Chateau de Champs, 3 June 1962
Secret
President de Gaulle said that the Prime Minister and he had had a good talk. Clearly there had been an evolution in British thought in favour of Europe. This was true particularly of the Prime Minister but also he felt of England as a whole. There were certain conditions without which Europe, worthy of the name, would not exist. The first was that Europe should exist by its own efforts and independent of its American allies. This would enable Europe to have her own policy in Africa, Latin America, Asia and as regards Russia. If only the United States and the Soviet Union had a genuinely independent existence they would either fight or agree; neither would be in the interests of Europe. On this point President de Gaulle was not sure that Britain was as resolute as France but perhaps there would be a change in the British attitude. It was true that others in the Six were not convinced yet either; even the Germans did not really have a European policy. Of course such a policy meant that Europe should dispose of and command its own defence. The second indispensable condition was economic. Here Britain had advanced to meet Europe which was now beginning to develop the life of the Six. So far the Six had not made great strides; they had only agreed with great difficulty in January on certain agricultural arrangements. However, things were moving, more and more links were being formed, more and more organisations established. It was quite clear that Britain was moving in the direction of the Six in this field, although of course there were problems to resolve and it would be wrong to claim that the way to British membership was entirely clear or that a treaty could be signed at once. It was to be hoped that this movement would continue since certainly with British membership of the Community many large possibilities would be opened up. It was necessary to find means to achieve this and to have the courage to take them […]
Of course the accession of the United Kingdom to the Community would produce a new and different situation, even if Britain accepted the Treaty of Rome in full. For example, the exchange position in Europe would be much altered. Then again the general economic climate would be different, and in the political field it was clear that co-operation inside an enlarged community would not be possible unless at least Britain, France, Germany and Italy were in agreement.
The Prime Minister said that he thought this was a very fair statement of the position. If the United Kingdom entered the Common Market this would be a great event. If Britain did not enter this would also be a significant fact. This was an important and decisive moment in history. If Britain’s entry was not possible now he did not himself believe that it would be possible in two, three or five years. As President de Gaulle had said, this was a question which had political and economic aspects. The political aspects provided the reason for trying to find an economic solution. In his own view the economic problems could be surmounted if it was clear that there was a common desire to reach a political goal. As regards the framework of the Treaty of Rome, he had made clear to President de Gaulle that the United Kingdom were prepared to accept the common tariff, the common commercial policy and the agricultural provisions. The only point he would make in this connection was that he did not think it would be right for any country to bear any more than her fair share of the cost of the agricultural levies. It was in his view clear that Britain was ready to accept the policy of closer association with Europe. This was perhaps less true among the older generation, but the young were no longer attracted by the ideals of Empire which had thrilled the generation brought up on Kipling and they were looking for a new vision. This they would find in the European idea. British industrialists were in good heart and accepted with enthusiasm the challenge of the Common Market. Agriculture presented a certain problem but Britain was prepared to move from the system of agricultural support, which they had hitherto maintained, to the new system. During the war when Britain had been reduced to as little as two or three weeks’ supplies of food her farmers had naturally been encouraged to grow as much as they could regardless of the cost. Since the war this policy had become very expensive and was now costing in subsidies something like million a year. It had already been altered in the case of milk whose cost had been shifted from the exchequer to the consumer. A similar change should be possible generally because food was now a less important item in the cost of living than it had been even twenty or fifty years ago. In 1906 the Liberal Party had won a famous General Election on the price of bread but the Prime Minister did not believe that this would be possible now. Of course the reduction of the burden on the exchequer would permit a reduction in taxation which would compensate for the rise in food prices. President de Gaulle had mentioned sterling. The position of sterling would certainly need to be considered but recent experience had shown that the concept of international co-operation to promote monetary stability was gaining strength. In his own view a larger credit base was still necessary in the world but it was undoubtedly true that short of such an enlargement many measures had recently been taken to promote greater international liquidity. He had no fears about the strength of sterling. Britain had only been forced to devalue once since before the war and had managed to resist subsequent pressures. The reserves were now strong and he did not at all fear having to devalue if Britain entered the Community. There was sometimes some misunderstanding about the position of the sterling area. The truth was that if the balance of some members went up the balance of others tended to fall. For example, if Australia got a higher price for her wool she tended to buy more goods. If in an exceptional case the sterling area as a whole was in deficit then of course the United Kingdom and the various members would mobilise their world reserves as they had done in the past.
The Commonwealth problem was of course the most important one. The new Commonwealth countries presented no political difficulties and very few economic ones. On the whole the question of tropical products did not seem to be too complicated to deal with. The old Commonwealth were in a different case. Politically there was the feeling among them that Britain’s joining Europe would mean less close ties with the Commonwealth. To this he would reply that the Europe to which Britain hoped to belong would not be a federal society which would try to destroy the past traditions. The future could only be built upon the great traditions of Europe’s ancient civilizations. As to the suggestion that it was undesirable for Britain to have close relations with the continent, he would ask the leaders of the Old Commonwealth to pay a visit to France where they would see the tombs of their dead of two world wars. These casualties had occurred when Britain was theoretically isolated and independent. It was arguable that far from this having been an advantage it had proved a fatal mistake. If in 1914 the Kaiser had been quite certain that Britain would fight with France then Germany might have hesitated whereas in the event M. Cambon1 had not known until the last moment what England would do. The same had been true between the two wars when differing British and French policies had allowed German remilitarisation to take its course. Germany was now fortunately an ally but the Russian menace had taken the place of the German one. If a European policy could be forged then it would be far more difficult for Russia to play one country off against another, and the lessons of the past might then be used to avoid future disasters. He therefore believed that there was a strong political reason for finding an economic solution to the problem of Britain’s membership of the Community.
[ matter omitted ]
As regards the details of the economic negotiations in Brussels he would only say that he believed a solution would be found. Some interesting figures had been brought to his attention showing the degree to which the Six were importers of cereals. Although they imported rather less wheat than the United Kingdom, taking cereals as a whole they imported about a third more, 12 million metric tons a year as against the United Kingdom’s 8 million. It was also clear that in the future the Community would have a large world trade and would have to import not only to meet internal demand but also to enable foreign customers to pay for European industrial goods. So this problem of temperate foodstuffs should not be insurmountable. Sentiment in Britain was now in favour of Europe, particularly among the young. There was now an opportunity to create an organisation such, to take another historical parallel, as would have enabled the Greek city states to survive. A decision must now be made before the end of the year. The United Kingdom could not pay a price which would betray the loyalty which they owed to the Commonwealth. But if there was general agreement about the political desirability of British membership then he did not believe that this was an insoluble problem. The experience and resources of Western Europe must now be unified and harmonised to the best possible effect if the world was to avoid destruction. One day there would have to be a detente with the Soviet Union. This could only come about if that country developed into a European and not an Asiatic power. It was very important to encourage this development which a united Europe would foster.
The meeting ended at about 1.20 pm.
1 Pierre Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to Britain, 1898–1920.
[UKNA: PREM 11/4019]