Australian Embassy, Washington, 19 June 1962
1614. Confidential
I have had some very good talks here—in particular I had a long and, I think, encouraging discussion with the President and Ball.
2. The line I have been going on is that if Great Britain is, as a result of pressure from the Six or the United States, put ultimately to a choice between a series of 1970 precipice solutions or staying out of the Common Market this will represent a terrible dilemma. I have said that I think such a dilemma will be resolved by not going into the Common Market. I have been pressing the Americans to realize this and to understand that if they strongly desire Great Britain to go into Europe (as plainly they do), they must do their best to see that the price is not too high. I have made it clear that the argument is not one about words; that our proposals right through have involved a departure from the normal preferences and the substitution of comparable outlets of various kinds.
3. The President and Ball both agreed that the problems were not of theory but of practice. They both agreed that the adoption down the line of the precipice idea would be wrong and that ways and means of accommodation should be looked for. To use Ball’s words, they say for Britain not to go in would be catastrophic, but to have to go in on terms of serious injury to the Commonwealth would be equally catastrophic.
4. They showed considerable interest in combining with us in search of world solutions. As the President said to me—‘You and we, being both outside the European Common Market, want to preserve and extend our trade with the Market. We therefore have great interest in common and should sit down and try to devise practical means of ensuring our joint objective.’
5. I suggested that further consultations on the official level in the light of our discussions would be valuable. They both agreed. With your approval I will convey this to Westerman in London.
6. During today we are trying to hammer out a joint statement to be made by the President and myself. He seemed quite keen on this. Indeed, his whole attitude is most friendly. If time permits l will cable you the draft for your comments. If the clock is against me I will act independently.
NOTES ON DISCUSSION WITH MR BALL2 (MONDAY—18TH JUNE) TO BE READ lN CONJUNCTION WITH CABLE 1614—MENZIES TO MCEWEN
The following is not a complete account, but a record of leading observations or responses made by Mr Ball in the course of the meeting.
1. Mr Ball said that the last thing the United States wished to do was impart rigidity into the Britain–Europe negotiations. He believed that the Six would be flexible. He personally had said to the French and the Germans that the Treaty of Rome was fashioned out of a flexible approach on the part of the Six—many of these flexibilities being in the interests of France and Germany—and it was up to France and Germany to retain flexibility.
2. Mr Ball said that the United States has some special trade interests of their own which conflict with Australia’s interests. But these are limited in scope, and beyond them we have a great area of special interests in common. The last thing the United States wants to see is agricultural self-sufficiency in Europe. This means that there should be a search for world solutions.
3. The Prime Minister said that Australia was looking for a pragmatic approach. We did not wish to get caught up in arguments about words. He would hope that we could take it that both countries wanted not to conflict in theory but union in practice. Mr Ball said that he entirely agreed, and that we ought not to be carrying on discussions from behind doctrinaire barriers.
4. The suggestion made earlier at the meeting with the President, concerning technical discussions, was mentioned. The Prime Minister said that we would try to make Dr Westerman available. Mr Ball and his officials said that they agreed very much that Dr Westerman’s personal presence would be valuable. The officials could refine the technical matters for the Governments to look at.3
5. Mr Ball said that the United States’ position is that they would regard it as a catastrophe if the United Kingdom application to join Europe were to fail. This is in effect the third recent attempt at union with Europe in one form or other. If it does not succeed, the break will be such that it will be difficult for a long time to put all the pieces back into place. But he added that, having said this, it is also the United States’ position that it would be equally catastrophic if the British application succeeded at such cost to the Commonwealth that disruption in that quarter was precipitated. He believed that the line to be taken was the one the Prime Minister had been mentioning, i.e. to avoid dogmatic disputes. He added ‘it will be dereliction on our part if we do not do this’.
1 Menzies arrived in Washington in mid-June for a brief stop-over on his way home from Britain.
2 Compiled by Bunting.
3 See Document 196.
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