Canberra, 14 July 1964
Top Secret
Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy
Introduction
1. The ultimate aim of Australia’s defence policy is to ensure the security of the Australian mainland and its island territories. This policy has been based on a forward defence strategy to hold South East Asia, thus providing Australia with defence in depth. Australia has participated in collective defence arrangements, thereby contributing to the security of more immediately threatened countries in South East Asia, and generally protecting the interests of Australia.
2. This appreciation reviews the strategic basis of our defence policy. It has been projected, as far as practicable, over the period of ten years up to 1974 to highlight likely trends in our strategic situation.
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The threat
37. The threat to Australia’s strategic interests and forward defence position on mainland South East Asia, including Malaysia, stems from the strength of internal communist parties and from Chinese communist expansionist aims, from North Vietnam and from Indonesia. The only direct threat to Australia and its territories is from Indonesia as discussed below.
38. Communism is exerting a relentless pressure in the area backed by very strong military forces. Increasing communist led insurgency in the strategically important areas of Laos and South Vietnam endangers indirectly the entire South East Asian mainland. The spread of the threat will depend to a large degree on whether a political structure can be set up in South Vietnam which can enable the government to retain her pro-United States position and to resist successfully the Viet Cong. The chances of success against the Viet Cong are not good. In the event of the establishment in South Vietnam of a government united or in close relations with North Vietnam, the Lao and the Burmese would be strongly tempted to follow the Cambodians in seeking a closer accommodation with the Communist Chinese. The communists could then concentrate their efforts on Thailand.
39. Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia has as one of its aims the removal of the Commonwealth presence including the bases. So long as the bases are available and Commonwealth forces support Malaysia there is little prospect of Indonesian success by military action.
40. Australia could become involved in war if Indonesia underestimated Commonwealth reaction to her confrontational activities against Malaysia. In these circumstances, Indonesian reaction might be to mount small scale air and sabotage raids against Darwin or possibly raids against the Cocos and Christmas Islands. Current Commonwealth planning contemplates that most of Indonesia’s naval and air capacity could be quickly destroyed by Commonwealth forces, though her large Army would still be intact. There would be some threat to Australian lines of communications in or near the operational area, and the possibility of sporadic attacks against Australian shipping and of mining of focal areas by a few submarines.
41. The Indonesian geographical location coupled with her extravagant claims to air space and territorial waters pose a threat to Australia’s defence interests, particularly our air and sea communications to South East Asia.
42. Indonesia will show an increasing interest in Papua/New Guinea. Early in the period her efforts could take the form principally of covert and propaganda activities, to prepare for later opportunities which might eventually arise out of dissident movements and the strains of social and political change. Activities early in the period could also include the development of intelligence, subversive activities in the villages and harassing measures in border areas. Later in the period should relations between Australia and Indonesia seriously deteriorate, these activities could intensify. If Indonesia succeeded in exploiting internal differences or subverting elements of the population an insurgency situation could develop in Papua/New Guinea. In addition there is a chance that, if the United States were heavily committed elsewhere, Indonesia might be tempted to step up her activity to a type of military confrontation similar to that now being conducted in Borneo. Further, if Papua/New Guinea were to become independent during the period its vulnerability to Indonesian pressures would be greatly increased, particularly as the ANZUS treaty would no longer apply directly to the defence on Papua/New Guinea, although it would still apply in the event of an overt attack on Australian forces there.
43. If in the longer term the allied strategy of forward defence failed to contain communism on the South East Asian mainland, Indonesia would have great difficulty, even if she so desired, in resisting communist pressures. The United States gives a high priority to trying to avoid the transfer of power in Indonesia to a communist regime. In recent years the United States’ calculation of what was necessary to avoid this risk led the United States to show tolerance of Sukarno’s policies and to move to bring about the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesian control subject to United Nations approval. Moreover, the United States has for some time been reluctant to express open opposition to Indonesian policies. In a situation, therefore, in which communist regimes have acquired control on the South East Asian mainland by processes short of overt aggression by China or North Vietnam, we should expect American political policy to be applied to persuading the Sukarno regime, or what follows from it, to refrain from aligning itself with any of the communist powers. It is not to be assumed that Australian and United States assessments of the risks involved in conciliation of Indonesia in these circumstances would always coincide.
