Australian High Commission, London, 28 November 1966
Confidential
Renewed Applications to the EEC
Background
A continuing acceleration to the momentum of Britain’s tentative moves towards a renewal of their application to join the EEC has been imparted over the last month. (There seems no need for a separate application to be made, as Mr McMillan’s [sic] original application is technically still in existence.)
2. The Cabinet met over the weekend of 22nd to 24th October at Chequers, and discussed the ‘deep probes’ which the Government had been carrying out in Europe for some months. Mr Brown and Mr Thompson appear to have been the main instruments for these probings.
3. There then followed a period when the Opposition urged the Government to make a Declaration of Intent. Mr Heath and Mr Wilson exhibited a noteworthy tendency to tear away at each other’s position over the re-opening of a British application for entry, although few substantial points were made by either of them. At the same time, there were press reports of restlessness on the issue from EFTA countries, notably Denmark.
Announcement of Desire
4. Finally on Thursday, 1Oth November, Mr Wilson announced in the Commons that further serious attempts would be made to join the EEC. Until this announcement, it was generally believed that the Cabinet was still evenly divided on the question, and that Mr Wilson remained opposed to joining. In making his announcement Mr Wilson said:–
‘I want the House, the country, and our friends abroad, to know that the Government are approaching the discussions I have foreshadowed with the clear intention and determination to enter EEC if, as we hope, our essential British and Commonwealth interests can be safeguarded. We mean business.’
He intended to make a new high level approach to see if the conditions for negotiations and entry exist.
5. EFTA was not to be neglected: ‘It is vital that we maintain the closest relations with our EFTA colleagues. The Government, therefore, now propose to invite the heads of government of the EFTA countries to attend a conference in London in the next few weeks to discuss the problems involved in moves by EFTA countries to join the EEC.’
6. This EFTA meeting is now planned to take place on 5th December at Lancaster House, preceded by dinner at Chequers on the Sunday evening. After this conference Mr Wilson and Mr Brown will ‘engage in a series of discussions with each of the Heads of Government of the Six, for the purpose of establishing whether it appeared likely that essential British and Commonwealth interests could be safeguarded if Britain were to join EEC.’
7. ‘In the light of these discussions, the Government will then take its decision on whether or not to activate the arrangements for negotiating for entry, and what the appropriate time for such negotiations would be. Commonwealth governments as well as EFTA governments, have been informed, and the closest degree of consultation will be maintained with them throughout.’
8. Mr Wilson’s announcement appeared to be a cautious Declaration of Intent, with several conditions. It did not suggest a future whole-hearted attempt to join the EEC at any price.
9. This cautious tone was somewhat less in evidence on the following Monday evening, 14th November, when the Prime Minister made his traditional speech at the Lord Mayor of London’s banquet. He generated some enthusiasm for the venture when he spoke of going forward with traditional British enterprise. ‘The tide is right, the time is right, the winds are right, to make the effort.’ He made a point, however, of saying that he could not guarantee success. The Prime Minister saw the present moment as providing an opportunity to increase British influence on world affairs. The anxieties of past years over British entry were now much less real. His audience (largely city people) must have been sympathetic to a move into Europe.
Party Meetings
10. There have been several meetings of the Parliamentary Labour Party to discuss the Prime Minister’s announcement. Press comment has indicated that little new has been revealed to the Labour MPs that could not be gleaned from other public statements. Opposition with [sic] the Party appears to have been relatively mild, coming mainly from left-wing trade union or ‘intellectual’ MPs.
Commons Debate
11. Although no motion was moved on the subject, the issue of British entry into the Common Market, in the context of the Prime Ministers announcement, was debated in the House on 16th and 17th November. A multitude of opinions were aired in the debate. It was clear that a majority of members of each Party were in favour of the Prime Minister’s initiative, although by far the strongest opposition came from members of his own Party.
