London, 4 September 1962
Secret
The Commonwealth and the Common Market
[ matter omitted ]
IV. Conference Tactics
33. While we can, therefore, reasonably claim to have honoured our promise to safeguard the vital trading interests of the New Commonwealth members and of the dependent territories, the same cannot as yet be said in respect of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
34. There is no good our imagining that we can persuade Mr Menzies, Mr Holyoake and Mr Diefenbaker to accept the Community’s assurances (in their present form) as fulfilling our oft-repeated undertakings to protect the interests of their countries. Any attempt by us to do so might fatally prejudice the prospect of securing their confidence and co-operation at the coming conference.
35. We should, of course, stress the great potential value of the promises obtained from the Six. On the other hand, we should (without waiting to have it dragged out of us) admit our disappointment that the Brussels proposals are couched in such general terms. We should point out that it was for that very reason that we did not commit ourselves in regard to the proposals for temperate foodstuffs to the same extent as we did in respect of other commodities, and that we specifically reserved our position, pending further consultations with the Commonwealth Governments concerned.
36. If the general line suggested above is adopted, it follows that we must make it clear at once to the three Old Commonwealth Prime Ministers that, when the negotiations in Brussels are resumed, we intend to press for some improvement on the present proposals for temperate foodstuffs.
37. From the standpoint of Commonwealth producers, the Brussels plan for temperate foodstuffs suffers from two main weaknesses:
(a) The objectives of the proposed world-wide agreements and of the Community’s future price policy are defined in such vague terms that they would not preclude the Community from using its price support mechanism to stimulate greatly increased home production at the expense of more efficient overseas producers.
(b) No safeguards are provided after 1970, in the event of international commodity agreements not having been concluded by that date. Faced with the prospect of what some have described as a ‘precipice’ on 1st January 1970, Commonwealth producers will be under severe pressure to conclude agreements on whatever terms the Community may dictate.
38. It is, therefore, suggested that we should concentrate on these two points, because:
- they go to the root of the problem and, if satisfactorily resolved, they would largely remove legitimate Commonwealth fears; and
- we are more likely to obtain from the Six improvements of substance by seeking clarifications and extensions of their own proposals than by attempting at this late stage to introduce some new approach.
Improvements to be sought
39. The Brussels proposals define the purpose of the world-wide commodity agreements on temperate foodstuffs only in the most general terms, namely to establish ‘the most suitable structure of international trade in agricultural products, in order to ensure an agreed balance between the interests of consumers and of producers in exporting zones and importing regions’. This will not fail to be compared unfavourably with the definition of the objectives of the proposed trade agreements with India and Pakistan, namely ‘to develop mutual trade for the purpose of maintaining and, as much as possible, increasing the level of the foreign currency receipts of these countries’.
40. The Six naturally do not regard the poverty-stricken and economically backward countries of Asia in the same light as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with their well-developed industries and high standard of life. Nor are they, of course, subjected to the same political pressures from their textile manufacturers as from their farming communities.
41. Nevertheless, they must by now have appreciated that no British Government could survive which attempted to take Britain into the Common Market without securing reasonable safeguards for the interests of its trading partners in the Old Commonwealth. On the other hand, the Six probably do not yet recognise that the general assurances they have offered are, in their present form, insufficiently precise to carry opinion in the Commonwealth countries concerned or at Westminster.
42. Whether we like it or not, the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Canada will undoubtedly make this clear to the world during or after the Commonwealth Conference in London. Therefore, since we know we shall not be able to persuade them otherwise and that we shall undoubtedly be obliged to make an attempt to get better terms from the Six, it would be unfortunate if the impression were given that we had tried to sell the Brussels proposals as they stand to the Old Commonwealth and had failed.
43. Instead, in our preparatory talks with Mr Menzies, Mr Holyoake and Mr Diefenbaker, we should try hard to agree upon a common approach, which could perhaps be embodied in the final communique. This might take the following form:
- We recall that at Brussels the Lord Privy Seal specifically reserved the British Government’s position with regard to temperate foodstuffs, pending consultation with the Commonwealth Governments concerned.
- In the light of the consultations which have now taken place, we agreed that the long-term solutions and transitional arrangements proposed by the Six are generally on the right lines.
- We welcome the assurances of principle given by the Six about future access to the Common Market for overseas producers and the spirit that has animated them.
- However, in order to allay genuine anxieties, the British Government will seek to obtain the agreement of the Six to a more precise definition of the objectives of the proposed international commodity agreements and of their assurances regarding the Community’s future price policy.
- The British Government intend also to discuss further with the Six what arrangements should be made in respect of commodities for which it may not prove possible to conclude international agreements before the expiry of the transitional period.
- In addition, the British Government will continue to press for nil tariffs on the major raw materials (aluminium, lead, zinc and newsprint) and to seek satisfactory arrangements for processed foods.
44. It will also be necessary to examine separately with Mr Holyoake the additional safeguards which might be asked for in respect ofNew Zealand, following upon the offer made by the Six to treat New Zealand as a special case.
45. If we are able in these preparatory talks to establish the basis for a common approach between ourselves and the Old Commonwealth Prime Ministers on the commodities of concern to them, and if we are able to convince them of the political importance of our entry into the Community, it should be possible to secure their active co-operation in guiding the other Prime Ministers and in persuading them to adopt a reasonable attitude towards the proposals relating to their countries.
[UKNA: CAB 133/262]