44. If, through a combination of external pressures and internal struggle, the Government of Indonesia became communist, the threat to Australia would vary largely according to the nature and extent of Indonesia’s alignments with other communist powers (particularly the Soviet Union and China). If Indonesia aligned itself with Communist China, a threat to Australia’s independence and security could develop. The extent of such a threat would depend on such matters as the priority which Indonesia and China would give to the elimination of an anti-communist government in Australia, the military risk which Indonesia in particular would be prepared to accept in facilitating direct attacks on Australia, and the risk that either country would accept of American or British retaliation which could include nuclear weapons. The ANZUS Treaty would remain a deterrent against direct attack on Australia and her territories.
45. While Communist China will seek to avoid war she might take the risk if she assessed that there was a danger of a hostile presence on her southern frontiers. The unpredictability of Indonesia makes war with her a possibility for Australia at any time over the Malaysian confrontation issue. During the period commitment of forces by Australia in concert with her allies could be required to deal with an insurgency situation in one or other areas of the South East Asian mainland and Malaysia, on a scale which could approach the proportions of a limited war. In Papua/New Guinea it is conceivable that, before the end of the period, an insurgency situation stimulated and assisted by Indonesia could also require the commitment of Australian forces.
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General strategic concept
65. From the foregoing we assess that continued participation with our allies in the maintenance of a forward defence policy of holding mainland South East Asia against communist expansion is the best course of action to be followed by appropriate military, political and economic measures. In addition from now on Australia must be prepared to respond immediately to situations which might arise at any time from Indonesia’s expanding military capability and aggressive policy which also threaten our forward defence posture.
66. Developments in South East Asia, such as the possible loss of South Vietnam and of bases in Malaysia, could threaten the allied forward defence posture but it will be in our national interests to preserve this position in South East Asia for as long as possible in Thailand or elsewhere. For this purpose contributions to our treaty and defence arrangements must be seen to be commensurate with our national interests and resources.
67. It will no doubt be Australia’s policy to endeavour to preserve friendly relations with Indonesia but this aim is not likely to be achieved unless we speak or negotiate from a position of strength in our own right. This requires in being demonstrably strong Australian forces with an offensive capacity sufficient to deter Indonesia from actions inimical to our interests. This would also provide an earnest of our endeavours to our allies.
68. If, in the longer term, our forward defence posture in South East Asia is lost and an unfriendly or communist Indonesia linked with communist South East Asia or armed by the U.S.S.R. confronts Australia, there would be a need primarily for sea and air power to defend our shores and lines of communication, supported by land forces able to counter any enemy force which succeeded in making a landing on the mainland or crossing our border in Papua/New Guinea. Such a serious situation would not develop quickly. Time would be available in which to determine in concert with our United States and other allies an alternative military strategy but we would need to adapt and expand our forces rapidly to meet the changing circumstances.
69. The range of likely military situations Australia must now be prepared to face has increased in number and complexity as a result of recent Indonesian policies and the further encroachment of communist influence in the SEATO Treaty protocol States, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
70. Situations short of limited war for which Australia should be prepared to provide forces without prejudice to a limited war capability are:—
(a) the support of Malaysia against Indonesian confrontation or a resurgence of communist terrorist activities;
(b) the support of SEATO counter insurgency plans;
(c) bilateral military assistance in mainland South East Asia such as to South Vietnam and Thailand;
(d) covert Indonesian activity in Papua/New Guinea;
(e) United Nations peace-keeping tasks.
None of these situations are likely to be of short duration and some could extend over several years.
71. Australian military forces are already deployed on cold war/counter insurgency tasks in Malaysia, South Vietnam and Thailand. Throughout the period, if limited war does not occur, it is likely that there will be increasing demands on our military forces to contribute to cold war/counter insurgency situations. There is a need for a capacity not only to be able to contribute to all those situations listed above but also to relieve and sustain those contributions we have accepted. The United Nations peace-keeping tasks are rated a lower priority. In relation to Papua/New Guinea we must have readily available forces capable of meeting a serious covert situation which later in the period could develop into military confrontation in border areas similar to that now being conducted by Indonesia in Borneo.
