Canberra, 29 March 1967
93. Secret
Britain and the EEC
As you will appreciate from the length of time taken to reply, departments have given careful consideration to your Savingram 3, some aspects of which have given them concern. 1
Departments are aware that the ‘Wilson round’ has aroused great public interest in Britain and the Six and is a favourite topic for press, radio and television comment and speculation.
Many authoritative speakers have also debated the issue in public.
2. In an atmosphere of this kind, it is not unnatural to feel that Australia should adopt a comparably outspoken attitude.
However doing so would be profitable only if it were consistent with the tactical requirements of policies adopted by the Australian Government.
3. Departments do not, and consider that we cannot afford to, consider the UK–EEC position in isolation.
It is necessary to strike a delicate balance between Government policy in this field, in the Kennedy round, in other international fields and in relation to the totality of Australian trade, economic and political aims and objectives.
Briefing material already passed to you has indicated the Government’s basic position on the question of the possible entry of Great Britain into the EEC.
In brief, it is as follows:–
- The decision to enter the EEC is one for Britain alone to take.
- The adoption by Britain of the Common External Tariff and the CAP as evolved so far, could cause serious damage to Australian industries. Preferences we now enjoy in the British tariff could become reverse preferences.
- If Britain decides to negotiate we hope she will press for terms and conditions to protect vital Australian trade interests.
4. The British Government, so far, has not announced an intention to negotiate and has carefully avoided specifying terms or conditions of entry. From this background the following answers emerge to the questions raised in your paragraph 11:
(A) No. Just as the question of whether or not to enter the Community is one for Britain alone, it is for Britain itself to convince the Six that it has the political will to do so. While we are sympathetic to the objective of political integration in Western Europe, the tangible economic effects of integration between the Six so far have not been favourable to us.
(B) No. We would wish you to avoid commenting on these matters at the present time.
(C) While it would seem unwise to comment on allegations that British entry poses only transitory problems for us, there is no reason why it should not be emphasised as occasion offers that Britain remains the main, and in some cases, virtually the sole market for many of our major agricultural products. (The Minister (commercial) has a copy of a letter to the special commercial adviser, London, which deals at length with subject).
(D) Any conditions Britain might wish to attach to her application for entry can be determined only by the British Government. Australia does not distinguish between the issues involved for us in British entry as major or minor, all are important.
1 Document 225.
[NAA: A 1838, 727/4/2 PART 6]