Washington, 11 February 1963
401. Secret
Australian Defence Position
When Ambassador took me to see Rusk today latter asked whether Australian defences are in adequate shape to assume the burdens arising in this area. Rusk proceeded to ask, by way of example, whether we had ‘reserves of trained men’ to call upon to meet any situation.
2. I said that the Government had had to choose between relatively larger armed forces, partially trained, and partially in reserve, and smaller forces fully trained and available to be used in South East Asia within two or three weeks of the call. This had been a deliberate choice based on advice that the longer time-tables which we had been able to use in World War I and World War II were no longer available. Rusk said that he was by no means sure that Malinowski2 shared this view about the brevity of wars. The point he wanted to make was that the United States would not be able to accept any new aid commitments whether civil or military. The creation of Greater Malaysia was something the United States supported but it was a British Commonwealth responsibility to look after it. If anyone had any idea that the United States would repeat anywhere else the situation in Vietnam where they had 12,000 men suffering casualties, they were mistaken. The United States would not be the gendarmes of the world.
3. I described the forces that Australia already had in the Federation of Malaya. I said it was a matter for the Government still to decide what commitments it would adopt towards the Federation of Malaysia when we were nearer to it coming into existence. But we did not think that the problem was merely a matter of obtaining undertakings of military support. It was important that countries which were being consulted about the creation of Greater Malaysia should be willing to stand by it in future. Malaya probably was in no need of economic aid beyond technical assistance. The Americans turned the conversation to Timor, and Harriman3 described the repressive policies of the Portuguese administrators and the low level of literacy and public health. We told them that Portuguese Timor represented a potential embarrassment to the Australian Government with a difficult parliamentary situation. The Prime Minister had written to Dr. Salazar4 a strong letter about the threat to peace which might arise if Portugal failed to grant some political freedom to the Timorese. This was the real question and it was not one of raising their standard of living. We did not see that Australia could go any further than this.
4. It was agreed that it would be appropriate for the British to lead off the discussion on Greater Malaysia.
5. The Secretary of State was relaxed and friendly in manner but when asking me about Australia’s defence responsibilities and defence preparedness he was serious and emphatic. It was quite clear that he was not seeking information but conveying an opinion.
1 Sent from the Australian Embassy, Washington, to the departments of Defence, External Affairs, and the Prime Minister. Tange was in Washington for the first quadripartite talks after Indonesia announced its opposition to Malaysia.
2 Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, Soviet Defence Minister.
3 William Averell Harriman, US Ambassador-at-Large, 1961–{;5; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1961–63; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1963—65.
4 Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Council of Ministers, Portugal, and de facto dictator of the Portuguese Republic, 1932–68.
[NAA: Al838, TS677/3 PART 5]