72. Limited war situations for which Australia must be prepared are:—
(a) communist aggression in mainland South East Asia covered by SEATO plans or alternate plans developed in concert with the United States or other allies;
(b) Indonesian aggression against Malaysia or interference with our bases or lines of communication;
(c) open hostilities later in the period with Indonesia over Papua/New Guinea.
73. The duration of a SEATO limited war would depend to a great extent on the strategy and counter-offensive intentions of the United States but it could be quite lengthy. War against Indonesia would probably be shorter as current ANZAM planning is to destroy Indonesia’s offensive air and naval capability within a week after hostilities commence. This would still leave Indonesia with a large residual ground force capability but Commonwealth air and naval forces would be able to isolate this capability within the island territories.
74. Our treaty and defence alliances are likely to remain effective in limited war and the powerful forces of the United States and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom deployed in or close to the South East Asian area will continue to be a strong deterrent to overt aggression. Australia will not become involved in limited war in a SEATO situation unless with our allies. In such a war our lines of communication to the mainland of South East Asia would be protected under specific military agreements with our allies made in accordance with SEATO plans. Similarly, in a war with Indonesia resulting from the Malaysian issue we would have the support of allies. There would not be the same certainty of allied support if we were to become engaged in hostilities with Indonesia developing from say an insurgency situation in Papua/New Guinea. It is not certain that the assistance we would receive from the United States under ANZUS in such hostilities would necessarily extend to the provision of armed forces. The degree of United States involvement would depend on the importance she attached to the international issues concerned, the scale of the hostilities and on her assessment of whether hostilities were likely to spread.
75. Our forces should be developed with particular emphasis on speed of response to enable Australia to make an adequate contribution to a war arising from a SEATO situation on the mainland of South East Asia or to a war against Indonesia. If both situations developed concurrently our priority of effort would have to be decided in consultation with our allies, particularly the United States. Our capability should also be sufficient to counter any likely Indonesian activities against our own territory or interests. This would also provide the forces needed for a cold war/counter insurgency situation. Forces in Australia for the relief of those already deployed are also essential. Forces developed on these lines would be adequate to deal initially with overt aggression by Indonesia against Australian territory.
76. As our potential enemies will have the initiative it is essential that Australian forces should have ample capacity, mobility and flexibility for a fast and effective response. The necessary strategic and tactical mobility to make this response is of the utmost importance in our defence preparedness. A speedy response also emphasizes the need for the provision in peace of war reserves to sustain them in operations. The scale of war reserves will depend on the lead-time for the procurement of supplies either in Australia or overseas.
77. Having regard to the present strategic situation and our treaty arrangements in which our most powerful allies have a nuclear capability there is no immediate requirement for an Australian nuclear capability. Nevertheless our military thinking does not exclude the possible contingency in the longer term, that, due to advances in military technology or to the development of a more serious threat of direct attack on Australia, such a capability in some form might be required for our security, or indeed for our national survival. Our forces should have as far as possible a potential capability to operate with nuclear weapons and in the face of nuclear opposition. However, in the period under review, the main requirement is to concentrate on improving the strength and effectiveness of our forces in the conventional field.
78. To attain the degree of national preparedness envisaged by this review will call for increases in our present defence forces, their arms and equipment and their means of strategic and tactical mobility. These increases can not be achieved quickly. The acquisition of some items of modem equipment particularly ships and aircraft, the training of personnel in their use, which must be phased in with the introduction into service of the equipments concerned, and the raising and training of new units, constitute a lengthy process. It could take from five to seven years to complete the likely changes required in our present Order of Battle.
1 The report was submitted to Cabinet for consideration (submission no. 493) by the Minister for Defence, Shane Paltridge, who observed in a covering note, ‘This report indicates a further substantial deterioration in Australia’s strategic position has taken place since the review at the beginning of last year.’ The range of military situations facing Australia had increased in number and complexity as a result of Indonesian policies and the further encroachment of communist influence in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
[NAA: A1945, 83/2/9]