London, 31 March 1962
497. Secret
We shall all have some grave issues to face during the coming year and it would be very precious to me ifthere were any chance of having some intimate talk with you before too long.
There is first the problem of our relations with Europe and their repercussions on the Commonwealth. I have just sent you and other Prime Ministers a message suggesting a Prime Ministers’ Meeting in September. I know, of course, the great importance you attach to all this. I have given anxious thought to the best time to have a Commonwealth gathering and have been forced to the conclusion that it would not really be of value until the early autumn.
But there is much else on my mind—the nexus of problems concerning our relations with the Soviet [sic], including disarmament, nuclear tests, and Berlin.
There is also the question of this rapidly expanding Commonwealth—which I fear may in itself make the Meeting in September an unwieldy one.
I shall be seeing Diefenbaker briefly in Ottawa after my visit to the President next month; I wish I could come to Australia or you to London. Is there a chance of the latter?
If you felt able to come over at some time, perhaps in May, June or July, it would be the greatest help to me.
I do hope Dame Pattie’s being ordered to rest is nothing serious. Please give her best wishes from us both.
1 Macmillan’s senior advisers and ministerial colleagues had recommended that he find some suitable opportunity to meet privately with Menzies, in order to reassure him personally of Britain’s ongoing commitment to the Commonwealth in the light of his concerns over the EEC. Sandys was especially keen on this idea, and strongly advised Macmillan to invite Menzies to London for a short visit, ‘perhaps combining business with pleasure at the tests with Pakistan’. Macmillan fully concurred with Sandys’ view, and immediately sent Menzies a particularly warm open invitation to join him in London for some ‘intimate talk’. Interestingly, two earlier drafts of Macmillan’s invitation contained variously worded enticements to ‘some good cricket when the Pakistan team is here’. But this means of arousing Menzies’ sympathy for all things British was presumably deemed too blatant, and was deleted from the final text. These overtures reflected a particular view of Menzies’ character which was widely held in British Government circles. Comparisons were often made between the abrasive diplomatic style of McEwen and the more subtle, moderate approach of Menzies, who was generally thought to be more sympathetic to British needs. The imperative of bringing Menzies ‘face to face’ with British Minsters, particularly the Prime Minister, implied that Menzies might be more susceptible to direct British persuasion. Indeed, British officials openly hoped that Menzies might ultimately come to exercise a ‘more statesmanlike’ influence over McEwen on the question of Britain’s entry into the European Community (UKNA: PREM 11/3664, F. Mills (Sandys’ Private Secretary) to Tim Bligh (Cabinet Office), 30 March 1962; PRO: DO 164/94; PRO: DO 159/59, Costar to Sir Saville Garner (Permanent Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office) 9 May 1962.
[UKNA: PREM 11/3644]