London, 14 July 1964
Top Secret
Base Facilities in the Far East
The Committee had before them a Secretary’s Minute covering a note by the Chief of the Naval Staff on base facilities in Australia.
Sir David Luce2 said that at their meeting on Tuesday, 30th June 1964, he had undertaken to let the Committee have some thoughts on the possible need for bases in Australia in the event of our having eventually to leave Malaysia. So long as confrontation continued we would no doubt be welcome in Malaysia, but if the pressure from Indonesia was removed there would sooner or later be a demand for us to give up our facilities. It was not enough for us to take the position that we would stay in Singapore as long as we could; we must face the virtual certainty of our eventual withdrawal. This should in turn lead us to consider what alternative base facilities we needed in the area and to encourage the Malaysians to make the necessary plans and preparations for the maintenance of their own security after our departure. If the Committee agreed, there might be advantages in his thoughts being taken into account in the study on the nature of military operations in the period 1968–1980 now being prepared by the Defence Planning Staff, and in the study being undertaken by the Planning Group set up by the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee to examine our long-term interests and needs in the Far East.
Lord Mountbatten said that he had regretfully come to the conclusion that, whatever we did, we could not halt the historical processes which led inevitably to the loss of our remaining bases in such places as Singapore and Aden. At present Singapore looked relatively secure, but only because of the Indonesian situation. There was little doubt that we would eventually have to leave it, but it was essential not to give currency at this stage to the idea that we were contemplating withdrawing in the near future. When the question of the possible establishment of an alternative base in Australia had been discussed with the Australians in 1962, they had formed an impression that we were preparing to reduce or abandon our commitments in the Far East, and this impression had only recently and with difficulty been dispelled. He suggested that a slow and carefully considered approach on the question of a base on Australian soil should be made to the Australians, possibly while he was attending the ANZAM Defence Committee Meeting in February 1965. Examination might show that there was no requirement for an extensive building programme but simply for the shared use of existing Australian facilities at ports and airfields, which might be available in view of the fact that fleets and air forces were generally decreasing in size. The development of a secure west-about air route might make it unnecessary to station United Kingdom troops permanently in Australia, though some sort of stockpile would probably be required.
In discussion the following point were made:–
(a) Possibly the most important question to be answered was whether, in the event of our having left Singapore, we would still have any significant commitment in South East Asia. If examination showed that at this stage our commitment in the Far East would be principally assisting in the defence of Australasia, there would be no requirement for a base in the sense of a main support area but only facilities at ports and airfields and for the temporary stationing on Australian soil of such United Kingdom forces as would be required.
(b) The paper implied that the Malaysians themselves would eventually be able to defend themselves without outside help. Assuming that Indonesia continued to receive Russian aid, it was very doubtful whether Malaysia could ever develop an equivalent potential. It was most unlikely, for example, that money would be available to provide sophisticated equipment such as high-performance aircraft. This might lead the Malaysians to look favourably on .any request from us to station ships or aircraft in Malaysia after we had handed over our bases.
(c) Mr Hasluck, Australian Minister for External Affairs, had said that Australia no longer looked to Great Britain for assistance in her defence since Great Britain no longer had the capacity to provide it. This statement revealed a disturbing Australian attitude, and should if possible be clarified during the visit of the Chief of the Defence Staff to Australia in February 1965.
Summing up, Lord Mountbatten said that the question of a base in Australia had since 1962 been left to the Australians to raise again, but he recommended that he should discuss it when he visited Australia in February 1965. It was most important that the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand should appreciate that even if we eventually had to leave Singapore we had no intention of abandoning Australasian interests. The paper before the Committee should be taken into account by the Defence Planning Staff in their study on future military operations and by their representative on the planning group of the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee, and in due course he would require a brief on the subject for his meeting with the Australians.
THE COMMITTEE:–
(1) Agreed with the remarks of the Chief of the Defence Staff in his summing up.
(2) Instructed the Defence Planning Staff to take account of the paper in their study on the nature of military operations in the period 1968–1980 and in the study being undertaken by the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee on our long-term interests in the Far East.
(3) Instructed the Defence Planning Staff to prepare a brief on the subject for the Chief of the Defence Staff before his visit to Australia in February 1965.
1 COS 47(64)7, Confidential Annex.
2 UK First Sea Lord, 1963–66, who resigned in 1966 together with Christopher Mayhew, the Navy Minister, over the Labour Government’s decision to cancel the CVA–01 Aircraft Carrier Programme.
[UKNA: DEFE 25/105]