Canberra, 25 June 1962
Confidential
The Prime Minister reported to the Cabinet on his discussions in London and Washington on the Common Market.
2. He referred to the effective impact of the visit of the Minister for Trade, and of the statement at Brussels of the Secretary of the Department of Trade.1
3. He mentioned two specific questions which he had pressed upon British Ministers—first, the necessity that arrangements reached between Britain and the Six as negotiations proceed be understood, and described, as tentative pending consideration of the total package of arrangements at the time of the Prime Ministers’ meeting in September; and second, the unacceptability to Australia (and almost certainly to other Commonwealth countries) of a series of ‘solutions’ under which Commonwealth preferences and other special trading arrangements are phased out by 1970.
4. He mentioned also what he felt to be the uncertain state of opinion within Britain about joining the Treaty of Rome. He felt that there was no unanimity of mind in the public, or in the Parliament, or even in the Government. There were within the Government and elsewhere views which were completely and enthusiastically in support of joining. These views seemed to be based primarily on political considerations, but to some extent on economic judgment as well. Nevertheless, there were others who viewed the whole exercise, whether politically or economically, with scepticism. The Prime Minister felt unable to predict what attitude Britain would finally take. The ultimate price of entry, which could not yet be known, would plainly have a considerable effect.
5. Referring to his Washington discussions, the Prime Minister mentioned in some detail the joint communique issued by President Kennedy and himself, and the encouraging atmosphere exhibited in the communique and he talks behind it.2
6. He felt that he had reached agreement with the American leaders on the idea of United States and Australia forsaking doctrinal arguments, such as about preferences, and instead, getting to grips in practical fashion with actual commodity situations. He noted, and agreed with, the view of the United States that if Britain joins the European Economic Community, the United States and Australia, both being outside the Community, would have strong practical interests in common in securing from the Six, by influence and negotiation, the lowest possible tariff wall and as far as possible, outward-looking trade policies.
7. The Prime Minister mentioned specifically that the President agreed that the 1970 ‘precipice’ arrangements should not be stock pattern, and agreed further that Britain should not be presented with the alternative of joining the Common Market on terms of great injury to Commonwealth trade, or of staying out. The Prime Minister felt that Britain’s entry into the Common Market is (for political reasons largely, but indirectly for American aid and therefore balance of payments reasons also) much desired by the United States. It has a practical interest therefore in seeing that a course is worked out by the Six which will relieve Britain from a too painful choice between Europe and the Commonwealth.
8. The technical trade discussions, referred to in the communique, will be directed to working together for solutions for individual commodities or groups of commodities, either on a world solution basis, or on a basis which preserves for Australia, the United States and other third countries, their present competitive status.3
1 Documents 171 and 177.
2 Document 187.
3 See Document 196.
[NAA: A4940, C3616]