MINUTE, BUNTING TO MENZIES

Canberra, 7 July 1961

Secret

An Extreme View, But One Which Might With Advantage be Put

The history of this matter is:–

1.

1. The United Kingdom elected to stand outside of the Six in the early stages.
2. When the Six formed themselves up, the Uhited Kingdom tried to develop an association with them. This failed.
3. They switched to the European Free Trade Area idea—the Seven. This failed.

[ matter omitted ]

1. Next, they felt that they might be able to start negotiations with the Six, but only with the knowledge that they could carry it through to a successful result from their point of view—they were not willing to risk a second failure. They have now moved away from this.
2. They are now considering (and may have decided) to enter negotiations with the idea of joining the Treaty of Rome, but with derogations.
3. This is not much of a basis for confidence.

2.

(a) The United Kingdom said to New Zealand,1 and will no doubt say to us, that if in negotiations with the Six they cannot reach accommodation which protects the interests of the Commonwealth they will break off negotiations. But all the information we get from our Ambassadors2 […] suggests that the Europeans have no intention of agreeing to derogations. What we know, the United Kingdom must know.

(b) This suggests that there is a great deal of pretence on the part of the United Kingdom—pretence that there are prospects for substantial derogations; pretence that it is reasonable for us to indicate (as New Zealand did) that it is safe for us to acquiesce in the United Kingdom entering negotiations; pretence that the United Kingdom can easily withdraw; and pretence that once having allowed (even if only by default) the United Kingdom to begin negotiations we can, at a later date, start protesting.

3.

1. If the United Kingdom goes into Europe, what we will see is–

2. the end of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom being under European management;
3. the end of the sterling area—our balances are second-class balances; the United Kingdom will consult Europe rather than us about how to deal with a sterling crisis; and
4. we don’t know where we stand in the matter of defence support in this area.

(b) All our international arrangements have been entered into on the basis of a particular relationship with the United Kingdom—whether they are commercial or political. This relationship will no longer exist. Our whole fabric of international ties and relationships will need re-thinking.

(a) Against this background the United Kingdom asks us to give some sort of approval or acquiescence, or, anyway, lack of objection, to their opening negotiations. This we cannot do. What we must say, and do say, is that we deliberately withhold support.

1 During Sandys’ visit to Wellington immediately prior to his arrival in Canberra in July 1961.

2 For example, Document 142.

[NAA: A4940, C3368 PART 2]