12. There was some criticism of Mr Wilson’s change of heart, muted by the fact that the Opposition were pleased to see him pursuing their own course. There was also considerable probing from Opposition leaders and Labour backbenchers who wanted Mr Wilson to tell them what sudden change had taken place which made it possible to take this initiative. No one disagreed openly with the often expressed sentiment that General de Gaulle’s attitude was the key to the whole problem. At all times the Prime Minister and his Cabinet refused to reveal any of their terms and conditions for British entry.
13. In opening the debate Mr Brown (Foreign Secretary) argued that it was wrong to claim that Britain was joining Europe, rather Britain had always been part of Europe. The present initiative was designed to unify the Continent and to make Britain the leader. It was imperative for Britain to obtain a far larger market for her products. In return Britain could offer her vast industrial and technological know-how. There was no other alternative than to ‘go it alone’ or to look to some wider Atlantic grouping.
14. He maintained that Britain had always been indispensable to Europe and it was, therefore, unwise to assume that France ‘would want to be an obstacle to the establishment of a wider and more influential Europe’. The Government was resolutely opposed to changing its relationship with the United States and it had not yet been shown that anyone would refuse to negotiate because of this stand. He recognised that entry into the EEC would react adversely on our traditional suppliers, particularly in New Zealand.
15. Opening the debate for the Opposition was Sir Alec Douglas Home. He claimed that the debate might as well close down if the Prime Minister or the Government thought that they could any longer insist on Mr. Gaitskell’s five principles and on complete protection of Canadian, Australian and New Zealand markets. He rejected the possibility that the Prime Minister’s latest moves were simply a charade, for neither his nor his country’s reputation could survive such a cynical display. He claimed that ‘the Commonwealth are more reconciled to Britain’s entry than before … they realise the economic necessity for Britain to go in and multiply her wealth. Their prime need is capital for Commonwealth development and they know that we can only earn a surplus for investment on the scale required if we have a market greater than the Commonwealth itself can provide.’
16. ch veto. He warned that General de Gaulle does not represent all of France and that many French people who are holding their hands at the moment ‘will be open to the same sort of arguments as we should be’.
17. Mr Sandys agreed with Sir Alec that the Prime Minister’s notable change of heart on the issue must be genuine for it would be unlike him ‘to identify himself personally with a deliberately planned diplomatic failure’. He also agreed with the Prime Minister, in contrast to other Conservative Party leaders, that Britain’s chance existed now and warned that it might be the last. A left wing trade union Labour member, Mr Orme, charged that Mr Brown had used much stronger language in arguing against a political entity arising from the Common Market when speaking to a private Labour Party meeting than he had used in the House that afternoon. The implication of this charge was that Mr Brown was seeking to have both the Labour left wing and the European supra-nationalist countries on his side. The charge was denied by a Labour front bench spokesman.
[ matter omitted ]
22. Closing the first day’s debate for the Government, Mr George Thompson [sic] summarised the results of recent probes.
- The Governments of the Economic Community had been convinced of Britain’s sincere desire to join the EEC.
- A greater degree of understanding of British problems had been created.
- Britain had succeeded in getting better understandings of the problems of both EFTA and EEC.
He also expressed doubts about the future of a Britain outside Europe and the future of Europe without Britain. ‘Within this century certainly either Europe will be an under-developed area … or Europe’s countries will individually be in the position of technological satellites of one of the super-powers.’
