British High Commission, Canberra, 24 August 1962
Confidential
Mr Menzies dined privately with me on Monday evening and was in an expansive mood. I can now with confidence give some indications of his thinking on the present state of our Common Market negotiations, […] and of the line he seems likely to take at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
2. Mr Menzies and his Cabinet have not yet reached a final decision about their attitude and are unlikely to do so until just before he and Mr McEwen leave for London. From what he told me, however, I am satisfied that he has made up his own mind on the broad principles of his approach, and we can expect this to remain unchanged unless there are some unfortunate developments in London of the kind to which I shall refer at the end of this letter.
3. Mr Menzies’ brief, as he told me in so many words, is the speech he made in the House of Representatives on the 9th August, which he drafted himself, and of which you have a copy. A large part of his speech was devoted to the political aspects and he talked at length about these on Monday evening. He has long suspected that our main motives for wishing to join are political and he is now firmly convinced of this. These political considerations worry him personally, more, I should judge, than the economic factors. Although, he said in his speech, he is prepared to contemplate with approval a close co-ordination of high political policies between Britain and the Community, he told me that he was suspicious of some of its members. Any suggestion of Britain being absorbed into an organic European Federal Union would, in the words of his speech, be an unhappy thing to contemplate.
4. For the purpose of ensuring as smooth a passage as possible at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, his preoccupation with the political aspects of our entry is, perhaps, no bad thing. Our Ministers, being closer to the scene, will no doubt be able to bring powerful arguments to bear in support of our own assessment of the political necessities which have to be faced, and to reassure Mr Menzies on our attitude to anything like full1-scale federalism. In all this, it must be remembered that Mr Menzies’ regard for the Commonwealth is emotional. It will not be enough, I suggest, to dispose of the political issues in a primarily legalistic way on the grounds that the Treaty of Rome is not a political document and that we are not being asked to decide political issues at this juncture, the method which seems to have been employed with some success in meeting objections in Parliament. Mr Menzies is more likely to respond favourably if it can be demonstrated (as no doubt can more easily be done at a Prime Minsters’ Meeting) that the survival of the Commonwealth, as an important influence in the free world, in any shape or form depends on our following a particular political path. Were he convinced about this, (and I do not underestimate the difficulty of convincing him) Mr Menzies would probably find it easier to swallow the economic consequences.
5. This is not to say that the economic issues are or will be treated lightly by him. In his speech he refuted at some length the charges of exaggerating Australia’s case which have recently been made by Mr Bury and others, spelling out in some detail the impact on some of Australia’s main exports of the application of the Treaty of Rome as it now stands.1 But I suspect that in his secret heart he may well feel that the economic consequences for Australia may have been somewhat overplayed.
6. We know that Mr Menzies, for both personal and party political reasons, must appear to the Australian electorate to be a doughty fighter in Australia’s interests. Mr McEwen will be at his elbow and, having suffered something of a setback following the Bury episode, will be anxious to re-establish his reputation as Australia’s true champion. Mr Menzies seems bound to take the view that what we have got so far and what we seem likely to get in the end, falls a good bit short of what we and Australia hoped to get when we entered the negotiations. He might feel inclined to tell us that these terms did not in his view fulfil our promise to safeguard Australia’s vital interests. If he did so, however, he would run the risk of presenting Britain with the choice between Commonwealth and Europe, a choice which he has repeatedly said must be avoided. I do not, therefore, believe that he will go as far as this. Short of this we can expect him, in the words of his speech, ‘to do all we can by hard work and persuasion to ensure that the terms finally agreed to by the Six do the minimum of damage to the present and anticipated pattern of Commonwealth trade and of Australian trade in particular’.
7. Parts of the speech appear to hark back to solutions which officials at any rate recognise as being unattainable, but the way is left open for alternative courses which would secure to Australia the substance of her trade. During our talk on Monday evening, he told me that he did not believe that Australia could have preferences for ever, but that he would insist on some safeguards and he cited world agreements, provided these were sufficiently comprehensive, as offering the best prospects for certain commodities, of which he instanced wheat and sugar.
