions which the four Ministers who are going to be directly concerned—the Prime Minister, the Minister for Trade, the Treasurer, and the Minister for Primary Industry—could have at their elbow. Accordingly, External Affairs will provide for the Prime Minister a note with points shortly stated. This will be chiefly for prompting purposes. Sir Arthur Tange intends to put into it not merely sentiments, but a few concrete instances which can be drawn on. Similarly the Treasury and the Departments of Trade and Primary Industry will prepare material for their own Ministers. This is expected to be also in the form of points and questions but supported by factual background so that a question can be sustained by supplementaries if the response or lack of response by Sandys make this advisable.
8. We felt it would be useful if this material, or anyway some of it, could be exchanged between the four Ministers involved. The aim is to have the material ready by Friday morning at the latest.
9. Finally, we gave attention to two particular aspects of preparation.
10. The first of these concerns what will be said about the United Kingdom’s economic position. Sandys is likely to make use of the thesis that the United Kingdom’s. economic strength is declining relatively to the other major powers, including the European bloc. This was first presented to us in the ‘10–year paper’ of 1960. It will lead to the proposition that to join Europe is to expand, and not to join is to wither. We feel there is room for debate about this, and Treasury have undertaken to prepare material in anticipation. This Treasury material will be available for our responses, and particularly for the Prime Minister in his opening response.
11. The other aspect gets right down to fundamental points of tactics and of position. I said in the beginning of this message that we assumed that our Ministers will desire to avoid commitments. They will square Sandys up to the considerations and problems affecting the decision of the United Kingdom, but all the time remaining neutral—i.e. not to be understood as supporting, nor as opposing, nor in any way responsible for whatever decision the UK makes. In theory—wonderful. But in practice—how do you achieve it and, having achieved it, hold out against the pressure Sandys will exert to shift you even if only ever so slightly. Our news from New Zealand at this moment is that Sandys wants to nail New Zealand this week as being in some degree of support or anyway of acquiescence. He will want to nail us similarly next week.
12. In a way, this will be not unlike the Thornycroft exercise of last year. In that case, we maintained our independence by stating across the table and in writing a clear and earthy view, but stopping short of blocking the UK’s initiative if they wanted to take it.2
13. The way to establish our independence in this coming matter will be to declare it—not leave it to be interpreted from communique or minutes or discussions. Interpretations will go against us. It will need stating in terms—orally and in writing. The letter to the British Prime Minister which you have in mind will be a suitable vehicle. If there is a communique, it will need to be watched for the interpretation which will be put on it.
14. But there is a further question to ask ourselves: are we right to assume that you and your colleagues should avoid all commitment and remain gloriously neutral? May you not end up with the view that you have a duty to oppose or, though less likely, a duty to come out in support? In other words, is it enough to take the line that this is for the UK to decide? We feel that it is not and that such extreme neutrality is to be avoided, if possible, just as opposition and support are to be avoided at this stage.
15. But how do you get words to express this to Sandys and Macmillan—we are not in support, we are not against, we are not neutral.
16. The answer we suggest to you is on these lines:–
(a) This visit by Sandys is the beginning of consultation and no more than that—the subject matter is limitless in its implications—this is our first real acquaintance with the mind of the UK on it—we need to study it.
(b) Because we need to study it and then to confer further, certainly with the UK and perhaps with other Commonwealth members, we are not ready to react—therefore we do not react—we do not express or imply support or opposition—but equally we do not say we do not propose to react—we reserve our position.
(c) The objective for us is to reach the stage where we can react—this involves study of the general views which Sandys has put, but much more, it involves getting down to the practical issues of trade, commodity and finance problems—this means that there must be devised a set of proposals, satisfactory to us, which have a chance of successful negotiation with the Six—these matters will provide the hard core of the issue for us—they will govern our reaction—if we cannot see the outcome as bearable, we will in the end be obliged to say publicly that we cannot support the UK if they enter Europe. (NOTE: This last point of a threat that we will, in certain circumstances, go on record as ‘not supporting’ seems a necessary element of our response.)
(d) Therefore we leave it on that basis—our position reserved and we will stand ready, and soon, to pursue the detail with the UK in order to determine our total position.
1 Document 137.
2 See Document 2.
[NAA: A4940, C3369 PART 1]