23. The second day of the debate began with a speech from Mr Heath. He criticised the Government’s position in three ways. Ministers seemed to show a lack of understanding of the real nature and purpose of the EEC, they refused to recognise de Gaulle as the key to the whole situation and they were unable to put forward a realistic set of points for negotiation. He used the typical ‘European’ argument that Britain would not lose sovereignty, but gain by a pooling of her sovereignty with that of others. (Mr Wilson seems to have a different conception and has in the past said that to relinquish sovereignty must be considered in the light of the purpose for which it is relinquished.) Mr Heath emphasized that none of the EEC Governments would consider changing the Treaty of Rome, the system of external tariffs and the continuing abolition of internal tariffs, and the Common Agricultural Policy, which would lead to economic union. He asked that the Prime Minister should not only consult Commonwealth representatives but have personal meetings with them to negotiate Commonwealth arrangements. He challenged the Government to say where they stood on the issues of defence and political arrangements in the EEC, claiming that these will be the most essential parts of the Prime Minister’s talks. The Prime Minister gave an immediate reply, agreeing that these were important, ‘most of all in the French context’, but he did not think that the act of joining the EEC carried with it the implication that it would become a European Defence Community. Mr Heath then claimed that the problem of British entry could not be solved until Britain had come to terrns with President de Gaulle over future European defence. Britain should explore de Gaulle’s idea of a European defence community, for this no one had yet accomplished. His belief was that de Gaulle did not want a full European defence community, but some new relationship between the Western nuclear powers. He later hinted that this relationship would be that suggested by President Kennedy—one pillar from Europe and one from the United States. More than ever before Mr Heath presented a Gaullist and ‘European’ view. ‘What Europe is about is redressing the balance on the two sides of the Atlantic … in trade, finance, defence, and in political influence … Is Britain prepared to be a member of a Community which is deliberately setting out to do that?’
[ matter omitted ]
Arguments in Favour
30. There are a number of immediate factors which seem to be in favour of a move such as that made by the Government on the 10th November. Most top civil servants are now urging entry, as they cannot see any other viable position for Britain at the end of the century. All members of EFTA, and five members of the EEC are in favour of a renewed effort, and some have been pressing the Government for an initiative for some time. There is open support from a large majority in the Commons. The Government is badly in need of some measure to increase business confidence and to stimulate investment. By becoming a ‘European’ Mr Wilson could steal the thunder of both Mr Heath and his Party; he could cast President de Gaulle as a villain, if necessary, and also capture some of the initiative from him.
31. There is probably a feeling in Whitehall that Commonwealth partners could seize the initiative themselves by making other trading arrangements harmful to Britain and also toughening their bargaining position over trade with Britain. The Government is said to be suffering from a certain disillusionment with its partners in the Commonwealth and EFTA. Time is growing short for a credible British attempt, as the Community will crystallise most of its arrangements in the next year or two. Opinion throughout the country appears to be moving further in favour of British membership.
Arguments Against
32. The obviously unfavourable consequences of the Government’s recent moves are not so numerous. They include the possibility of further estrangement of the Commonwealth and the USA, and the danger that a quick rebuff from the French will leave the Government in a foolish position.
The Central Question
33. The mystery shared by all commentators at present is how to interpret Mr Wilson’s activities. His recent moves have been seen as:–
- a reconnaissance—a further, deeper probe designed to tempt the French into a favourable response;
- an insincere gesture simply for the record; or
- a genuine first step in an irreversible initiative designed to gain British entry at any cost but with every attempt to obtain the most favourable conditions.
Possibly (2) can probably be dismissed as too implausible and suitable only for propaganda by those who oppose Mr Wilson politically. The question of whether we are witnessing.a last extensive reconnaissance or the very first stage of renewed negotiations hinges on whether the British have received any definite encouragement from the French. There is no evidence of any response from the French as yet.
35. Attitudes to Australia
Fears for the future of Australian trade and the Anglo-Australian connection were mentioned by only a few of the speakers. New Zealand was often mentioned as needing special treatment and adequate safeguards for her economy, but many references by Conservative and Government leaders to Australia and the rest of the Commonwealth have implied that they can stand the shock and that their trade with Britain now has less importance than it did in 1961 to 1963. The moral of this seems to be that while New Zealand will be treated by the British as a special case, Australia is unlikely to be considered for concessions, being regarded as having a fundamentally sound position.
[NAA: A 1838, 727/4/1/3 PART 3]