8. While, therefore, we can expect Mr Menzies to continue to urge Australia’s case with the utmost vigour, the more so if we appear in any way to play it down, we can, I feel, expect him to be sufficiently flexible in his approach to recognise that there are more ways than one of safeguarding Australia’s interests.
[ matter omitted ]
10. Mr Menzies told me in strictest confidence that he had received a letter from President Kennedy, a wonderful letter, he called it, in which the President had pointed out what a tremendous influence Mr Menzies would have on the forthcoming Prime Ministers’ Meeting.2 It is not hard to guess with what object this letter was written but despite the transparency of its timing I formed the impression that it might not be without influence on Mr Menzies’ attitude. He clearly sets great store by American goodwill for the Commonwealth, and towards Australia in particular, which he claims to have discovered and to have reinforced during his recent visit to Washington. His officials are more cynical about probable American motives.
11. Recent telegrams from Wellington reflect a recrudescence of the endemic suspicion which the two countries harbour for each other’s motives. Mr Menzies said nothing about this to me but I can well believe that he would find any sort of discrimination in favour of New Zealand difficult to swallow. However, he cannot really expect to find much sympathy in other quarters for this attitude.
12. Conversations which some of us have had with officials in the Prime Minister’s Department all tend to confirm the impressions which I gained from Mr Menzies himself. […] He hopes to avoid taking a leading part in the discussions in London and this was repeated by Bunting to Larmour3 a few days ago. His refusal to take part in a television interview about the Common Market with Mr Robin Day4 and to see Mr Peter Walker, MP5 is further evidence of his reticence, and of his unwillingness to risk embarrassing us.
13. Mr Menzies is certainly not going to London with his mind made up to deter us from joining. He will go with very real fears about the political future, fears which must be treated with great seriousness but which, unless he feels that they are being dealt with cavalierly, will not in the end affect his attitude towards our joining the Common Market as such. He will also go determined to get the best possible deal for Australia and to make us fight on her behalf as long as there remains in his view the slightest chance of improving on the terms offered or forecast. In telegram No. 544 we referred to the likelihood that Mr Menzies would want to play for time. Particularly in the light of what he hopes the Americans may achieve, I should expect him to support any developments at the meeting which would keep the position unresolved for some further period. But if a moment of decision is reached, then subject to what is said in the following paragraph, I should expect Mr Menzies to accept, without enthusiasm and probably with many personal misgivings, whatever we had convinced him was incapable of being improved upon.
14. In sum, I think Mr Menzies will ‘go quietly’. But we must ensure that he feels that we have done our utmost for him and for Australia. If he felt that he was being put into a position which would make it appear to the Australian people that he had let them down then there would be trouble with possible repercussions on British public opinion. [ … ]
1 Documents 198 and 199.
2 Kennedy wrote: ‘I suspect that the critical time for you may come at the meeting of the Prime Ministers in September. As I estimate Harold Macmillan’s political problem, and your own prestige, I think your position may well be decisive in the United Kingdom. What you clearly support, the backbenchers are not likely to fight, and what you cannot honorably accept, England will have to reject. I think this great responsibility has fallen to the right man’ (John F. Kennedy Library: POF/111, Folder 22, Kennedy to Menzies, 2 August 1962). Some days later, Menzies received a similar message from US Ambassador William C. Battle, expressing his ‘respect for the skill and responsibility with which the Australian Government has been advancing its interests with the UK and the Six’. Battle’s phrasing was somewhat more coercive: ‘We trust that Australia’s balanced approach and the statesmanlike position that the Australian Government is taking will set the tone for the important Prime Ministers’ Meeting in September’ (NAA: A1209/125 1961/1203 part I, Battle to Menzies, 6 August 1962).
3 Edward Noel ‘Nick’ Larmour, Counsellor, British High Commission, Canberra, 1961–64.
4 British political broadcaster and commentator.
5 Conservative Member for Worcester.
[UKNA: DO 159/61]