Canberra, 6 October 1961
3192. SECRET
We have received preliminary ad vices from our delegation which has been working in a friendly atmosphere with your officials in London in analysing the nature of our trade interests which could be affected by United Kingdom entry into the Common Market, and in developing, in broad principle, possible arrangements to safeguard those interests.
Until our delegation returns, the picture we have is necessarily incomplete. However, I understand there is to be a meeting in Paris next week between United Kingdom Ministers and the Governments of the EEC, and my colleagues and I therefore think it proper to convey to you some important considerations.
If United Kingdom Ministers find it necessary at that meeting to say anything that bears upon the protection of Australian trade interests, I would want to press very strongly our view that any statement of this kind should be based upon my Government’s position as put to Duncan Sandys when he was here. In short, we want the whole of our trade interests in the United Kingdom to be protected. These interests have their counterpart in United Kingdom interests in trade into Australia. In particular we hold strongly to the view (with which I am sure you will agree) that the United Kingdom Ministers should not make any statements which would preclude or make it difficult for the case to be argued in due course for any individual item of Australian trade.
Your [sic] will, l know, understand that for us we cannot regard any of our trade items, upon so many of which whole communities depend, as expendable. If it is the United Kingdom position now or subsequently that some items of Australian trade should be abandoned, then we should know what these items are.
We consider the principle at issue here as supremely important. If your Government were to take the initial stand that there were some items of Australian trade for which you would not be prepared to propose safeguarding arrangements, we would feel that this would seriously prejudice the atmosphere in which we are earnestly seeking to work out solutions of the problems which confront you and us.
The final decision whether or not to enter the Common Market on the terms negotiated will, of course, be yours, as we have throughout recognised. We are not unaware of the great political and defence considerations which must exercise your minds, as well as the economic factors directly involving the United Kingdom. But I am sure that you will recognise that if you ultimately, and after weighing all the considerations involved, decide to enter into the Common Market on conditions which damage particular Australian industries—whether small or large—we must be in a position to say publicly and accurately that these industries have been damaged because satisfactory special arrangements were, in spite of the best efforts by the United Kingdom, simply not attainable because the Six rejected them, and the United Kingdom felt constrained to accept the rejection.
Our officials in London have been discussing various possible means of protecting our particular trade interests. I should make it clear, however, that while our officials have sought to be constructive in these discussions the adequacy of such arrangements as may finally be made will, in many cases, be determined critically by specific things such as quantities, prices or the levels of tariff.
When we have had full particulars from our officials after their return, there may well be other important matters on which I shall wish to communicate with you, including if necessary, the matter of the status of our representatives in the negotiations.
[NAA:Al838, 727/4/2 PART 1]